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Abstract
This thesis presents new algorithms and hardware designs for Signature-based Net-
work Intrusion Detection System (SB-NIDS) optimisation exploiting a hybrid hardware-
software co-designed embedded processing platform. The work describe concentrates
on optimisation of a complete SB-NIDS Snort application software on a FPGA based
hardware-software target rather than on the implementation of a single functional unit
for hardware acceleration. Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA) based on
Bloom filter was designed to optimise SB-NIDS performance for execution on a Xilinx
MicroBlaze soft-core processor. The Bloom filter approach enables the potentially large
number of network intrusion attack patterns to be efficiently represented and searched
primarily using accesses to FPGA on-chip memory. The thesis demonstrates, the via-
bility of hybrid hardware-software co-designed approach for SB-NIDS. Future work is
required to investigate the effects of later generation FPGA technology and multi-core
processors in order to clearly prove the benefits over conventional processor platforms
for SB-NIDS.
The strengths and weaknesses of the hardware accelerators and algorithms are analysed,
and experimental results are examined to determine the effectiveness of the implemen-
tation. Experimental results confirm that the PMHA is capable of performing network
packet analysis for gigabit rate network traffic. Experimental test results indicate that
our SB-NIDS prototype implementation on relatively low clock rate embedded process-
ing platform performance is approximately 1.7 times better than Snort executing on
a general purpose processor on PC when comparing processor cycles rather than wall
clock time.
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SPI Stateful Packet Inspection
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
SRT Snort Rule Tree
SSL Secure Socket Layer
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TFN Tribe Flood Network
ToS Type of Service
TTL Time to live
UDP User Datagram Protocol
US-CERT United States-Computer Emergency Readiness Team
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
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Introduction
This thesis is about optimisation of Signature-based Network Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem (SB-NIDS) packet analysis speed. A complete SB-NIDS prototype is presented,
developed using hybrid hardware-software embedded processing platform.
1.1 Background and Problem Overview
One of the effective ways to secure computer networks from the attacks is the network
defence software technology such as Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). NIDS
has been widely adopted in the business and government sector to secure computer
networks by detecting different kinds of network attack as well as detection of illegal
access to confidential data and resources. Although NIDS is a good network defence
software, on high data rate networks such as gigabit rate its performance is poor. It is
unable to analyse all traffic as network packets arrive faster than NIDS packet analysis
speed. Consequently, NIDS packet buffer fills very quickly and force it to drop some
packets without analysis in order to make more space in buffer for new packets. For
example, SB-NIDS software package Snort when executed on Intel Xeon Dual-Core
2.0 GHz general purpose processor and test with network test data which requires 175
concurrent Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connections is only able to analyse
network traffic up to 566 Mbps throughput [2, 3]. The main reasons for slow packet
analysis rate are the complexity of network packet analysis operations and frequent
memory accesses. These operations typically involve bit masking, bit comparison, bit
shifting that general purpose processor instruction sets do not support efficiently. Also
frequent memory accesses on these loosely coupled processor architectures consume a
relatively high number of CPU clock cycles (100s) if a cache miss occurs (Section 6.3).
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Various attempts have been made to optimise SB-NIDS packet analysis speed (Chap-
ter 3). Most of the current state of the art solutions optimise only specific computation-
ally intensive parts or components of SB-NIDS software (Section 3.5). Some solutions
use clusters of processors and high performance embedded processing platforms in or-
der to optimise a complete SB-NIDS application (Section 3.4.1). Commercial NIDS
solutions based on embedded processing platforms use high specification embedded pro-
cessing hardware. They claim to provide a complete SB-NIDS solutions with a support
of up to 10 Gbps network throughput (Section 2.4.5). Still a great deal of work needed
to be done to support NIDS packet analysis throughput preferably over 10 gigabit rate
as network data rates continuously increasing such as recently approved IEEE 802.3ba
standard which supports 40 Gbps and 100 Gbps transmission rate [4].
1.2 Solution Synopsis
A prototype SB-NIDS using hybrid hardware-software embedded processing platform
was developed to enable high speed packet analysis. To support this effort, an open
source and widely used SB-NIDS software package Snort was used. An execution analysis
of Snort was carried out using software profiling tools in order to identify bottlenecks in
packet analysis. Based on the profiling results, the most suitable embedded processing
platform was selected. This embedded platform is a hybrid hardware-software processing
solution having tightly coupled hardware architecture to enable low clock cycle accesses
to hardware peripherals such as Network Interface Cards (NICs) and memory. It also
allows hardware accelerator development in Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
and multi-processing using MicroBlaze soft processing cores. One of the main goals of
hardware accelerator development is to offload any computationally significant operation
of a software from a CPU to FPGA. FPGA provides parallelism, pipelining and bit-
level processing facility, and has great potential to reduce and/or remove performance
bottlenecks in SB-NIDS software. Multi-processing facility can be applied to SB-NIDS
packet analysis process in order to improve the overall SB-NIDS processing efficiency
although this is not investigated in this thesis.
Prototyping and optimisation was carried out in stages. Initially, Snort was ported to
the embedded processing platform. This involved Snort software architecture restructur-
ing in order to successfully map and execute to new processing platform which is based
on Xilinx MicroBlaze soft-core processor and FPGA. This prototype is called as Manch-
ester Metropolitan University-Snort I (MMU-Snort I ). MMU-Snort I performance on
new processing platform then evaluated to identify any improvement or bottlenecks in
packet analysis processes. Test results showed that prototype SB-NIDS or MMU-Snort I
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
execution speed has improved when compared with the CPU clock cycles of the original
Snort software package when executed on a PC with a general purpose processor.
In the next stage pattern matching algorithm performance was optimised. This involved
development of Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA) and its integration
into Snort prototype or MMU-Snort I. This resulted in the second prototype called
MMU-Snort II. PMHA provides high throughput and low memory pattern matching
solution using a Bloom filter data structure based approach which allows quick lookup
of keywords or patterns [5]. The size of the attack signatures is significantly reduced
to the extent that the whole attack pattern represented as Bloom filter is stored to
FPGA on-chip memory/Block Random Access Memory (BRAM) for quick checking
of signature presence in packet payload data. Aditionally, full database of patterns is
stored in off-chip Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory (SDRAM) for further
signature checking in case a signature stored in FPGA BRAM is found in a packet during
first stage of pattern lookup. This is because Bloom filter search approach can provide
false positive matches for pattern lookup. The integration of PMHA into MMU-Snort I
required further design changes, resulting in an optimised and integrated PMHA for
Snort on the same processing platform. In the last stage, PMHA was further optimised
to search efficiently longer patterns (> 64 Bytes) and for fast pruning of Bloom filter
false positive matches which resulted in MMU-Snort III prototype.
In summary, investigation and development of complete SB-NIDS prototype using hy-
brid hardware-software processing platform is presented here, with a focus on the added
benefits of throughput and reduced memory requirements. A full description of the
architectures and algorithms is presented in this thesis. In addition, a detailed per-
formance analysis and experimental results are used to demonstrate the suitability of
hybrid hardware-software platform for SB-NIDS execution, higher throughput support
and smaller memory requirements.
1.3 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this research project is to develop a series of algorithms and hardware
architectures for SB-NIDS in order to optimise its packet analysis speed.
1.3.1 Objectives
In order to achieve this aim; following research objectives have been identified:
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• Design and implement SB-NIDS prototype that perform network packet analysis
at higher speed than Snort on general purpose processor.
• Evaluate SB-NIDS prototype using publicly available data for SB-NIDS testing
and identify packet analysis speed improvement and/or any performance issues.
• Gain efficiency and/or improve SB-NIDS packet analysis speed by offloading pat-
tern matching from CPU to FPGA that search one of the largest attack patterns
preferably at gigabit data rate.
• Use Snort application specific knowledge (Section 5.2.2) to improve pattern match-
ing (PMHA) performance further by reducing number of pattern search per packet.
• Evaluate PMHA implementation using publicly available test data for SB-NIDS
in order to to verify its performance improvement.
1.4 Contributions and Claims
The primary objective of this effort is the development of SB-NIDS prototype solution
using one of the viable embedded hybrid hardware-software processing platforms. The
main challenge faced in the development on this platform is the design and implemen-
tation of a full SB-NIDS while improving the performance needed by the state of the
art networks of today. This embedded processing platform is flexible as it not only al-
lows the execution of complete software applications such as SB-NIDS on an embedded
processor but also supports software optimisation, and enables the offloading of pro-
cessing from a CPU to FPGA hardware and multi-processing with multiple processing
cores. It also enables overall improvements in packet analysis speed of SB-NIDS due
to tightly coupled hardware architecture in which hardware peripherals like Ethernet
network interface have significantly lower latency access to network data and the CPU
performs relatively fast off-chip memory accesses requiring tens of clock cycles in com-
parison to hundreds of clock cycles on general purpose processor architectures. The
platform memory hierarchy arrangement in low-to-high clock cycles memory access sort
order are, FPGA BRAM, off-chip Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) and off-chip
Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory (SDRAM). This allows further improve-
ments in the SB-NIDS performance by storing frequently access data such as network
attack patterns or signatures to low latency access memory. Overall the processing plat-
form features is found to be viable to implement the SB-NIDS. Also, flexible hybrid
hardware-software processing and scalability in terms of multiple processing cores are
ideal for further optimisation of other SB-NIDS components that are bottlenecks on high
speed packet analysis. The idea presented in this thesis is a prototype SB-NIDS solution
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that is intended to demonstrate the suitability of hybrid hardware-software processing
for SB-NIDS execution, optimisation and further research and development.
Initially a study of Snort SB-NIDS software architecture was carried out in detail to un-
derstand the packet analysis mechanism and processing requirements, this study was
then used to restructure Snort architecture for porting and optimisation on hybrid
hardware-software processing platform, and in this way a novel SB-NIDS prototype
architecture called MMU-Snort I on this platform was devised. In the next stage MMU-
Snort II was developed which involved the development of special PMHA and algorithm
suitable for low memory hardware that can also be easily integrated with MMU-Snort I.
This effort tempts the development of a algorithm that reduces the amount of large
memory required to store the attack signatures and reduces the pattern matching com-
putational time to enable high speed pattern search in payload. The primary benefit
attained through this which also advances the state of the art, is the compression of the
whole attack signatures that fit on-chip FPGA memory for performing quick filtering
or lookup, less computations required for pattern search than other closely related state
of the art solutions that were implemented using bloom filter based pattern matching
technique, and a complete SB-NIDS prototype based on one of the effective and widely
used open source SB-NIDS, which when further optimise in future using multiple pro-
cessing core and also migrate to a recent and more advanced hybrid hardware-software
processing platform will enable the high data rate network protection.
The strengths and weaknesses of the architecture and algorithms were analysed, and
experimental results were obtained to determine the effectiveness of the implementation.
The resulting contributions of this work are:
• A novel SB-NIDS prototype based on one of the effective and widely used open
source SB-NIDS software package Snort prototyped on a hybrid hardware-software
processing platform for further research, development and optimisation.
• A PMHA that compactly store 7876 unique attack patterns in 8 KB of FPGA
BRAM using Bloom filter search approach that supports quick lookup of packet
data for checking pattern presence.
• An application specific PMHA design which also integrated into prototype SB-
NIDS that supports parallel pattern search in a packet payload up to 1.85 Gbps
throughput.
• An inclusion of Snort application specific knowledge or logic to PMHA that reduces
the number of packet data lookup in Bloom filter stored in FPGA BRAM for 45 %
of SB-NIDS attack signatures 1.
1A JAVA program is written to count the percentage of application specific information.
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• An adoption of technique to Bloom filter search approach that reduces the number
of hash value computation required by the Bloom filter based search algorithm [6].
The PMHA computes only two hash value in this implementation which produces
the same Bloom filter false positive rate as with ten hash values.
1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis describes a solution to the problem presented in section 1.1. Chapter 2
is the detail discussion on network security issues and technologies. Chapter 3 is the
summary and discussion of the state of the art SB-NIDS and pattern matching solutions.
Chapter 4 is the proposed system architectures detail. Chapter 5 is the design and
implementation details of SB-NIDS (MMU-Snort I) and PMHA (MMU-Snort II and
MMU-Snort III). Chapter 6 presents the analyses and results which include comparison
of all three prototypes performance in order to estimate performance improvements.
This also include comparison of the results with the closely related state of the art
PMHA. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the findings and provides some insight into future
directions.
Chapter 2
Background
“Whoever thinks his problem can be solved using cryptography,
doesn’t understand his problem and doesn’t understand cryptography
(Arritributed by Roger Needham and Butler Lampson to each other)”
The statement above is also relevant for current state of the art computer security de-
fence mechanisms such as Firewalls and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Currently, no
effective solution exists for all network security problems and in some situations defence
mechanisms are themselves vulnerable to network attacks and/or their failure may lead
to complete failure of a network. To understand the scale of network security problems,
issues concerning network security threats and defence mechanisms are discussed in de-
tail in this chapter. The current state of the art in network security technologies are
presented in (Chapter 3).
2.1 Chapter Roadmap
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows:
• In section 2.2, range of network security issues are discussed concerning two core
problems: flaws in network protocol design with reference to the Internet Protocol
suite (also known as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP))
and vulnerabilities in software applications and Operating Systems (OS). Other
network security threats (Malwares such as Viruses, Worms and Spywares) are
discussed briefly to clarify and quantify the scale of network security problems.
• In section 2.3, core network defence mechanisms are discussed to illustrate counter
measures deployed against common network security attacks.
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• In section 2.4, the main issues concerning Intrusion Detection System (IDS) tech-
nology, limitations and performance are explained in detail. The discussion main
focus is Signature-Based Network Intrusion Detection System (SB-NIDS) technol-
ogy.
2.2 Network Security Issues
The increasing frequency of cyber crimes and computer hacking attacks such as Denial of
Services (DoS) and phishing attacks are indicated by [7–10]. Further, a recent malware
(Section 2.2.3) attack on the University of Exeter (UK) computer network resulted in
the shut down of their entire campus network service [11]. Such problems have occurred
in domains including banking, financial services and retail. Network security problems
are compounded by a heavy reliance on Web for accessing everyday services such as
bill payments and online shopping transactions. Consequently, web based services are
an attractive targets for hackers whose goal is to steal personal financial details. The
hackers themselves are competent, but a big part of problem is actually the “Internet”
itself as explained by Professor Ross Anderson,
“The Internet protocol suite was designed for a world in which trusted
hosts at universities and research labs co-operated to manage networking
in a co-operative way [12].”
Consequently, the Internet was not designed to support secure online services. Flaws
such as easy to manipulate key packet values (Internet Protocol address, Port number
etc) in the “Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP)” hinder the provision of effective mecha-
nisms to deal with network security issues. Further, software application vulnerabilities
enables hackers to install malware on computers in order to create large distributed
collections of hacked machines (botnets) that are deployed to launch Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks on computer systems or services (Figure 2.1).
Network attacks 
core reasons
Flawed network 
protocol design
Vulnerabilities in
software systems
Figure 2.1: Two core reasons of network attacks
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2.2.1 Flawed Internet Protocol Design
Network protocols such as IP, TCP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), and Hyper-
text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) are the core protocols for packet based communication
over the Internet. These protocols and others such as Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Protocol,
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) have lead to the
development of online network services such as file sharing, electronic media streaming
and financial payment systems. The secure provision of such services is challenging be-
cause they are built on top of IP protocol which is itself flawed. These protocols do not
directly provide authenticity or confidentiality protection. Thus, knowledgeable users
can exploit basic sniffer programs to inspect network packets and even to manipulate
critical protocol features inside packets such as IP addresses, ports and payload data
values. Protocol based network attacks exploit authenticity and confidentiality issues
and may involve manipulation of packets in order to launch:–
• Denial of Services (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
• Forgery attacks
• Session Hijacking attacks
In the following sections, protocol based attacks are discussed in order to demonstrate
the exact nature of problems and flaws with Internet protocols.
Denial Of Service (DoS) Attacks
Definition: DoS is an attack on critical network resources such as routers, OS, appli-
cation servers, network links aimed at disrupting their normal function.
DoS attacks can bring down critical network resources and normally results in commu-
nication disruption and service access denial to legitimate hosts.
Classification: Typically DoS attacks strive to deplete available processing and net-
work bandwidth resources which Hussain et al suggested to classified into: software
exploits and flooding attacks [13] (Figure 2.2).
Software exploits are a direct attack on critical network computing equipments (Routers,
Switches, Server machines etc.) whereas Resource depletion attacks aim to deplete
computational processing resources. A TCP SYN DoS attack sends a succession of
SYN requests to a server (Section 2.2.1) 1. The goal of this attack is to cause memory
1TCP SYN packet used in three way TCP handshake process between two machines for establishing
TCP connection.
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Denial of Service
Packet FloodingSoftware Exploits
Figure 2.2: Denial of Service classification
and processing resource depletion in order to prevent new legitimate requests for TCP
connections to open and/or for those currently open to fail to make progress on the
machine under attack. A flooding or bandwidth depletion attack is an attempt to deplete
network link bandwidth by sending a high volume of network packets. In this type of
attack, an attacker floods the target network with network packets that completely
occupies the network bandwidth and does not let the legitimate user to get connected
to the network (Figure 2.3).
Denial of Service
Bandwidth DepletionResource Depletion
Figure 2.3: Denial of Service second classification
Network Protocols in DoS Attacks
DoS attacks are typically carried out using lower level network protocols: TCP, Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and IP. Some of
these protocols used for DoS attack identified by Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT) are [14]:
• TCP attack
• ICMP Ping of Death attack
• UDP flood attack
DoS attacks are not limited to this list of protocols but can also be carried out using IP
packet by exploiting fragmentation and reassembly feature of IP packet.
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DoS Attacks Using TCP
TCP is a connection oriented session level protocol for reliable duplex communication
over the Internet. Many web services on the Internet utilise TCP. Such web services are
hosted on server machines with potentially hundreds and thousands of client machines
simultaneously connected via TCP protocol. Server machines must have high computa-
tional performance and large size main memory in order to serve each and every client
request efficiently and to maintain TCP connection state. Servers are very vulnerable
to attack as it is easy for hackers to launch DoS attacks exploiting TCP packet header
flags bits (SYN, RST).
The two widely known DoS attacks carried out by the manipulation of TCP flags are:
TCP SYN attack and TCP Reset attack [15, 16] (Figure 2.4).
DoS attack using TCP
TCP RST 
attack
TCP SYN 
attack
Figure 2.4: Denial of Service attacks using TCP
Table 2.1: Summary of DoS attacks using TCP
Attack How Effect Remedy
TCP SYN
Attacker sends repeated
TCP SYN packet with forged
source IP address to target
machine.
Server main memory becomes
full due to pending connec-
tion request.
Software
Patch
TCP RST
TCP RST packet with forged
IP address is send by attacker
to the target machine.
Drop connection that dis-
rupts the communication.
No Solu-
tion
TCP SYN Attack: TCP protocol specification specifies one of the main purposes
of TCP SYN flag is for establishing connection between two machines. This is carried
out using a three way handshake process involving (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK) packet
exchanges. Hackers exploit this connection establishment process in order to carry out
DoS attack. The attack involves sending a series of TCP packets to the target machine
for connection request with a TCP SYN flag set and forged source IP address. The target
machine on receipt of every TCP SYN packet must allocate space in the SYN queue in
system memory and acknowledge the request by sending back a TCP packet with ACK
flag set to the source machine IP address. The source machine will never acknowledge
this message because source IP address is forged by the attacker. The result is that the
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target system SYN queue can become full and force the target machine to reject further
connection requests. Figure 2.5 shows a normal TCP connection establishment process
and TCP SYN attack.
1) SYN
2) SYN - ACK
3) ACK
Normal TCP Connection. 
The three-way handshake correctly 
performed
Client Server
               1) SYN 
(Forged Source IP address)
          2) SYN - ACK
(Sent to forged IP address)
TCP SYN Flood. 
Attacker sent many packets but 
no ACK pakets
Attacker Server
Figure 2.5: Normal TCP connection and TCP SYN flooding attack
TCP SYN is one of the classic examples of using the TCP protocol to attack network
resources. However, this attack can be fixed by patching the OS (SYN cookie fix) or
a defence mechanism can be used to monitor an unexpected number of flooded request
(Section 2.3).
TCP RST Attack: The purpose of the TCP RST flag is to immediately terminate an
established TCP connection between two machines. If a packet with TCP RST flag set
to ‘1’ received by the destination system then it immediately terminates TCP connection
without any further exchange of TCP packets. The RST flag option is also exploited by
attackers to launch DoS attack as examined for the first time in 2003 by Watson [16].
According to Watson’s description, an attacker closely monitors TCP communications
across networks and gathers vital information concerning host IP addresses and ports
of current participants in TCP connections. On obtaining this information an attacker
launches an attack by creating a TCP packet with a participants host IP address and
ports along with TCP RST flag set and sends this packet to any of the two participants’
hosts resulting in an instant connection termination and DoS effect.
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DoS Attack Using ICMP
ICMP is a connectionless protocol and an integral part of IP suite. The ping command
uses ICMP for troubleshooting network communication issues and gathering network
details about hosts and open ports. The information gathered can be used to launch
ICMP DoS attack. Two famous DoS attack carried out using ICMP protocols are the
Smurf attack and Ping of Death attacks [17, 18] (Figure 2.6).
DoS attack using ICMP
Ping of Death 
attack
Smurf 
attack
Figure 2.6: Denial of Service attacks using ICMP
Table 2.2: Summary of DoS attacks using ICMP
Attack How Effect Remedy
Smurt
attack
Attacker sends ICMP ping
packet with target machine IP
address set as source IP to the
broadcast address.
Network bandwidth depletes
due to packet flooding as
well as processor resources ex-
hausts.
Protocol
fix pro-
posed in
August
1999
Ping of
Death
Attacker sends oversize ICMP
ping packets to the target ma-
chine.
Processors resource depletes
due to operating system prob-
lem dealing with oversize
packets.
Operating
System
patch
Smurf Attack: uses an ICMP echo request/reply (ping) packet. The attacker must
acquire network information concerning particular IP addresses of hosts. The attacker
then spoofs2 ICMP echo request packets to be from one or more valid hosts (victims)
and sends a high volume of packets to the network broadcast address. Now every host on
a network receives an ICMP packet and they reply back to the spoofed IP address of the
victims (valid hosts). Now each victim who originally did not send any ICMP packet
will receive ICMP echo reply from all hosts on a network and this depletes network
bandwidth and may overwhelm the victim machine causing DoS effect. Smurf attack is
shown in figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7 shows only one ping request in smurf attack. A technical countermeasure was
proposed in August 1999 to the protocol standard that ICMP echo requests sent to the
broadcast address are no longer replied to by default [19]. Router configuration can also
be used to prevent the propagation of broadcast packets to other subnetworks.
2Spoofing is the creation of packets with forged or incorrect source address.
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Internet
Attacker Machine
Target Machine
Ping request
Broadcast address
Figure 2.7: Smurf attack
Ping Of Death Attack: Another kind of DoS attack using ICMP is also carried out
using ICMP echo request/reply packet or ping packet called Ping of Death (POD) DoS
attack. An attacker sends a high volume of malformed or oversize ICMP ping packets3
up to the allowed maximum IP size of 65535 bytes. These packets are then fragmented
by the transmission network. The victim machine receiving such fragmented packets
tries to reassemble them and a buffer overflow can occur causing a system crash or
reboot. This attack is no longer effective as most operating systems are patched to deal
with malformed ping packets by allocating a significant amount of memory and via the
incorporation of buffer overflow checking code.
DoS Attack Using UDP
UDP is a connectionless transport layer protocol. Thus, it is possible to send any
type of UDP packet to any machine on any ports without informing the recipient or
handshaking. UDP port DoS attack is a DoS attack based on UDP [20].
UDP Port DoS Attack: here, an attacker sends a series of UDP packets to an IP
address of a victim machine on a specific port or a set of random ports. For every
UDP packet received by a victim, its OS tries to determine which application provides
services on this port. If the victim machine is not running any application for the
3Ping is 56 bytes in size and 84 bytes when IP header is considered.
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requested service on a port then it replies with an ICMP destination port unreachable
packet indicating there is no service available. If the attackers send UDP packets in large
volume then the overhead of triggering repeated ICMP destination port unreachable
reply packets can overwhelm the victim machine processing and it may even deplete
network bandwidth.
This attack can easily be stopped by analysing the network traffic using network defence
technology such as NIDS with correct packet filtering policies (Section 2.3).
DoS Attack Using IP
IP is widely used protocol and is compatible to work with different types of commu-
nication standards such as Ethernet, Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) etc. IP
allows applications to send up to 65535 bytes in a single packet (including 20 bytes
packet header). When a packet of such size is sent over a network it is often fragmented
into multiple packets because of Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)4 packet/frame
transmission limits. All fragmented packets must be reassembled at the destination sys-
tem before passing upward to the application layer. The memory and computational
requirements of reassembly can be used to cause DoS effect such as Ping of Death DoS
attack. Others DoS attacks caused by manipulation of IP protocol are Land attack and
Teardrop attack [21] (Figure 2.8).
DoS attack using IP
Teardrop 
attack
Land
attack
Figure 2.8: Denial of Service attacks using IP
Land Attack: here, attackers manipulate the IP packet source field by copying the
destination IP address into the source IP address field in order to trick the destination
machine into sending packets to itself to crash the machine and cause DoS effect.
Teardrop Attack: exploits a bug found in OS fragmentation and re-assembly code that
improperly handles overlapping (and hence malformed) IP fragments. An overlapping
IP fragment occurs if two or more IP fragments have offsets indicating that they overlap
each other in position within the unfragmented IP datagram. An attacker sends a series
4Typical MTU for Ethernet is 1500 bytes.
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Table 2.3: Summary of DoS attacks using IP
Attack How Effect Remedy
Land
attack
Attacker flood the target ma-
chine with IP packets with
destination IP address of ma-
chine copied into source IP ad-
dress field.
Target machine sends the
packet to itself that exhausts
the processor resources.
Operating
System
patch
Teardrop
attack
Attacker sends series of over-
lapping IP fragments to victim
machine that exploits bugs
in OS fragmentation and re-
assembly code.
Processors resource depletes
due to operating system prob-
lem with overlapping IP frag-
ments.
Operating
System
patch
of overlapping IP fragments to a target machine and this cause system crash and DoS
effect.
These two attacks can easily be stopped with proper configuration (OS patch) and/or
by the deployment of defence mechanism such as firewalls or NIDS (Section 2.3).
Distributed Denial Of Service (DDoS) Attack
Definition: DDoS uses multiple compromised host systems to mount a coordinated
attack on critical network resources in order to cause DoS effects.
Explanation: In DDoS attack there is typically a master host or node controlling a
number of slave machines to initiate or stop an attack. The master node is in direct con-
trol of an attacker that has taken control of slave machines using DDoS agent software.
DDoS agent software is installed into victim machines either by exploiting a vulnerabil-
ity (Section 2.2.2) in software systems or by tricking the user into installing the agent
software. There may be more than one master node controlled by the attackers that are
used to manage the distributed network of slaves. An attacker usually instructs master
nodes to launch an attack using active slaves and direct them to simultaneously launch
an attack. This DoS attack when launched with a number of nodes is called DDoS
attack. Network topology of DDoS is shown in figure 2.9.
According to Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) (Renamed to Department
of Energy-Cyber Incident Response Capability (DOE-CIRC) [22]), the first such kind of
DDoS was seen in the summer of 1999 with the introduction of DDoS attack tools [23].
DDoS exploits the weaknesses of common Internet protocol and launches DoS attacks
(TCP SYN flood attack, UDP flood attack, ICMP flood attack etc.) in a distributed
manner in order to quickly deplete processing and bandwidth resources of target ma-
chines and network. First successful DDoS attacks noted in the year of 2000 when Yahoo
Chapter 2. Background 17
Internet
Attacker
Master Node (Router)
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Target Server
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Figure 2.9: Network topology of DDoS
website was attacked which resulted in DoS [24]. Table 2.4 has the summary of some
common DDoS attack tools.
Table 2.4: Common DDoS attack tools
Tools Protocols Description
Trinoo (aka
Trin00)
UDP
This tool sends out a large number of UDP
packets to the victim.
The Tribe Flood
Network (TFN)
ICMP, TCP and UDP
This tool is able to attack victims with
ICMP flood, SYN flood, UDP flood and
Smurf attacks.
Stacheldraht ICMP, TCP and UDP
This tool combines the features of Trinoo
and TFN with encryption support.
Trinity TCP and UDP
This tool uses Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
for launching UDP or TCP flood attack.
Tribe Flood
Network 2K
(TFN2K)
ICMP, TCP and UDP
Successor to TFN. This tool uses TCP,
UDP, ICMP or a Smurf packet flood to tar-
get the victim.
Shaft ICMP, TCP and UDP
This tool uses TCP, UDP and ICMP pack-
ets or all three at the same time for flooding
victim.
Omega
ICMP, TCP, UDP and
IGMP
Similar to Shaft. This tool use TCP, UDP,
ICMP, IGMP or mixture of protocols to
flood the victim.
Forgery Attacks Using Protocols
The basic problem is that the core Internet network protocols provide no significant
authenticity or confidentiality protection. Network packets can easily be intercepted and
manipulated to forge or alter IP addresses in order to create spoofed packet containing
false values. Forgery is usually carried out to misrepresent another computer system,
or for attackers/hackers to conceal their identity by forgery which is clearly illegal.
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However, packet manipulation and forgery are correct or, atleast are accepted according
to IP protocol specifications in order to support functionality such as legitimate remote
access to electronic services whose access is restricted via source IP address. Most DoS
attacks discussed in previous section and all in this section are carried out with spoofed
addresses.
Table 2.5: Forgery using Network protocols
Protocol Description
SMTP (Email
address)
An email address to represent email sender/receiver identify can
be forged to carry out spamming or phishing attack.
IP (IP address)
Most of the attacks on networks and IT infrastructure use IP
address forgery to misrepresent or hide real identity of attackers.
MAC (MAC
address)
MAC address manipulation on LAN used to hide or misrepresent
attacker identity to carry out attack such as session hijacking.
Forgery Attack Using SMTP
Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) is the standard protocol for sending electronic
mail (E-mail) across IP networks. SMTP is a simple text based protocol where client
and server exchange string commands for connection establishment, authentication, and
sending of mail data over reliable transport layer (TCP) to recipient mail servers.
SMTP has no real security mechanism as it is created on the idea of co-operation and
trust like other lower level protocols. SMTP allows open mail relay. This means an
SMTP server can be configured to allow anyone on the Internet to send e-mail through
it, not just mail destined for, or originating from, known users. This significantly con-
tributes to the large security problem of current time known as E-mail spamming.
E-mail Spamming: Spammers usually use forged email addresses in order to pretend
their E-mail comes from a real company (in some cases invalid email addresses are
deployed to conceal identity). The goal of Spam is to trick a user into releasing sensitive
information such as Bank details or to lure them into the inadvertent installation of a
trojan horse or virus (Section 2.2.3) when downloading an apparently useful program.
Basic SMTP has no mechanism to authenticate users and/or to verify forged sender
email address in packet headers and it will assume that any correctly formatted email
address is valid. Email phishing attacks are carried out using forged email addresses.
Solution: There is no effective way to stop spam emails. Although proper configura-
tion of SMTP server is recommended and there should be a single point of entry for
connecting to an SMTP server usually through some kind of defence technology so ev-
ery connection can be monitored (Section 2.3). The SMTP extension protocol called
Chapter 2. Background 19
Enhanced SMTP (ESMTP) provides user authentication based on usernames and pass-
words.
Forgery Attack Using MAC
Medium Access Control (MAC) is a link layer level protocol of TCP/IP that allows
multiple devices to be connected to a shared physical communication medium. The
data communication between machines in this shared medium is supported mainly with
the help of a 48 bit unique MAC address (also known as a hardware address). This
address is used in a shared communication medium to identify the individual machines.
MAC Attack: Attacker and victim machines should be on the same subnet for MAC
based forgery attack. An attacker creates a spoofed packet with a forged MAC address
to misrepresent another computer system. The main aim of the attack is to take over a
victim’s communication with another computer on a subnet exchanging sensitive data
and information. There is no defined mechanism to detect MAC address forgery due
to the lack of confidentiality mechanisms in network protocol. Figure 2.10 shows the
forgery attack carry out using Address Resolution Protocol (ARP).
Switch
1)Broadcast ARP request:
Find MAC address
for 192.168.0.3?
Attacker
Machine
 IP: 192.168.0.3
MAC: 02-00-54-4E-11-FF
2)Both attacker
and 192.168.0.3
machine respond 
to ARP request
IP: 192.168.0.10
MAC: 12-01-11-4F-1A-FF IP: 192.168.0.2
MAC: 02-10-54-5A-AC-11
Figure 2.10: MAC address forgery attack also known as ARP spoofing
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Forgery Attack Using IP
Most of the attacks discussed until now forged addresses such as MAC address, IP ad-
dresses or email address in order to create spoofed network packet for launching different
types of complex network attacks such as DoS or DDoS. Some network configurations
also provide access to network services on resources based on IP or MAC address au-
thentication. If an attacker forges these addresses then it can gain access to services and
information. There are other kinds of attack that carried out with the help of forged IP
address such as session hijacking and routing attacks.
Session Hijacking Using Protocols
Definition: An unauthorised access to information or services in a computer system
by infiltration through an already established connection between hosts is called Session
Hijacking.
Explanation: Like most of the attacks discussed previously, spoofed packets with
forged IP address are commonly used for session hijacking as well as for routing attacks.
Attackers exploit flaws or weaknesses of protocols such as TCP, ICMP and Border
Gateway protocol (BGP) in order to carry out session hijacking. Session hijacking
and routing attacks involve direct intrusion into established network connections. The
objective of these attacks is not just the disruption of communication between hosts
but to actually change the routes used by a host or a router in order to eavesdrop on
communication and steal vital sensitive information directly from network packets.
Session Hijacking Using TCP
TCP supports reliable duplex stream based communication. Packets are delivered in
order using 32 bit sequence numbers in each and every TCP datagram.
Attack Description: TCP session hijacking attack alters TCP sequence numbers. An
attacker must guess or intercept packets to get the correct TCP sequence number of
a TCP session between two hosts. Then, with a TCP sequence number and a forged
IP address of any other trusted host on the network, an attacker creates a spoofed
TCP packet and sends it to the target/victim machine. Because of the correct sequence
number the other host treats the packet as an established session packet and starts
exchanging packets with an attacker machine and discloses sensitive information. The
other machine that originally had an established session with the victim machine now
has an invalid TCP sequence number and its TCP session with the host is invalid.
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Session Hijacking Using Routing
Session hijacking can also be carried out by exploiting weaknesses in network routing
table update procedures. The two protocols used for hijacking sessions are ICMP (Route
Redirect message) and Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [25, 26]. An attacker creates a
spoofed packet with the forged IP address of a victim to misrepresent and inform the
gateway or routers to update their route table with false routing information in order to
redirect communication through a rogue or compromised gateway/router. In this way
an attacker is able to successfully see all communication of a victim machine.
In this section a small number of protocol weaknesses and flaws were discussed along
with variety of network attacks. A more comprehensive overview of network attacks
and flaws in protocols is presented in the survey presented by Simon Hansman and Ray
Hunt [27].
2.2.2 Vulnerabilities in Software
Vulnerabilities in softwares and bad host configurations provide additional opportunities
for hackers to launch different types of network attacks. These vulnerabilities arise due
to flawed programming or badly tested software releases. For example, it is relatively
common for new or updated versions of libraries and applications to be released that are
related to networking and operating system services. SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Secu-
rity (SANS/MITRE) reported in 2009 about the top 25 dangerous coding errors where
two of the errors led to more than 1.5 million US dollars of website security breaches
during 2008 [28]. The common software flaws are unchecked user inputs potentially
leading to buffer overflows and SQL injection5, fundamental issues with OS user policies
where possible unauthorised privilege escalation is possible with the potential for mal-
ware to execute commands on behalf of a hacker. Further, password management flaws
can allow the user or root/Administrator passwords to be cryptographically weak and
therefore easily compromised by hackers in order to gain unauthorised access. A key
task for a network administrator is to be aware of current vulnerabilities in operating
system and application software and to deploy updates or fixes as and when they become
available. The next section discusses network attacks exploiting common vulnerabilities
in software and is further evidence for the need for proper network configurations and
defence mechanism for networks (Section 2.3).
5SQL injection refers to the unintentional direct execution of SQL statements by a program.
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DoS Attacks Using Software Vulnerabilities
Some common DoS attacks carried out by hackers by exploiting software vulnerabilities
are now discussed:
Buffer Overflow Attack: exploits flawed programming where a buffer can be overfilled
and values are written into adjacent memory to the end of the buffer storage. This causes
corruption of data which either crashes the application or it can be used to cause the
execution of injected code in order to perform a malicious operation.
Crasher Attacks: causes the host systems to crash, leading to DoS due to a reboot.
A popular example of crasher attacks exploiting OS vulnerabilities are land attack and
Ping of death (Section 2.2.1).
2.2.3 Malicious Code
Malicious code is commonly referred as Malware.
Definition: Malware is a software program designed to perform malicious activities on
a computer system without owner consent.
Explanation: Malware is deployed to cause damage to a computer system by an at-
tacker. It can be used to take control of a computer system, to access sensitive infor-
mation and to launch attacks on other computer system. Malware installation on any
computer is difficult to detect and prevent. Advanced defence mechanisms sometimes
even find it difficult to counter those new variants of malwares commonly known as zero
day exploits (Section 2.4.6). However, certain combination of defence mechanism are
effective but far from perfect in completely countering any new or zero-day malware
attacks (Section 2.3).
Types Of Malware: Malwares can be self-replicating in order to propagate themselves
either by attaching themselves from one computer file to another, or by emailing them-
selves to other machines using a victim’s email client software address book. Examples
of self-replicating malwares are computer Viruses and Worms (Figure 2.11).
Like self-replicating malwares, non-replicating malwares also performs malicious activ-
ities usually by fooling them installing on victims machine. Commonly known non-
replicating malwares are Trojan Horse, Spyware and Adware (Bad Adware) (Figure 2.11).
Other malwares include backdoors, trojan downloaders, password stealers, Crimeware
and Mobile malware.
Chapter 2. Background 23
Non-replicating malwares
Adware
(Bad Adware)
Trojan
Horse
Spyware
Malware
Self-replicating malwares
WormsViruses
Figure 2.11: Types of malware
Crimeware: is a malicious software intended to yield financial benefits for an attacker
using theft of personal information for fraudulent use, theft of trade secrets or intellectual
property and spam distribution [29].
Mobile Malware: is a malicious software designed to infiltrate mobile devices without
user consent. Security analysts believe mobile malware is a significant and large threat
due to the exponential increase in number of mobile devices such as smart phones and
netbook mobile devices with mobile internet connectivity [30].
Self-replicating Malware
Computer viruses and worms are self-replicating malwares that propagate and infect
systems to perform malicious activity. A virus propagates by attaching itself to com-
puter files. A worm propagates through a computer network without attaching itself to
computer file.
Virus: The term computer virus first came to known in 1986. Fred Cohen’s PhD thesis
demonstrated how program code could propagate itself from one machine to another [31].
Table 2.6 summarises some common virus types [32].
The top four virus types in table 2.6 are easy to detect using virus scanner technology.
However, the last three types of viruses use tactics that enable them to successfully avoid
detection by virus scanners or other network defence mechanism such as SB-NIDS.
Worm: Computer worms typically cause more destruction to computer systems and
networks than computer viruses. Computer worms are of two types: Mass-mailing
worms and Network-aware worms [27]. Mass-mailing worms spread through emails.
Example of mass-mailing worm is Mellisa that attaches itself to email for propagation.
Network-aware worms are more sophisticated and destructive than mass-mailing worms.
Network-aware worms look for known vulnerabilities in Internet hosts and try to gain
access in order to compromise machines. Once a worm reaches a target machine it
modifies critical operating system files to hide its identity and then attempts to propagate
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Table 2.6: Viruses types and behaviour
Protocol Description Detection
File Infector
Mainly infects the program files (.EXE, .COM, .BIN
etc). It may also infect script or configuration file.
Easy
Boot record
infector
Infects system boot sector. Easy
Multi-partite virus Hybrid nature. Infects boot record as well as file. Easy
Macro virus Infects macro-enabled Microsoft office document. Easy
Stealth virus
Stealth virus disguises itself to thwart detection by
altering its file size, or concealing itself in memory.
Hard
Encrypted virus
It uses encryption to hide itself from virus scanners.
Each time it infects it automatically encodes itself
differently.
Hard
Polymorphic virus
Everytime this virus infects file it changes its signa-
ture.
Hard
to further hosts. Examples of this kind of worm is SQL slammer worm that exploits
the known vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine.
Non-replicating Malware
There are other malicious codes or malwares which are intrusive, hostile and annoying.
Unlike viruses and worms they are non-replicating and do not propagate themselves.
Such malware often installs itself in a victim machine by tricking the user into believing
them to be benign programs when actually they have a malicious purpose. Often such
programs interfere with system settings and open backdoors for remote access to system
resources. The two widely known non-replicating malwares are: Trojan Horse and
Spyware.
Trojan Horse: Trojan Horse or a Trojan is a non-replicating malware that spreads
by opening an email attachment or downloading and running a file from the Internet
containing trojan code. Trojans appear to perform desirable functions but are used
to compromise victim system security. Usually it changes system settings and allows
hackers to remotely connect to a machine for malicious purpose. Desirable operations
performed by hackers using trojans are file uploading and downloading, launching at-
tacks such as DDoS and email spamming, other malware installations, data theft, remote
screen viewing, rebooting the machine and resource hogging of hardisk space and pro-
cessor computing power.
Spyware: A non-replicating malware that secretly installs itself in a victim’s machine
for the purpose of collecting data. Sometimes spyware come as part of regular software
packages and are installed in a hidden directory. Spyware monitors victim’s system usage
and Internet surfing habits and sends the information over the internet to spyware owner
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or hacker. Information collected using spyware is then used to target advertisements and
to further tempt the user into installing other malicious malwares.
2.3 Network Defence Mechanism
This section discusses techniques and some state of the art network security technologies
used to minimise and counter network threats.
2.3.1 Configuration Management
Configuration management aims to minimise network security issues through technically
sound network organisation and by frequently applying application software updates
and OS patches. Vulnerability scanner and configuration management software tools
are available to automatically apply such updates and patches. Encryption is typically
deployed to protect the transmission of sensitive information. Typical deployments
include the IP layer using a framework such as IPsec or at the application layer using the
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. Firewalls are typically used to secure a network from
outside attack and to prevent subversive users from advertising unauthorised network
services to the external internet beyond the firewall. Another strategy is Virtual Private
Network (VPN) which securely sends private data between two sites or locations.
2.3.2 Firewall
A Firewall is a combination of software and hardware coupled with restrictions on net-
work topology that is used to secure and limit network access. A typical firewall deploy-
ment is shown in figure 2.12. Firewalls are used to limit outgoing and incoming network
traffic to ensure that it is well-formed (thus preventing spoofed packets entering or leav-
ing the network) and legitimate. Standard networking equipment such as routers offer
functionality such as packet filtering using rules to determine which incoming/outgoing
network packets are allowed to pass or be dropped.
Types Of Firewall: Firewall comes in three main flavours as shown in figure 2.13,
although variations of these basic organisations are also possible.
Packet Filter: A packet filter applies selective passing or blocking of network pack-
ets based on Open System Interconnection (OSI) layer 3 (IPv4/IPv6) and OSI-layer 4
(TCP, UDP, ICMP, and ICMPv6) headers. The most often used criteria of passing or
blocking the packets are source and destination IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6), source
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Figure 2.12: Firewall sitting between LAN and the Internet
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Figure 2.13: Types of Firewall
and destination ports (TCP, UDP, ICMP, and ICMPv6). Some packet filter also checks
the ICMP codes along with other criteria to pass or block network packets.
Packet filters can detect packets that has spoofed or malformed IP addresses for launch-
ing different network attacks (Section 2.2.1). For example, packet filters can stop all
the packets coming from outside the network with forged local network IP addresses
in sender source packet header field to foil attacks. Packet filters cannot detect any
protocol violation that is often used to disguise certain types of attack traffic because
packet filters make no attempt to understand the packet payload data.
Circuit Gateways: It is a more complex firewall that can detect specific protocol vi-
olations. A circuit gateway monitors the transport level of OSI model (OSI layer 4 or
TCP sessions). For example, TCP handshaking between host is checked to determine
whether a requested session is legitimate. Also circuit gateway monitors the request/re-
ply packets of established session for detecting protocol violation. For example, TCP
SYN DoS attack can easily be detected by circuit gateways.
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Circuit gateway is effective for session monitoring. However, it cannot prevent attacks
carried out using malicious code encapsulated in packet payload data.
Application Gateways: operate at the application layer of the OSI model (OSI
Layer 7), consuequently, they examine packet payload data to determine if the con-
tents are well-formed and legitimate. Unfortunately, this means that specific code, or
programs must be available to analyse the contents of multipacket messages in order
to determine if the messages conform to the protocol specification and that they are
well-formed. The computational and memory requirements of such gateways are signifi-
cantly increased over other firewalls and they can become network bottlenecks that limit
data-transfer rates. Application gateways can detect the spread of worm and computer
viruses by comparing packet payload data with the signature of known malwares.
Currently firewall is virtually non-existent and is replaced by Internet Security systems.
These systems are actually IDS or Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) which offers an
effective means to detect and prevent the networks against complex kind of network
attacks and malware outbreak by combining the power of all types of firewalls and
malware scanners. The IDS technology is now discussed in more detail.
2.3.3 Intrusion Detection System
IDS is a security system for detecting attacks on a computer and network. IDS actively
monitors events occuring on computer systems and networks and analyses them for the
signs of suspicious activities. If IDS finds any suspicious activities then it logs event
information and raises an alarm for the attention of Network Administrators as shown
in figure 2.14.
Internet
1) Capture
Data
3) Analyse
Data
4) Intrusion
Alert/Log
Database
2) Decode
Data
Data Source
Figure 2.14: Typical IDS data analyses flow
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2.4 Intrusion Detection System: An Indepth Analysis
IDS provides more effective security solution than firewall because they go beyond moni-
toring of network packets and even analyse OS events and log possible signs of suspicious
activities. In this way an IDS detects those activities or attacks that cannot be detected
with a firewall, such as trojans, spywares and other bad adwares.
2.4.1 Host Monitoring
Host monitoring IDS must carefully analyse every event occurring on a computer for
the possible signs of suspicious activities. IDS must be trained to recognise suspicious
event patterns, and or have knowledge of legitimate patterns of events. For example,
typical computer authentication systems might allow a maximum of 5 consecutive failed
login attempts for user access prior to the IDS on a host raising an alarm. Further, if
any user performs suspicious operation on a computer then the host IDS should raise
an alert for the attention of Network Administrators.
2.4.2 Network Monitoring
IDS when deployed for network traffic analysis, analyses all inbound and outbound
network traffic and alerts network administrators on the discovery of potential network
threats. Such IDS can identify network probes/scanning and attacks such as TCP SYN
attack, viruses/worm outbreaks and attacks on software vulnerabilities.
An IDS is a passive monitoring system, since its primary purpose is to only alert the
network administrators whereas an IPS, forcibly halts suspicious activity by for example
blocking suspicious network packets, or halting activity due to suspicious events on a
specific host in order to prevent an attack with the risk of potentially halting legitimate
activity. Usually every IDS has an option to be configured as an IPS. For example, the
IPS associated with Automated Teller Machine (ATM) may block or retain a card if
incorrect pin is entered repeatedly.
2.4.3 Types of Intrusion Detection System
There are two types of IDS based on the type of events they monitor. The two types
are called Host IDS (HIDS) and Network IDS (NIDS) (Figure 2.15). There is another
kind of IDS that have combine capability of both IDS known as Hybrid IDS.
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These IDS types may use two different types of intrusion detection techniques: Signature
detection and Anomaly detection. IDS types and their detection techniques are now
discussed.
Intrusion Detection System(IDS)
Network IDS (NIDS)Host IDS (HIDS)
Hybrid IDS
Figure 2.15: Types of IDS
Table 2.7: Comparison of IDS types
IDS Types Analyse Deployment
NIDS Network traffic/data Network points/backbone
HIDS Host events/data Individual machine
Network Intrusion Detection System
NIDS is a type of IDS that analyses network traffic for the detecting signs of malicious
activities. NIDS is a complementary technology to firewall and detect attacks often
missed by firewall. NIDS analyses incoming/outgoing network traffic, and can detect
suspicious activities of spyware, adware, trojans and other malwares that are not de-
tected by Firewalls. NIDS can inspect a range of protocol vulnerabilities from data link
layer to application layer of TCP/IP protocol stack. It can also detect malicious code
or malware in a network packet payload data using pattern matching commonly known
as Deep Packet Inspection. Figure 2.16 shows the packet processing flow in NIDS.
Packets are capture from the network interface by NIDS’s packet capture component.
This packet is then passes on to the Packet Decoder component that stores data to
memory for later analysis concerning the decoded packet protocol/payload information.
The data analysis component analyses this decoded packet protocol data for any protocol
anomalies and malware patterns. Finally, the intrusion alert component raises the alert
and/or logs the events.
NIDS Deployment: A NIDS can be deployed on a point in a network where network
packet inspection is essentially required. A large number of NIDS can be deployed either
on a major network backbone to analyse every packet crossing through networks or it
can also be setup at only specific network points analysing traffic directed to specific
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Figure 2.16: Typical NIDS data analyses flow
server or machines. A common strategy of deployment is a combination of firewall and
NIDS. Whatever deployment position is decided, NIDS should not be accessible from
anywhere on a network, so it is not assigned an IP address. However, it is normally
accessible locally from inside the network for configuration and maintenance.
Internet
NIDS
Management Console
File Server
WWW Server
HIDS
HIDS
Firewall
Figure 2.17: NIDS sitting between LAN and the Internet
Figure 2.17 shows NIDS deployment in which a firewall first filters network packets and
remaining packets are analyse by NIDS. NIDS network interfaces are connected to the
main network link via port mirroring devices, the NIDS is typically configured with no
IP address in order to protect direct attack on the NIDS device itself. Another NIDS
network interface connected to the management console is configured with an IP address
in order to manage NIDS software. The management console and NIDS are usually setup
on a local or internal network. Managing NIDS over the Internet is considered risky and
prone to attack as communication between management console and NIDS could be
eavesdrop, attack and compromise, which would be disastrous for the whole network.
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Host Intrusion Detection System
HIDS is a type of IDS software system that analyses the events occurring on a computer
systems rather than network for detecting malicious events. HIDS closely examines the
state of a computer system including hardisk activity, Random Access Memory (RAM)
contents, OS processes and log files, and raises an alarm if it encounters any unusual
or unexpected activity. For example, if a user with Read-only file access rights tries to
modify the files content then HIDS will raise an alarm and notifies the administrators
about ongoing activity. Figure 2.18 shows the event analysis flow in HIDS.
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Figure 2.18: Typical HIDS data analyses flow
OS events are first intercepted by the HIDS’s event capture component. These events are
then decoded and the decoded data is stored to HIDS application memory for analysis.
The data analysis component examines events data for any violation of system access
rights or any similar suspicious activities. Finally, an intrusion alert component raises
the alert and/or logs the events.
HIDS Deployment: HIDS normally install on a monitoring devices rather than on a
crucial network points. HIDS is indeed a requirement for a system hosting private data
and internet facing servers such as web servers, database servers. Industry standard for
most intrusion detection systems mandate the use of both NIDS and HIDS. Figure 2.19
shows this kind of deployment.
HIDS agent software is typically installed on any LAN servers facing the Internet and
providing services to external machines. HIDS agent software collects server machine
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Figure 2.19: NIDS sitting between LAN and the Internet and HIDS agents on Internet
facing servers
events and pass them on to the HIDS server software for event analysis. HIDS server
has necessary information (e.g. system policies, rules, signature) in order to carry out
analysis and if malicious activity is found it logs events or/and raise alarm(s) for the
attention of Network Administrator. A management console is also usually connected
to the HIDS server that keeps HIDS server information up-to-date with new policies and
attacks.
2.4.4 Intrusion Detection Techniques
There are two approaches used by IDS to monitor events for the detection of malicious
activity. Signature detection and Anomaly detection. Signature detection is the prevalent
approach in IDS implementation, and is deployed in notable commercially successful
products such as TippingPoint IDS and Cisco IPS series. Table 2.8 shows the summary
of both detection techniques.
Table 2.8: Summary of IDS detection techniques
Technique Method Advantage Disadvantage
Signature
detection
Analyse data using
database of attack
signatures/patterns.
Accurate detection of
attacks.
Unable to detect previ-
ously unseen attacks.
Anomaly
detection
Analyse data using
statistical techniques.
Detect previously un-
seen as well as old at-
tacks.
Raise lots of false
alarms.
Signature Detection
Signature detection techniques involve matching sets of known attack signatures with
events occurring on a computer and network for any signs of malicious activity. Each
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attack signature represents a known security threat (e.g. Virus, Worms, Spyware, DoS
attacks etc).
An IDS that analyses data using signature detection techniques is known as Signature
based IDS (SB-IDS). A SB-IDS maintains a database of signatures used to checking the
flow of network traffic or computer system events for the presence of malicious/suspicious
activity. When any packet or computer events matches a signature an appropriate action
is taken, which usually involve raising alarm(s), logging events and sending alert to the
Network Administrator. A NIDS that uses signatures for detecting attacks in network
traffic is called Signature based NIDS (SB-NIDS). Snort and TippingPoint are SB-NIDS
with a feature to detect malicious events occurring on a network. OSSEC is a Signature
based HIDS (SB-HIDS) that use signatures to analyses computer system events.
Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection techniques use statistical methods such as frequency, variance, mean
and standard deviation to analyse events and define if a pattern is normal or anamolous.
In order to analyse these events, first a baseline of normal profile of users, networks,
servers and workstations, server and application programs is created to detect anomalous
events [33].
An IDS that uses anomaly detection to detect attacks is called Anomaly based IDS
(AB-IDS). Bro is an open source, Unix based NIDS that analyse network traffic using
signatures as well as anomaly detection techniques [34]. Bro is primarily a research
platform for intrusion detection.
Commercial IDS solutions prefer signature detection implementation over anomaly de-
tection because it is difficult to define normal system and network profiles. Further, it
becomes highly subjective as to what is normal, and what is an anomaly that could
be an indicator of suspicious/malicious activity or attacks. Commercial anomaly detec-
tion products do not appear to be successful and none are evident. However, the main
drawback of signature detection technique it can not let the IDS detect attacks that are
previously unseen.
2.4.5 Popular Intrusion Detection System Products
The concept of intrusion detection for internet security has been around for nearly thirty
years which was born with James Anderson seminal paper entitled, Computer Security
Threat Monitoring and Surveillance [35]. Even after 30 years, only a small number of
successful commercial and open source IDS products/applications are available. The
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reason is very simple, an IDS is a highly sophisticated software system that must an-
ticipate and detect malicious activity by analysing millions of generated events/packets.
It is difficult for software vendors to successfully bring to market an effective IDS solu-
tion with the characteristics of accurately detecting malicious behaviour and intrusion.
Current commercial and open source developers are unable to saturate the market of
IDS technology and only a small number of vendors and developers are providing IDS
solutions.
Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 shows the product details of leading HIDS and NIDS and
private companies NIDS.
Table 2.9: Summary: Product details of leading HIDS and NIDS
Product
Release
Date
Platform Method Description
Tripwire
HIDS [36]
1992 Unix
Monitor file
changes (File
integrity checker)
Commercial products: Trip-
wire Enterprise and Tripwire
for Server. Open source ver-
sion moderated on Source-
forge.net
OSSEC
HIDS [37]
2005
Linux,
Solaris,
Windows,
MAC OS X,
OpenBSD,
FreeBSD
Signature and
Anomaly detection
Owner (Trend Micro): Free
and open source software
Bro
HIDS [38]
1998 Unix
Signature and
Anomaly detection
Open source NIDS for re-
search purpose
Snort
NIDS [3]
1998
Linux,
Solaris,
Windows,
IBM AIX
Signature detection
and Protocol analy-
sis
Commercial product: Source-
fire IDS/IPS. Open source
version available from
snort.org
Table 2.10: Summary: Best NIDS/NIPS product of leading private companies
Company Best Product Method Throughput
Cisco IPS 4200 Model: 4270 [39] Signature detection 4.0 Gbps
IBM
Proventia NIDS Model:
GX6116 [40]
Signature detection 6.0 Gbps
Sourcefire IDS/IPS Model: 3D9900 [41] Signature detection 10.0 Gbps
TippingPoint NIPS Model: 5100N [42] Signature detection 5.0 Gbps
2.4.6 Issues and Limitations of Intrusion Detection System
IDS security technology is not a perfect security solution and limitations and weakness
include sophisticated attacks, false alarms, zero-day exploits and speed of analysis (Sec-
tions 2.4.6). Complementary security tools and products include:- vulnerability scanners
that probe ports of network servers for detecting anything malicious that could allow
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unauthorised access, File integrity checkers to monitor important systems and private
data for signs of unauthorised modifications, and Honeypots that are deployed as a trap
machine with fabricated information designed to appear valuable in order to lure the
hackers away from critical systems [43–45].
IDS limitations and weaknesses are now discussed.
Sophisticated Attacks
NIDS provide no mechanisms to deal with sophisticated network attacks such as DDoS
which carries out with the help of botnets. An IDS cannot detect the location of botnet
client or master machine nodes.
False Alarms
A false alarm in IDS is defined as, any ongoing network and computer activity that
IDS seems suspicious and so raise alarm which actually neither malicious nor misuse of
resources.
SB-IDS’s have the potential of very low false alarm rate as they have exact signatures
from an attack and malicious activity database which they use to compare network
traffic and events occurring on a computer. In other words any action that is not
explicitly recognised as an attack is considered acceptable. However, AB-IDS produce
higher number of false alarms as these IDS have a baseline definition of normal event
and activity that they use to distinguish between normal and anomalous events. The
baseline is an estimated calculation of what is known as normal activity on a network
and computers, which are effective to detect previously unseen attacks but raises a
high number of false alarms because anything that does not correspond to a previously
learned behaviour is considered intrusive.
False alarms are a fundamental issue for anomaly detection techniques and improvements
in lowering the false alarm rate is an active area of research. Statistical and artificial
intelligence (Artificial neural network) are the main methods used to create a baseline
profile of normal network and computer usage for anomaly based IDS in order to detect
anomalous activities [46].
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Zero-day Exploits
A Zero-day exploit is defined as, a piece of malicious code used by hackers that exploits a
software vulnerability unknown to the owner/user of software or developer or any other
person.
SB-IDS’s provide no ways to deal with zero-day exploits and other attack variants as their
detection success relies on the provision of attack signatures. By definition a signature
database has no definition of a zero-day exploit and the attack will be missed. AB-IDS
can potentially detect zero-day exploits if they result in system/network behaviour that
is sufficiently unusual but there is no guarantee of detection everytime and AB-IDS
additionally suffers with the issue of false-alarms.
Speed Of Packet Analysis
The evolution of new hardware and network technologies has resulted in dramatic in-
creases in network transmission link speeds. The contant increase in link speed requires
high computational performance from NIDS as it must accomplish all processing in even
less time. Possible solutions to counter this issue is to either reduce the overall data rate
of the network, or simply drop some packets without analysis to keep up with the pace or
rate of incoming/outgoing packets. Both solutions have drawbacks as one lower the net-
work data rates or slows down the network and the other puts the network at increased
security risk as some attack signatures can be missed to detect in drop packets.
Researchers came up with a different idea to tackle this ongoing problem. They identified
the need to improve NIDS packet analysis speed using high performance processing
hardware or a platform that is more suitable for packet processing. These platforms
have been used to optimise algorithms to increase packet analysis speeds for NIDS.
Commercial answer to this problem is also high performance processing platforms where
NIDS sold as standalone packet analysis devices that are ready to be deployed in a
network. Successful commercial products such as Cisco NIDS, Tipping NIDS, Sourcefire
NIDS and IBM all selling these standalone devices.
2.4.7 NIDS Computationally Demanding Process
There are three main computationally demanding process of SB-NIDS that are a per-
formance bottleneck on high data rate network and slow down SB-NIDS packet analysis
speed: Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI), Packet Classification and Pattern Matching.
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Figure 2.20 shows the typical internal architecture of an SB-NIDS to demonstrate the
packet analysis flow depicting the three main computationally demanding processes.
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Figure 2.20: Packet Inspection in SB-NIDS
An SB-NIDS Packet Sniffer component first captures a network packet from a network
interface and uses the Packet Decoder to decode the packet protocols. The decoded
packet protocol data is then store in a SB-NIDS application memory area. This decoded
packet data is then analyses in series of stages. In the case of stateful protocols such
as TCP, the SPI component uses the key packet header values (IP addresses and Port
numbers) to check the packet association with one of the established TCP connections.
Next the packet higher layer protocol data is analyse using SB-NIDS dedicated software
components that checks validity of protocol by looking for invalid protocol values that
may lead to protocol related attacks. Finally, packet header and payload content is
searched for invalid header values and malicious patterns with the help of Rule selection
and Rule evaluation component.
Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI)
Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) is a process to track each and every network connection
traversing through the network in order to look for any illegal connection trying to attack
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the network services and equipments. SPI helps to detect different network attacks such
as TCP SYN DoS attack and port scanning/probing.
For each TCP connection successfully established, the SPI module assigns a unique ID
number by computing a hash value on key packet header values typically IP addresses
and port numbers. The unique ID number is then store in a connection state table in
main memory. For every incoming packet, the SPI module computes the hash value
using IP address and port number and looks up the connection state table in order to
check that the packet belongs to one of the established connections. SPI is a bottleneck
on a high data rate network due to frequent memory access that directly effects packet
analysis speed. Also key packet header values are also hash in SPI which also degrades
packet analysis speed performance. Javier et al carried out a study on SPI to measure
its impact on packet processing speed under high volume traffic [47, 48]. They observed
the packet analysis speed was significantly degraded with an increasing number of active
connections.
Packet Classification
Packet classification is the process of selecting attack signatures or rules for comparison
with packet data in order to detect malicious activity. These rules are selected by
matching key packet header values (IP addresses, Port numbers and Protocol type)
with those specified in a part of rule known as Rule header. In the context of SB-NIDS,
packet classification can also be referred as Rule Selection.
Rule selection involves matching source and destination IP addresses and ports, and
protocol types. Protocol type is a simple matching process which involve only constant
values, whereas IP addresses and ports occasionally involve matching a range of values
which is complex and computationally demanding. This process becoming more com-
plicated due to regular increases in both network data rate and the number of attack
rules. Lakshman, and Stiliadis, Gupta and McKeown and Srinivasan et al developed a
novel algorithm to perform fast packet classification [49–51]. Mcauley and Francis and
Florin et al optimised the packet classification processing speed performance using high
performance processing platform [52, 53].
Pattern Matching
Pattern matching in SB-NIDS involve comparing packet payload contents with known
malicious patterns specified in part of rule known as Rule options. Pattern matching
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is carried out using exact pattern matching algorithms. These pattern matching algo-
rithms execute slowly on general purpose processors typically requiring a high number of
memory accesses and comparison operations. For example, a C-programming language
method strcmp(char *str1, char *str2) compare characters requires one memory access
to fetch each character into a CPU register and a comparison per character. On a device
such as an FPGA, an optimised string comparison functional unit can be developed to
check multiple characters in one clock cycle.
Notable pattern matching algorithms include Boyer-Moore and Aho-Corasick [54, 55].
These algorithms are still used in many network and system softwares such as Snort and
grep, and are also currently the subject of pattern matching optimisation research for
network applications (Section 3.5).
2.5 Summary
This chapter began by looking at a range of network security issues concerning two
core problems: i) flawed design of network protocols in particular Internet Protocol
suite (TCP/IP) and ii) the vulnerabilities in software applications and OS. Some other
network security threats such as malwares also discussed to understand and quantify
the scale of network security problem. To minimise and counter these network threats
and stop the spread of malwares some core network defence mechanisms are discussed.
To illustrate the effectiveness and limitations of network security technology, some de-
fence mechanisms are discussed with a main focus on detail explanation of Intrusion
Detection System (IDS), the main issues concerning IDS technology, its limitations and
performance are focussed on Signature-Based Network Intrusion Detection System (SB-
NIDS).
Chapter 3
Survey and Related Work
Monitoring everyday network traffic for an attempted intrusions and complex kinds
of network attack is not a simple task for Network Administrators [56]. This task is
increasingly difficult due to the huge volume of legitimate network traffic and constantly
increasing network data transfer rates. Simultaneously, hundreds of software based
solutions for network monitoring, debugging, surveillance and intrusion detection has
been developed [57]. Some notable software solutions are NMAP, Netcat, Metasploit for
network monitoring and debugging [58–60]. Other solutions are Snort, Bro, Cisco NIDS
for detecting network intrusions and attacks, commonly known as Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) or Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) [3, 38, 61] (Section 2.4).
IDS or NIDS, particularly Signature based Network Intrusion Detection System (SB-
NIDS) collect and analyses network traffic in real time by capturing packets directly
from network interface(s). On high speed transmission network with data rate of gigabit
per seconds or over, SB-NIDS struggles to perform packet analysis of every incoming
or outgoing network packet. Consequently, SB-NIDS data buffer becomes full which
force SB-NIDS to remove or drop some packets from packet buffer. This happens due to
complex process of data collection, manipulation and analysis of network data in NIDS
components (Section 2.4.7).
3.1 Chapter Roadmap
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows:
• In section 3.2, introduction of how state of the art SB-NIDS is explained in the
rest of this chapter. The basic technique and compare and contrast are followed
in state of the art discussion.
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• In section 3.3 the state of the art are explained. The main focus is on describing
the state of the art SB-NIDS and pattern matching implementations. State of the
art are grouped into categories and their contributions are clearly explained.
3.2 Introduction to Literature Review
The three computationally demanding process of SB-NIDS has been the subject of re-
search and development. They can be distinguished as three independent areas of re-
search (Section 2.4.7). The contribution of research is the state of the art high speed
algorithms and hardware architectures that are capable of supporting high data rate
throughput. In this survey, state of the art of only one area (Pattern Matching) is dis-
cussed in detail due to its direct association with part of the research presented in this
thesis (Section 3.5). Additionally, some state of the art are also discussed that were
proposed to optimise the SB-NIDS using high performance processing and computing
technology to support packet analysis at high data rate network link. Figure 3.1 and
figure 3.2 shows the state of the art related work.
3.3 Literature Explanation
First the state of the art SB-NIDS design and implementation is discussed which are
distinguished in categories and compared (Section 3.4). This is followed by the discussion
of state of the art pattern matching algorithms and hardware architectures (Section 3.5).
Different pattern matching implementations is identified into categories and compared.
3.4 SB-NIDS using High Performance Computing Plat-
form
It has been observed that hardware architectural approach is used consistently to opti-
mise the packet analysis speed performance of complete SB-NIDS to enable high data
rate network traffic analysis. The two hardware architectural approaches for optimising
the complete SB-NIDS are: Computer Clusters and Embedded Processing Platform.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Computer cluster and Embedded processing based SB-NIDS
Hardware
Architecture
Authors Summary
Kruegel et
al [62]
One of the earliest ideas that employed cluster
of general purpose processor (PC) for deploying
Snort for stateful and distributed packet analysis.
Schaelicke et
al [63]
A Loadbalancer design that supports dynamic
feedback mechanism to ensures dynamic adjust-
ment of network traffic distribution in order to
avoid particular NIDS sensors overloaded with
too much traffic.
Computer Cluster
Xinidis et
al [64]
A sophisticated Loadbalancer that perform
packet distribution as well as packet filtering, lo-
cality buffering and TCP packet reassembly.
Vallentin et
al [65]
Hardware architecture with cluster of general
purpose processors (PC) for the deployment of
SB-NIDS and has mechanism to detect and re-
cover from NIDS node failure.
Ficara et
al [66]
A cluster based NIDS architecture where the SB-
NIDS deployed on a cluster of general purpose
processor (PC) and connected via Loadbalancer
implemented on Network processor performing
packet distribution as well as packet filtering and
packet re-ordering.
Clark et
al [67]
Network Node Intrusion Detection System
(NNIDS) for packet analysis at host (PC) level
developed by porting Snort components on a Net-
work Processor.
Embedded Processing
Clark and
Ulmer [68]
A Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS)
implemented on FPGA that perform packet anal-
ysis by monitoring multiple Gigabit Ethernet
links.
Yoon et
al [69]
FPGA based security system with management
subsystem for updating security policies and anal-
ysis subsystem for network packet analysis that
performs stateful packet inspection and signature
checking.
Vasiliadis et
al [70]
A modified Snort where Packet capture, Decoder,
Preprocessor and Logging Engine executes on
CPU and Snort detection engine is offloaded to
Graphic Processing Unit (GPU) for rule evalua-
tion.
3.4.1 Computer Clusters for SB-NIDS
Such SB-NIDS deployed with cluster of NIDS packet analysis engine or sensors that
analyses fraction of distributed network traffic. Figure 3.3 shows the typical arrangement
of hardware for cluster-based SB-NIDS.
The core hardware in such architecture is a Load balancer which distributes the network
traffic for analysis by cluster of SB-NIDS. Load balancer can either be implemented with
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Network backbone
Cluster of NIDS
Load balancer
Figure 3.3: Typical arrangement of hardware for Cluster-based SB-NIDS
embedded processing hardware technology or a standalone PC with a Load balancing
software. A SB-NIDS cluster can be made up either by installing NIDS software package
on standalone PCs or by deploying high performance SB-NIDS packet analysis processing
technology commonly available in commercial market (Section 2.4.5).
The main reason for such a complex arrangement of hardware (Table 3.2) is to perform
network packet analysis on a very high throughput preferably gigabit per second rate of
network throughput. One of the important components that perform critical function
in attaining such a high speed packet analysis in NIDS cluster is the Load balancer. The
main function of the Load balancer is to distribute the network packets to the SB-NIDS
cluster. Such a distribution should be fair in terms of packet distribution and load,
and should also maintain the state of the network connections or flows which is critical
for detecting network attacks. Distributing network traffic in such a manner is not at
all simple. Therefore, the proposed SB-NIDS cluster systems main emphasises was on
strategies and techniques of equal, efficient and stateful distribution of network traffic
between SB-NIDS clusters [62–66].
Research contribution
One of the first ideas of distributed packet analysis using computer clusters proposed in
2002 by Kruegel et al. [62]. Their distributed NIDS architecture employed the cluster of
NIDS engines or sensors install on ordinary PC with general purpose processor. Each
NIDS sensor is responsible for the detection of specific attacks due to careful distribution
of attack rules between clusters of sensors in a manner that each sensor searches the
packet only for particular type of network threat or attack.
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Table 3.2: NIDS cluster hardware specification
Authors Hardware Description
Kruegel et al [62]
Scatterer: (Intel Xeon 1.7 GHz Processor). Traffic Slicer and Re-
assembler: (Intel Pentium IV 1.5 GHz). Network Switch: (Cisco
Catalyst 3500XL).
Schaelicke et al [63]
Simulation Environment on general purpose processor: Hardware
specification not specified.
Xinidis et al [64]
Splitter prototyped on: (Radisys ENP 2506 board with Intel IXP1200
Network Processor: One ARM processor and six special purpose pro-
cessor (Microengines)). NIDS nodes: (Dell PowerEdge 500SC with
Intel Pentium III 1.13GHz ) and (Dell PowerEdge 1600SC with Intel
Pentium IV Xeon Processor 2.66 GHz ).
Vallentin et al [65]
Frontend and Backend nodes: (Intel Pentium D 3.6 GHz dual-CPU)
at LBNL. Frontend node: (Dell PowerEdge 850 with Intel Pentium
D 920 Dual-core) and Backend node: (Sun Fire X2100 with AMD
Opteron 180 Dual-core) at UC Berkeley.
Ficara et al [66]
Hardware Classifier: (Radisys ENP-2611 board with Intel IXP2400
Network Processor. Intel Xscale 32 bit RISC process and eight special
purpose processor (Microengine)). NIDS node: (Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz
Processor).
Table 3.3: Advantages and disadvantages of cluster based NIDS
Authors Advantages Disadvantages
Kruegel et
al [62]
Considered first proposed NIDS us-
ing computer cluster with Stateful
loadbalancing.
Expensive set of Loadbalacing
hardware
Schaelicke et
al [63]
Dynamic loadbalancing feedback
mechanism for equal load distribu-
tion.
Stateless loadbalancing.
Xinidis et
al [64]
An active loadbalancer (Splitter)
that also filter traffic as well as pro-
cess some NIDS function.
Packet distribution based on rules
groups provide a way to attack and
fail the system by overloading spe-
cific NIDS node with packets.
Vallentin et
al [65]
Spare hardware for on the fly re-
placement of failed NIDS sensor.
No fail recovery mechanism avail-
able for loadbalancer hardware fail-
ure.
Ficara et
al [66]
Loadbalancer (Classifier) performs
NIDS packet classification process
and offload some NIDS processing
load.
Unsupportive to stateful and proto-
col analysis because classifier hard-
ware forward only those packets
that match rule headers.
Their NIDS cluster architecture is comprises of an array of complex sets of hardware. The
packet distribution occurs with the help of these hardwares. In this architecture, first the
Scatterer hardware captures the network packet from the network interface and forward
them to the sets of Traffic Slicer hardware. Traffic slicers then further distributes these
packets to the appropriate NIDS sensor based on Snort on a general purpose processors.
These packets travels through the arrays of Reassembler hardware which are indirectly
connected to Slicer hardware via Network switch and directly connected to NIDS sensors.
Before packets finally passes on to the NIDS sensors for analysis, the Reassemblers
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arranges the packet order on the basis of first-capture-first-forward basis. The main
idea of the slicing mechanism is to distribute the packets to multiple NIDS sensors
in order to gain packet analysis efficiency and support of higher rate throughput. This
architecture also supports SPI and can analyse packets at over 190 Mbps on each sensor.
One of the best features of this cluster based NIDS is scalability which can be achieved by
adding easily an extra NIDS sensors. The main disadvantage of this complex but highly
distributed cluster based NIDS are high first time investment and maintenance cost.
There is also an operational issue which is SB-NIDS sensors dependency on one and only
centralised packet Scatterer hardware that can make the complete SB-NIDS system non-
functional in case of scatterer hardware failure. Furthermore, this distributed SB-NIDS
architecture provides no Dynamic feedback mechanism, a mechanism that dynamically
adjust network traffic distribution due to network traffic flow change in order to avoid
particular SB-NIDS sensors overloaded with too much traffic1. In summary, this system
is a scalable SB-NIDS solution but requires high first time investment and maintenance
cost and also lack Dynamic feedback mechanism feature that is essential to take control
on uneven packet distribution flow.
In 2005, Schaelicke et al came up with a design of efficient Load balancer hardware
on FPGA for the cluster based SB-NIDS approach called SPANIDS [63]. This Load
balancer hardware has a gigabit Ethernet interface to capture the network packet and
distribute them in a stateless manner between the cluster of NIDS sensors using the
flow based network traffic distribution approach. When Load balancer captures the
packet, it extracts the IP addresses and port numbers from the network packet for flow
based distribution. The Load balancer then hashes these values into a table created in
the Load balancer local memory or RAM. Each table entry is associated with specific
NIDS sensor responsible for analysis of particular flow of packets. Figure 3.4 shows this
process.
Hash 
calculator
Packet
NIDS
Sensors
Table
Figure 3.4: Loadbalancing using hash calculator
1flow based network traffic distribute traffic based on IP address and/or port number.
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Network traffic distribution using this kind of hashing or flow based distribution can
easily overload any SB-NIDS sensor in cluster. In order to overcome this issue dynamic
feedback mechanism is incorporated into the design of this efficient Load balancer which
is the main contribution of their work not supported by Kruegel et al. [62]. The dy-
namic feedback mechanism is supported with the help of simple communication protocol
implementation. NIDS sensors communicates with the Load balancer with flow control
message to notify the traffic load on the SB-NIDS sensor. The Load balancer then ad-
justs the traffic on the loaded SB-NIDS sensor by diverting some of the flows to the
least loaded SB-NIDS sensor. Such an adjustment in response to a flow control message
disturbs the flow based analysis due to the movement to different sensors. The major
disadvantage of this proposed Load balancer is the heavy reliance on one Load balancer
hardware that in case of failure makes the complete SB-NIDS cluster non-functional,
the same problem shared by the SB-NIDS cluster design proposed by Kruegel et al. [62].
The simulation model of the cluster based system is created to evaluate the dynamic
feedback mechanism performance. It consist of 12 simulated sensors, each with packet
buffers of the Linux default size of 64 Kbytes and a Load balancer FPGA hardware. The
experiment conducted with the 21 hour network traffic trace shows that the dynamic
feedback mechanism is able to drastically improve the number of packets drop. Without
feedback mechanism, a total of 498,995 packets are dropped, while feedback mechanism
reduces the total to 46,208 packets drop which is the significant improvement. In sum-
mary, the efficient Load balanacer hardware design implemented in FPGA is presented
which has a advantage over Kruegel et al load balancing approach due to dynamic feed-
back mechanism features but both design share the same weakness of single centralised
Load balancer hardware with no support of failed recovery mechanism [62].
In 2006, Xinidis et al proposed the concept of active Load balancer for cluster based SB-
NIDS [64]. Unlike passive Load balancer that distributes only the network traffic between
NIDS nodes; active Load balancer proposed in this design performs not only the packet
distribution but also supports useful features to improve the packet analysis speed. This
include Packet filtering (Section 3.5.2), Locality buffering and SB-NIDS processing such
as TCP packet reassembly. Packet filtering involve the processing of header only attack
rules then forwarding rest towards the SB-NIDS sensor via the locality buffer. Locality
buffering is a technique that is applied by reordering the network packet using locality
buffer of SB-NIDS sensor. This result in improve packet analysis speed performance
due to reduction in cache misses. The packet reordering criteria is crucial for successful
implementation of locality buffering which is actually arrangement of stream of packets in
a way that each SB-NIDS sensor trigger the same set of attack rules everytime it received
network packet2. This active Load balancer is prototyped on Intel IXP1200 Network
2In Snort, rules are arranged based on matching headers forming rule-groups.
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processor which performs flow based packet distribution by hashing key packet header
values (IP addresses and port numbers). Cluster of SB-NIDS sensors based on Snort (ver
2.0 and 2.0.2) with active Load balancer executed on PC with general purpose processor
and is tested with traces of network packets collected in September 2002 on NLANR
network shows the significant performance improvement in terms of reducing overall the
processing load on NIDS sensors. The test results demonstrated reduction of overall
8 % traffic by filtering and 10-17 % by locality buffering. The Load balancer throughput
measured for 64 bytes packet is 500 Mbps and for 1472 bytes packet is 980 Mbps. In
summary, the first ever active Load balanacer hardware design is presented on network
processor which performs packet distribution and actively engaged in other processing
to reduce the processing load from cluster of NIDS sensors. The overall capability of
the Load balancer is increased which is the novel contribution of this work but lacks in
features like dynamic feedback mechanism for flow control and failed recovery mechanism
necessary to coup with failure of one and only centralised active Load balancer.
In 2007, Vallentin et al proposed a design of cluster-based SB-NIDS architecture using
the combination of Frontend node and Backend node hardware [65]. SB-NIDS sensors
are represented as Backend nodes is the cluster of PCs with general purpose processors.
The Load balancer is represented as Frontend node has a gigabit Ethernet interface
to capture the network packet for distribution to SB-NIDS sensors for packet analysis.
This distribution is flow based which is performed by extracting IP addresses and port
numbers from packet and hashes them to generate hash value. This hash value is then
taken the modulus with the total number of SB-NIDS sensors for selecting the packet
destination sensor for packet analysis. Once the destination sensor identify, the Load
balancer writes the destination NIDS sensor MAC address and forwards the packet.
This cluster based system is very similar to other previously discussed cluster based
NIDS with the exception of failed recovery mechanism to enable recovery of SB-NIDS
sensor in case of failure. To perform this task an additional hardware called Hot Spare
hardware is installed in a system which monitors the NIDS sensor via a ping like method
known as heartbeat mechanism. If any SB-NIDS sensor found failed then the Hot spare
takes the charge of monitoring all the traffic flows destined to failed SB-NIDS sensor
MAC address. The single and most common issue is the centralised Load balancer with
no failed recovery mechanism for Load balancer. The most promising characteristic of
this system is the packet inspection support of 10 Gbps data rate throughput with the
FPGA based Load balancer. In summary, a cluster-based SB-NIDS is presented with
an added feature of failed recovery mechanism for SB-NIDS sensor which advances the
state of the art.
In 2008, Ficara et al proposed a cluster-based SB-NIDS architecture which comprise of
NIDS sensors deployed on cluster of PCs on general purpose processor and Load balancer
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on Network Processor [66]. SB-NIDS sensors and Load balancer are connected directly
with gigabit Ethernet link. Load balancer is also connected with a network backbone.
Once it receives the packet, it then extracts key packet header values (IP addresses and
ports) and hashes them to generate hash values. This hash value is compared with
the pre-computed hash values of attack rule headers group stored in Network Processor
local memory [71]. If any rule group header hash values match with key packet header
hash values then the packet is forwarded to the NIDS sensor responsible to evaluate
the particular rule group on packet. In summary, this cluster-based SB-NIDS is a lower
cost PC based SB-NIDS; this SB-NIDS has no distinguished features like failed recovery
mechanism or dynamic feedback mechanism.
In summary, cluster-based SB-NIDS are efficient and provide high throughput SB-NIDS
packet analysis. Majority of cluster-based SB-NIDS requires high cost hardware invest-
ment and future maintenance.
3.4.2 Embedded Processing Platform for NIDS
High performance embedded processing and computing platform has also been used to
implement optimised SB-NIDS solutions. Most of these commercial solutions of SB-
NIDS is sold as a “Box solution” in a commercial market that are implemented with
embedded processing platform (Section 2.4.5).
Research Contribution
One of the earliest work that demonstrates the design and implementation of SB-NIDS
using high performance embedded processing platform is proposed by Clark et al in
2004 [67]. This NIDS is called Network Node Intrusion Detection System (NNIDS). It
is a SB-NIDS implementation using Snort on Network Processor for distributed packet
analysis. The unique idea of implementing the NNIDS on a network processor comes
from their believe that the Network Processors can be easily integrated into a Net-
work Interface Card (NIC) of any computer or node which will easily enable distributed
packet analysis on network. NNIDS is developed on Radisys ENP-2505 development
board. Main components of the board are Intel IXP1200 Network processor that has
a StrongARM processing core and six microengines (Processors) with a clock speed of
232 MHz and Xilinx Virtex-1000 FPGA co-processor attached with IXP1200 proces-
sor via PCI mezzanine connector (PMC). Snort apart from pattern matching is ported
on Intel IXP1200 network processor while the pattern matching is offloaded to FPGA
co-processor for high speed pattern matching. The test result of NNIDS shows that
the pattern matching component of the system is able analyse network traffic up to the
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951 Mbps. NNIDS also only able to perform SPI but does not provide any facility to per-
form application level protocol (DNS, SMTP, FTP, HTTP etc.) analysis. In summary,
it is first ever Snort port on Network Processor architecture with FPGA based pattern
matching hardware acceleration unit that improves Snort slow speed search of attack
signatures nearly up to 2 to 3 times when compared with Snort’s pattern matching
throughput on general purpose processor but still lower in comparison to other state of
the art FPGA based Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA) which performs
packet analysis up to 1.85 Gbps throughput (Section 5.3). Also this system propose the
unique concept of enabling distributed packet analysis by integrating SB-NIDS in NIC
and so advances the state of the art.
In 2005, Clark and Ulmer proposed a Signature-based Network Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tem (SB-NIPS) design that performs inline packet processing in order to stop and prevent
network attacks [68]. It is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex II Pro (V2P7-6) FPGA de-
vice on a ML300 embedded development board. The unique feature of this system is the
support of packet analysis on multiple gigabit Ethernet links using Snort’s attack rules.
These attack rules are translated into hardware configurations for the FPGA by imple-
menting a program using JAVA Hardware Description Language (JHDL). This SB-NIPS
has two main units, a Network Interface (NI) unit and a Intrusion Detection (ID) unit.
Multiple NI units are connected to two different network links and supplies network
packets to an ID unit for network threat detection and prevention. Due to the limited
chip area of the V2P7 FPGA, this system was only tested with 21 rules and achieved
a maximum throughput of 8 Gbps. Clark and Ulmer also implemented this design to a
larger Xilinx XC2VP100 Virtex-II Pro FPGA chip with 1299 Snort attack rules (17514
characters) and utilised 36 % of the chip’s LUTs and 47 % of its slices. This design is
not very efficient in comparison to the FPGA based PMHA which is implemented with
more than 3 times Snort attack rules (9140) and utilised 56 % of FPGA logic blocks and
66 % of slices of a Xilinx XC2V6000 Virtex-II FPGA (Section 5.3). Also the ID unit
implementation of this SB-NIPS does not perform any protocol based analysis. In sum-
mary, it is the first SB-NIPS design with both packet capture and intrusion detection
and prevention components implemented on FPGA. Not fast enough in comparison to
PMHA presented in this thesis.
In 2006, Yoon et al proposed a NIPS architecture called Next Generation Security Sys-
tem (NGSS) [69]. NGSS is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro XC2VP70 FPGA
with Verilog Hardware Description Language (HDL). NGSS is made up of two systems:
Security Gateway System (SGS) and Security Management System (SMS). SMS is just
a management system that updates security policy (Configuration and rules update).
SGS is the core network traffic analysis unit with three FPGA based hardware modules:
Anomaly Traffic Inspection Engine (ATIE), Pre-Processing Engine (PPE) and Intrusion
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Detection Engine (IDE) implemented on Xilinx Virtex-II Pro XC2VP70 FPGA. PPE
module performs the SPI and maintains the session state table in CYNSE70256 9 Mbits
TCAM and 2 MBytes Cypress SRAM. IDE module performs the packet classification
for rule selection by comparing key packet header fields (Protocol, IP address and port
number) with rule headers stored in TCAM memory. IDE module also performs the pat-
tern searching in packet payload using on-chip FPGA memory in which Snort’s attack
patterns are stored. ATIE module generates alert messages and also performs intrusion
prevention actions. NGSS is tested with only 200 Snort rules which is a reason why
a system perform analysis with such a high throughput of 2.0 Gbps which is better
than the PMHA throughput presented in this thesis but much lower in number of at-
tack rules (Section 5.3). In fact this system provides high speed packet analysis but it
does not provide functionality to perform different application level protocol analysis
(HTTP, DNS, FTP, Telnet, DNS etc.). This makes it susceptible to perform different
kinds of protocol based attacks (Tiny fragment attack, DNS amplification attack etc).
In summary, NGSS advances the state of the art by providing NIPS design that able
to perform SPI as well as attack signatures checking at high throughput on a tightly
coupled embedded processing platform but lacks with feature of protocol analysis. This
feature is provided with a NIDS prototype on embedded processing platform presented
in this thesis (Section 5.2).
In 2008, Vasiliadis et al demonstrated the use of Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) to
speed up the packet analysis speed of SB-NIDS [70]. The SB-NIDS development on GPU
is carried out using Snort and so this SB-NIDS is named as Gnort. Gnort implementa-
tion involved offloading Snort’s computationally demanding packet processing operation
(pattern matching) from a CPU to GPU. This is carried out by executing Snort’s Packet
Capture, Packet Decoder, Preprocessor and Logging plug-in components on a PC with
general purpose processor and its only Detection Engine component which performs the
most computationally demanding operation is offloaded for execution from a CPU to
GPU. Packets when capture by the packet capture components on CPU first go through
Packet Decoder and Preprocessor components and then pass on to the Detection Engine
on GPU for attack signature search in packets. Packet transfer from CPU to GPU per-
formed in bulk rather than every single packet. This is due to the overhead associated
with every packet transfer. CPU use buffer to store packets before they transfer them
to GPU which helped attaining higher data transfer throughput between the CPU and
GPU. Also this transfer is supported by Direct Memory Access (DMA) feature. Once
the packets received by GPU it is searched for the presence of attack signatures by
Aho-Corasick (AC) multi-pattern matching algorithm executing on GPU stream pro-
cessors. If any pattern found in a packet then GPU pass the attack signature detection
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information back to CPU for alerting administrator and logging. Detection Engine com-
ponent which performs pattern matching is implemented on NVIDIA GeForce 8600GT
card which contains 32 stream processors arranged in 4 multiprocessors, operating at
1.2 GHz frequency and has 512 MB memory. Rest of the components implemented on
Intel Pentium IV 3.40 GHz processor with 2 GB of memory. Test result shows that AC
on GPU consistently achieved 1.40 Gbps compared to 600 Mbps on PC with general
purpose processor. In summary, Gnort novel contribution is the use of implementation
platform that provides complete SB-NIDS solution with high speed pattern matching
on GPU. An integrated NIC on GPU would be a better option if ever available, to
implement high speed network packet processing applications. Gnort pattern matching
throughput is 1.40 Gbps which is lower in comparison to the FPGA based PMHA design
presented in this thesis that supports 1.85 Gbps throughput (Section 5.3).
In summary, SB-NIDS design using embedded processing platforms is cost effective solu-
tion in comparison to cluster based SB-NIDS. Therefore, embedded processing platform
is more appealing for developing and optimising SB-NIDS. Most state of the art apart
from Gnort also struggle to provide features necessary to detect wide range of attacks in
comparison to the solution presented in this thesis (Section 5.3). The pattern matching
optimisation carried out using FPGA as part of the state of the art solution also does
not support full attack rules due to limited FPGA resources in comparison to the PMHA
presented in this thesis (Section 5.3).
3.5 Pattern Matching for SB-NIDS
Numerous research work has been done in past to optimise the pattern matching speed
for SB-NIDS [72–79]. Some research work proposed novel pattern matching algorithms
for NIDS to improve the packet analysis speed [72, 73]. Others research work came
up with packet filtering technique in order to reduce the amount of traffic inspected
by pattern matching algorithm of Snort [74–80]. Current research focus is exploring
reconfigurable hardware [81–90] and network processors for pattern matching speed ac-
celeration [91–93]. Almost all proposed pattern matching design used Snort attack rules
for implementation and testing of their solutions. Out of these solutions, few proposed
solutions to specifically optimised packet analysis speed of Snort. These solutions actu-
ally optimised the rule evaluation process of Snort which involved packet classification
(Rule selection) and packet analysis (Packet header and payload check with rules). These
solutions can be named as Snort Rule evaluation system which has been implemented
with FPGA hardware, hybrid hardware/software platform and Network Processor for
the improvement of packet analysis speed [85, 87, 90–92, 94].
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3.5.1 SB-NIDS Specific Pattern Matching Algorithms
These algorithms were proposed specifically to optimise the pattern matching of Snort
SB-NIDS. These algorithms came up with better results of search speed which is achieved
by designing an algorithm that utilise the best features of state of the art pattern
matching algorithms that include Boyer-Moore (BM), it’s variant by Horspool and Aho-
Corasick [54, 55, 95]. Due to this reason these two novel algorithms can be collectively
called as Hybrid Pattern Matching algorithms [72, 73].
Table 3.4: NIDS specific hybrid multi-pattern matching algorithms
Authors
Hybrid
Algorithm
Description
Fish and
Varghese [72]
SBMH
Hybrid features adapted from Horspool (Boyer-Moore
(BM) variant) and Aho-Corasick(AC) algorithms.
Coit et al [73] AC BM
Combined features in one algorithm adapted from
Boyer-Moore (BM) and Aho-Corasick (AC) algorithms.
Research Contribution
In 2001, Fish and Varghese proposed the first hybrid SB-NIDS specific pattern matching
algorithm called Set-wise Boyer-Moore-Horspool (SBMH) [72]. This hybrid algorithm
adapts the Horspool variant of the Boyer-Moore algorithm and Aho-Corasick algorithm.
This hybrid algorithm simultaneously match a set of patterns in just a single iteration or
loop by applying a multi-pattern matching search technique of Aho-Corasick algorithm3.
Also it adapt the Horspool bad-character heuristic search technique to skip character
during pattern comparison to optimise further the pattern matching4. The multi-pattern
search is applied by creating a suffix pattern tree and Horspool bad-character heuristic
is applied by creating a bad-character shift table. Both the suffix tree and bad-character
shift table is created by pre-processing the patterns. Figure 3.5 is an example that
shows the suffix tree and bad-character shift table constructed by pre-processing patterns
“xyz”, “rstyz” and “abcdeyz”. Figure 3.6 is an example of the search of a sample text
“patternrstyz” in a suffix tree.
To begin pattern matching, the shortest of all patterns is left-aligned with the left of
sample text (Before Shift) or packet data. The match is then started from right to
left character by character. When the test cannot match any character in sample text,
the algorithm uses the bad-character shift table for moving the text to the left which
may also result in skipping characters. SBMH, Aho-Corasick and Boyer-Moore Horspool
3Aho-Corasick pre-process patterns to create pattern search tree in order to support simultaneous
search of multiple number of patterns.
4Horspool algorithm pre-process patterns in order to gain pattern heuristic information for creating
search shift-table.
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Figure 3.5: Suffix tree and Bad-character shift table for SBMH
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Figure 3.6: Example showing pattern search in a text “patternrstyz”. Pattern “rstyz”
is found in a text in final shift
algorithms performance is tested and compared with different set of Snort’s attack rules.
Based on the test results they suggested that NIDS like Snort should have different
algorithm implementation that trigger depending on the number of rules selected on a
packet for evaluation. Boyer-Moore-Horspool if there is only 1 rule, SBMH if there are
between 2 to 100 rules and Aho-Corasick if there more than 100 rules. Also for packet
traces of web traffic the SBMH algorithm is much better and improves overall Snort
performance by a factor of 5. In summary, the novel contribution of combining multi-
pattern search with character skipping resulted in improve pattern matching specially
for web traffic. However, any pattern matching implementation that uses pattern tree
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for multi-pattern search consumes huge amount of memory.
In the same year of 2001, Coit et al also proposed hybrid multi-pattern matching algo-
rithm which they implemented independently in Snort [73]. They combine multi-pattern
search of Aho-Corasick and character skip feature of Boyer-Moore in a single algorithm
and so named as AC-BM (Aho-Corasick-Boyer-Moore). Like SBMH, AC-BM also pre-
process patterns to construct the pattern tree for multi-pattern search support and also
gained pattern heuristic information for constructing a search shift-table. However, un-
like SBMH which creates a suffix tree, AC-BM pre-process patterns to create prefix tree
and also search the packet data for patterns from right to left. Also AC-BM search is
supported by has two shift tables instead of one. These shift tables are bad-character
shift table and good-prefix shift table. Figure 3.5 is an example that shows the prefix
tree constructed by pre-processing patterns “brit”, “bribe”, “bring” and “brought” and
also shows the initial alignment of search text “searchthistext”. Figure 3.8 is an example
of the searching a text using AC-BM suffix tree applying only good-prefix heuristic.
             b e 
     
 
         i t  
 
             n g  
    b r 
  
         
                 o u g h t  
 
     s e a r c h t h i s t e x t 
Figure 3.7: Prefix tree and text alignment to begin pattern search in AC-BM algo-
rithm
The bad-character heuristic works in the same way as in SBMH. However, the good-
prefix shift is a different and complicated process than bad-character heuristic. In fig-
ure 3.8 case (a), match test is failed at character ‘g’. Text symbol “to” has matched so
far with pattern in a tree. The text can be shifted until the next occurrence of “to” in
the pattern is aligned to the text symbols “to’. This is a good-prefix shift. Similarly,
for case (b) in figure 3.8, the comparison fails at character ‘o’ of text. There is no other
occurrence of “sit” in any pattern. However, since a prefix “si” of the match text “sit”
occurrence exists in pattern, the text can be shifted until the next occurrence of “si” in
the pattern is aligned to the text symbols “si”.
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Figure 3.8: Search shows good-prefix shift
AC-BM performance is compared with the original implementation of Boyer-Moore.
For the combined content (keywords) and non-content attack rules search, Boyer-Moore
performed better than AC-BM algorithm. However, when the test were skewed by the
elimination of the non-content attack rules, the AC-BM algorithm found superior to
Boyer-Moore pattern matching algorithm. AC-BM found 1.31 times faster than Boyer-
Moore when tested with 200 Snort content only attack rules and 3.32 times faster than
Boyer-Moore when tested with 786 Snort content only attack rules. There is no study
identified that provide the test comparison between AC-BM and SBMH.
In summary, the two state of the art SB-NIDS specific algorithms AC-BM and SBMH
adopted multi-pattern matching and skip based search technique. The whole idea of
hybrid approached proved better search result. No effort has been made to reduce
the memory requirement of pattern search tree in these two proposed work. This was
addressed separately by Tuck et al. [96] and Marc Norton [97] in a separate study.
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3.5.2 Packet Filtering Technique for Pattern Matching in SB-NIDS
The idea of filtering elements (Patterns) in order to reduce the search time first conceived
by Burton Bloom in 1970 [5] (See section 5.3.1). He proposed the use of bit-array for
quick filtering of the patterns prior triggering any exact pattern matching algorithm for
exact matching. If quick filter lookup indicates the pattern presence then it searches
with exact pattern matching algorithm, otherwise it simply discarded. This basic idea
of filtering is also exploited in other work for optimising pattern matching of SB-NIDS.
Some of these work are explained in [74–79]. They can be collectively called as Pattern
Filtering Systems (Table 3.5).
Filtering
System
Incoming
Packet
Candidate
Rules
SB-NIDS
or 
Pattern Matching
Engine
Figure 3.9: Block diagram showing typical position of Filtering System for SB-NIDS
Table 3.5: Pattern Filtering Systems
Implementation Authors
Markatos et al [74] (ExB)
Software (General Purpose Processor)
Anagnostakis et al [75] (E2xB)
Antonatos et al [76] (PIRANHA)
Attig et al [78] (SIFT)
Hardware (FPGA)
Song et al [79] (Snort Offloader)
Sourdis et al [77] (Prefiltering)
Gonzalez et al [80] (Shunting)
Initial filtering systems focussed to develop the algorithmic solution of filtering and
implemented as a software program (Table 3.5) for general purpose processors [74–76].
Subsequent work optimised filtering algorithms and exploited the processing power of
FPGA (Table 3.5) to provide high speed filtering system [77–79]. Table 3.6 shows the
details of hardware technologies used for the implementation of these filtering system.
Research Contribution
Markatos et al in 2002 proposed the pattern filtering idea for Snort SB-NIDS [74].
Their filtering system is known as “Exclusion-based signature matching or ExB” that
filters or excludes as many patterns as possible so only few remaining patterns are
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Table 3.6: Details of Hardware technologies
Authors Hardware Description
Markatos et al [74])
Intel Pentium IV 1.7GHz, 8-KB of L1 cache, 256 KB of L2 cache
Anagnostakis et
al [75]
and 512MB RAM
Antonatos et
al [76]
Intel Pentium IV 2.8GHz, 8-KB of L1 cache, 512 KB of L2 cache
and 1GB RAM
Attig et al [78]
Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-8 FPGA
Song et al [79]
Sourdis et al [77] Xilinx Virtex II 4000-6 FPGA and Xilinx Virtex IV 40-12 FPGA
Gonzalez et al [80] Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 30 FPGA
Table 3.7: Advantages and disadvantages of software based pattern matching filtering
system
Authors Advantages Disadvantages
Markatos et
al [74]
Recognised as first ever implemen-
tation of filtering technique in SB-
NIDS.
Easily become a victim of DoS at-
tack due to slow process of bit map-
ping in character array for every in-
coming packet.
Anagnostakis
et al [75]
Optimised ExB (E2XB) version
now supports the case insensitive
pattern filtering.
Still the optimised ExB (E2XB)
repeatedly create bit-mapped in
character array for every incoming
packet.
Antonatos et
al [76]
Process patterns only once to create
suitable data structure for filtering
that can easily implement in hard-
ware.
Provide no support to filter net-
work traffic for patterns less than
4-bytes.
Attig et
al [78]
Ability to achieve throughput of
20Gbps using a Xilinx Virtex-IV
FPGA.
No support to scan payload content
for length 1, 2 or 3-bytes pattern.
Song et al [79]
Packet filtering (Filter firewall),
header only rule checking and two
level bloom filter on average filters
87% of traffic.
Snort on external PC rather than
integrated embedded processor(s)
connected with filtering hardware
via Ethernet interface.
Sourdis et
al [77]
Filtering hardware and Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) on a single
embedded processing board.
Integrated IDS only performs the
rule evaluation on a packet.
Gonzalez et
al [80]
An inline filtering system (Shunt)
that acts as an Ethernet card to the
host that analyse packets using Bro
NIDS.
Bro on PC with shunt acting as its
gigabit Ethernet card experienced
a small fraction of packet drop but
drop can become worst on higher
data rate interface (10-Gbps).
search using pattern matching algorithm. ExB filtering algorithm is defined as, “For
any pattern P with i number of characters ci, if any i
th character ci of pattern P does
not show up in packet payload content T, then the pattern P is not present in packet
payload content T.” To implement this algorithm, ExB creates the data structure or
bit-map of every incoming packet payload and perform the quick check of every pattern
character presence in this data structure. The bit-map is created in a character-array
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of 256 indexes which always set to zero before bit-mapping using bzero() C-language
method. Figure 3.10 shows the ExB’s algorithm bit-mapping process of a sample text
“1000poundsinnetworkpacket” and figure 3.11 shows the filtering of patterns “100dollar”,
“1001pounds”, “1000pounds” and “nomoney” in a ExB created bit-map of a sample text
“1000poundsinnetworkpacket” in figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Pre-processing in ExB of a text “1000poundsinnetworkpacket”
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Figure 3.11: ExB algorithm searching patterns in a text “1000poundsinnetwork-
packet”
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In figure 3.10, character array index with a value 1 indicates the presence of particular
character in a sample text “1000poundsinnetworkpacket”. For example, ASCII value of
character ‘w’ is 119 so the algorithm sets the corresponding array index to 1. Figure 3.11
which shows the pattern filtering , the mark (/) on characters of patterns shows that the
corresponding character array index is not set to 1 during bit-mapping which indicates
the sample text does not contain that character. Therefore, this pattern will be excluded
for pattern matching in Snort using one of the pattern matching algorithms such as
Boyer-Moore. For patterns “1001pounds” and “1000pounds” all characters are found
in a bit-map so both pattern will be search in Snort with pattern matching algorithm.
Pattern “1001pounds” with pattern matching in Snort would result as a non-match
pattern which in other words is a false positive and a weakness of this filtering algorithm
also acknowledged by authors. Instead they suggested the use of 13 bits character array
which they consider a good trade-off between false positive and lower memory usage. The
novel contribution which advances the state of the art is the first ever filtering system for
SB-NIDS in order to lower the invocation of computationally demanding Boyer-Moore
pattern matching algorithm in Snort. The weakness of this work is the high compute
time require for bit-mapping, the method which execute for every incoming packet and
an easy target of DoS service attack such as smurf attack (Section 2.2.1). This weakness
is recognised and also improved by Anagnostakis et al in 2003 by introducing ExB
algorithm enhancement known as E2xB [75].
E2xB is an optimised version of ExB that provide the faster bit mapping process, support
for case-insensitive matching and is tested with wider set of experiments. The faster bit
mapping process is improved by removing the overhead associated with initialising a
character array or clearing of 256 bytes character array (all array index should set to 0
before processing packet data) using (bzero() C-language method). Now in E2xB, the
array index for corresponding character ASCII value is marked with unique packet-ID
instead of 1 which serves the purpose of indicating the presence of particular character
in a packet data. E2xB algorithm performance is also compared with state of the art
SBMH and Boyer-Moore pattern matching algorithm. It was concluded from the test
results that E2xB consumes less search time than Boyer-Moore and SBMH for all network
packet traces except one. Improvement of E2xB is nearly 25 % and in some cases can be
as high as 36.1 % over SBMH and Boyer-Moore. In only one case of experiments E2xB
found worse than Boyer-Moore by 8 %. In summary, ExB and E2xB are one of the first
pattern filtering system for Snort which advances the state of the art. Performance of
E2xB is better than two state of the art pattern matching algorithms, even optimised
E2xB processes every packet to create bit-map instead of one bit-map of pattern for all
packets which is more appealing and practical to get the better result.
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Antonatos et al in 2005 proposed PIRANHA, a filtering system for Snort suitable to
implement in hardware [76]. PIRANHA filtering algorithm is optimised and better than
ExB. The algorithm searches only 4 bytes rarest substrings of patterns in a packet data
and if found in packet then only those patterns are fully search with Snort pattern
matching algorithm. Rarest substring of pattern reflects the least number of times that
a specific substring exists in all patterns. PIRANHA algorithm is implemented with
Hashtable that is more suitable for filtering. It first finds all the 4 bytes substring
in all patterns and selects only one rarest 4 byte substring to represent each pattern
in hash table. Figure 3.12 shows the examples of PIRANHA arranging the patterns
“filteringprocess” and “filterisneverbad” in a hashtable for filtering and figure 3.13 shows
the pattern filtering process for a sample text “verygoodfilteringprocess”.
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Figure 3.12: Example of pre-processing of patterns “filteringprocess” and “filterin-
goodmilk” in PIRAMHA
 
TEXT: v e r  y  g o o d  f i l t  e r i n  g p r o  c e s s 
 
 
g p r o 
 
g o o d 
P1 P2 
PATTERN1 (P1): filteringprocess         PATTERN2 (P2): filteringoodmilk 
Figure 3.13: Example of searching text “verygoodfilteringprocess” for patterns “fil-
teringprocess” and “filteringoodmilk” in PIRAMHA
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The rarest substring selection and association to patterns in hashtable is a two stage
process. At first the un-optimised hashtable is created which would result in slow pattern
filtering performance due to high number of memory accesses but low false positive rate.
In the second stage, the optimised hashtable is created by selecting only one 4 byte
rarest substring to represent each pattern which would result in high speed pattern
filtering performance but high false positive rate. Filtering is more straight forward
process than hashtable setup. For every incoming packet, each 4 byte sequence of packet
payload content substring is checked in the optimised index table to find occurrence of
any rarest 4 byte pattern substring. If any 4 byte rarest pattern substring matches
with the 4 byte packet data substring then algorithm compares the last 2 bytes of
pattern with the corresponding 2 bytes of packet content. In case this also result in
match then pattern is send to Snort to compare it with a corresponding bytes of packet
content using pattern matching algorithm. PIRANHA performance is tested and then
compared with some state of the art algorithms which include Mu-Wanber multi-pattern
matching algorithm (MWM) and E2xB [98]. The test results show consistently better
performance than these two algorithms. With eight different network packet traces,
PIRANHA performance is between 10 % to 23.50 % better when compared to other two
algorithms. PIRANHA also has low memory requirement. For full Snort attack rules
(2500 number of Snort rules in 2005), PIRANHA only consumed 37 MB of memory while
MWM consumed 45 MB, Aho-Corasick (AC) consumed 140 MB, variants of AC like
Marc Norton [97] AC-BANDED consumed 96 MB, Tuck et al. [96] AC-Bitmap and AC-
Path needs 20 MB and 15 MB of memory respectively. In summary, PIRANHA pattern
filtering algorithm is more optimised than ExB algorithm because it only processes
patterns once for pattern filtering. Also it is easier to implement in hardware due to
simple Hashtable implementation. It also has better performance than other state of
the art algorithm but has a drawback of not supporting the patterns of less than 4 byte
length which are approximately 400 in numbers in June 2009 release of Snort attack
rules.
Song et al in 2005 proposed the Snort Offloader pattern filtering system using a com-
bination of hardware and software processing platform for improving packet analysis
speed of Snort [79]. The hardware side of hybrid platform is the reconfigurable hard-
ware (Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-8 FPGA) on which high speed pattern filtering system
is implemented in order to reduce the number of pattern search using Snort pattern
matching algorithm which is executed on the general purpose processor. Figure 3.14
is the block diagram showing only two main FPGA based hardware filtering system
modules.
The two hardware modules are: Active packet filter (APF) and Passive packet filter
(PPF) is implemented on Xilinx XCV200E FPGA. APF is loaded with traffic flow
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Figure 3.14: Block diagram of Snort offloader showing two main hardware modules
information for active bypassing or blocking of packet (Packet filter firewall 2.3.2) and
PPF is loaded with 2600 attack rules comprises of patterns and other packet header
values for the purpose of filtering. APF is the first layer or module that receives the
packets from the network interface and checks key header values (mainly IP addresses
and Port numbers) for bypassing or blocking for certain traffic flow. At the same time,
PPF inspect the packet header and payload against attack Snort rules with the help
of its two sub-modules: Header classification and Two-level Bloom filter. First packet
payload content is searched for pattern presence by computing eight hash values per
substring in just 2 clock cycles to check the corresponding index value of the first-level
16-Kbit Bloom filter which takes another 3 clock cycles. If Bloom filter report possible
presence of any pattern then this pattern combines with attack rule IDs from the header
classification module is hashed together for checking in second-level Bloom filter index.
If the second-level Bloom filter also reports match, then packet is forwarded towards the
software executing Snort matching pattern algorithm. PFF also match the 144 number
of header only attack rules (No patterns) in packet header classification hardware sub-
module, thus further reducing processing load on Snort. This pattern filtering system
is tested with traces taken from Washington University network shows on average 87 %
of network traffic is reduced or filter. Authors also claim that the filtering system can
successfully operate to scale its operation up to 10 Gbps but no such claim proof is
provided with the help of any experiment results. In summary, this is the first ever
FPGA hardware based filtering system which performs pattern filtering as well as the
header only attack rules processing in FPGA. Its processing speed is much higher due
to hardware based implementation and much better than previously discussed software
based pattern filtering system.
In 2005, Attig and Lockwood proposed SIFT: Snort Intrusion filter for TCP which
is very similar to Snort Offloader [78]. SIFT like Snort Offloader is developed with
a combination of hardware and software processing facility. The filtering system is
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implemented on FPGA hardware with Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-8 FPGA in order to
reduce the amount of network traffic forwarded to Snort SB-NIDS for pattern search in
packet payload. Snort is executed on general purpose processor (AMD Athlon MP 2600+
with 3 GB RAM). SIFT also performs the header only attack rules on a packet in FPGA
hardware. The difference in the approach is that SIFT uses five Bloom filter engines
(16 Kbits vectors in FPGA block memory) for checking substring of packet payload
content for the presence of attack patterns. These is carried out by calculating eight
hash values on every substring of packet data and perform Bloom filter index lookup
for corresponding hash values. If the corresponding Bloom filter indexes are all set to
1 that indicates the pattern presence with certain false positive probability, then the
packet is forwarded to the Snort for comparison using Snort pattern matching algorithm
such as Boyer-Moore or Aho-Corasick. The filtering system is implemented with 2464
Snort attack rules and able to operate at 80 MHz, provides a throughput of 2.5 Gbps. It
processes 4 bytes per clock cycle and also filters between 86 % to 96 % of network traffic
for common network protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP, and IP). In summary, SIFT and Snort
Offloader provide very similar packet filter results. It’s only weakness is lack of support
to scan packet payload content for 1, 2 and 3-bytes patterns which constitute around
400 patterns of June 2008 release of Snort attack rules. In comparison to very similar
Bloom filter based pattern matching hardware design on FPGA presented in this thesis
(Section 5.3), SIFT operates with higher operating frequency and so provides higher
throughput. The lower pattern matching hardware operating frequency of the pattern
matching hardware design in this thesis limitation imposed by the hybrid hardware-
software processing platform which does not enable to synthesised the FPGA design
with MicroBlaze soft core processor of more than 50MHz frequency. Another reason
of attaining such a higher throughput by SIFT is that it offered only pattern filtering
system which does not perform any false positive patterns pruning. Furthermore, the
number of attack rules is nearly 3 times lower in this pattern filtering system which
directly affects the throughput.
In 2006, Sourdis et al proposed a FPGA based packet filtering system with integrated
Intrusion detection system (IDS) on the same FPGA [77]. This IDS consists of payload
matching and specialised processing engine. This specialised processing engine performs
regular expression and static pattern matching for Snort attack rules evaluation. The
filtering purpose in this system is to reduce the evaluation of number of rules search per
packet in IDS engine. Figure 3.15 shows the filtering process.
All packets first pass through the filtering hardware Field Extractor module where packet
header fields and payload content are extracted. Next the packet header is feed into the
filtering hardware Header matching module which perform key packet header field (Pro-
tocol, IP address and Port) match with rule header and reported the successfully match
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Figure 3.15: Packet processing flow in filtering hardware
rules. Simultaneously, the packet payload content also feed into the filtering hardware
Partial payload match module which match the payload content constant number of
prefix bytes (Between 2 to 10 bytes) with patterns from attack rules and report the
successfully match rules. Output from both modules are then AND (The AND gate)
and then final list of rules are then reported to integrated IDS for full matching of at-
tack rules. The filtering system is implemented with 3191 Snort rules (2271 number of
patterns) using two different FPGA families: Xilinx Virtex2-4000-6 and Virtex4-40-12.
With Virtex2-4000-6, packet filtering hardware is able to synthesised up to a clock fre-
quency of 335MHz (8-bits/clock cycle) giving an effective throughput of 2.7 Gbps and
with a clock frequency of up to 303 MHz clock (32 bits/clock cycle) giving 9.7 Gbps
of throughout. With Virtex2-4000-6, the filtering hardware is able to synthesised with
a clock frequency of up to 335 MHz (8 bits/clock cycle) giving an effective throughput
of 4.0 Gbps and with clock frequency of up to 303 MHz (32 bits/clock cycle) providing
14.0 Gbps throughout. The IDS part which has a coprocessor for pattern matching is
able to support 2.0 Gbps which is also very high throughout. However, an IDS in this
system is just a rule evaluation system and an additional layer of packet analysis soft-
ware system is needed to perform protocol analysis and stateful packet inspection that
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can only complement the lack of basic function of this IDS. In summary, it is the first
ever integrated FPGA filtering system with IDS which lacks in basic IDS functionality
but able to able to reduce the significant number of rules evaluation in IDS from 45 rules
on average per packet to 1.8 rules on average per packet.
Table 3.8: Hardware based pattern filtering
Authors
Number
of Rules
FPGA Throughput
Attig et al [78] 2464
Xilinx Virtex
XCV2000E-8
2.5 Gbps (4 bytes/cy-
cle at 80MHz
Song et al [79] 3600
Xilinx Virtex
XCV2000E-8
10.0 Gbps (Estimated
throughput)
Sourdis et al [77] 3191
Xilinx Virtex-II
4000-6
9.7 Gbps (4 bytes/cy-
cle at 303 MHz
Xilinx Virtex-IV
40-12
14.0 Gbps (4 bytes/cy-
cle at 303MHz
In 2007, Gonzalez et al proposed the first ever inline packet filtering system using
Net2FPGA 2.0 development platform. Net2FPGA platform has four gigabit Ethernet
interface connected to a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 30 (XC2VP30) FPGA [80]. The filtering
system acts as an Ethernet card to the host machine that has a Bro IDS installed to
perform packet analysis. When a network packet arrives the filtering system chooses
from one of three possibilities: a) Forward the packet to the opposite interface (Pass
packet without inspection) b) Drop it (Packet is identified as an attack) or c) Divert
(Shunt) the packet towards the host (Performing packet analysis). The filtering system
carried out these operations with the help of Bloom filter which is programmed with
malicious packet key header values (IP addresses, port numbers and Protocols). First
the filtering system hashed every incoming packet header key values (IP addresses, port
numbers and Protocols) and perform Bloom filter index checking with corresponding
hash values. If Bloom filter lookup result in a match found then Hashtable is checked.
The hashtable entry may include an action (forward, drop or shunt) to take on packet
with a priority defined from 0 to 7. A priority encoder then selects the highest priority
action and performs the corresponding action on the packet. The test result of filtering
hardware with network traces taken from University of Berkeley network shows that the
in best case, 88 % packets are forwarded to pass through network without analysis and
in worst case, the percentage of network packets passed without analysis dropped to
43.8 %. In summary, this is the first ever inline packet filtering system that does not
simply forward the packet to IDS but take appropriate action and so advances the state
of the art.
In summary, the idea of filtering system seems convincing for reducing computationally
load on pattern matching in SB-NIDS. It is more effective when implemented in FPGA as
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proposed by Song et al. [79] and Attig and Lockwood [78]. This is made further effective
and efficient by Sourdis et al. [77] and Gonzalez et al. [80] by presenting a FPGA based
filtering system with integrated NIDS on the same tightly coupled hardware architecture.
3.5.3 Pattern matching using High Performance Computing Platform
To optimise the pattern matching speed for Snort, the high performance computing
platform has been the subject of great interest for almost a decade. The two high per-
formance platform widely explored for this purpose are reconfigurable hardware (FPGA)
and Network Processor. ASIC has also been used for pattern matching optimisation,
such as Kumar et al ASIC based regular expression based pattern matching which is
implemented using finite state pattern machine approach [99]. Overall most of the ef-
fort is implemented with FPGA or Network Processor. These can classified further
by the chosen approaches of implementation, such as Hashing, Bloom filter and State
machine (Finite Automation or Non-Finite Automation)) that efficiently utilised the
high performance platforms processing power and resources. Table 3.9 summarise some
of these work implemented using FPGA [84, 86, 88, 89, 100–104] and network proces-
sors [93, 105]5.
All pattern matching design in table 3.9 have one thing in common that they imple-
mented and tested using Snort attack patterns. There are other pattern matching ap-
proach implemented using FPGA and more closely related to the work in this thesis
(Section 5.3). These work along with others closely related work to this thesis will
only be discussed in detail. These work are Bloom filter based pattern matching using
FPGA [81, 82, 106] and Snort rule processing optimisation which can be collectively
called as Snort Rule Processing System [85, 87, 90–92, 94]. Snort Rule Processing Sys-
tem involved packet processing that include packet classification (Rule selection) and
packet analysis (Packet header and payload check) which are implemented using FP-
GAs [85, 90, 94], hybrid hardware-software embedded processing platforms [87] and
Network Processors [91, 92]. (Table 3.10) shows the hardware used in these implemen-
tations.
Research contribution
In 2002, Gokhale et al proposed rule processing system for Snort using hybrid hardware-
software embedded processing platform [87]. They have written the Rule compiler soft-
ware module and the Rule processor hardware module. Rule compiler reads the subset
5This table illustrate few mostly cited work.
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Table 3.9: Some pattern matching implementation on FPGA and Network Processor
Hardware
Architecture
Authors Summary
Sourdis and
Pnev-
matikatos [86]
Pattern matching implementation using Content
Addressable Memory (CAM) for searching pat-
terns in network packets.
Baker et al [100]
A pattern matching hardware architecture using
Brute-force search approach of pattern matching
for SB-NIDS.
Tan and
Sherwood [88]
A hardware design that search patterns in packets
in parallel with multiple state machines created
of malicious patterns.
FPGA
Jung et al [89]
An implementation that converts pattern state
machine into state transition table for parallel
pattern search in packets.
Brodie et
al [102]
A pattern matching of regular expression that
matches multiple patterns concurrently using
state machines.
Sourdis et
al [84]
A pattern matching using hashing tree and string
comparator hardware circuit.
Mitra et al [103]
PCRE (Perl Compatible Regular Expression) En-
gine implementation using state machine based
pattern search.
Kennedy et
al [104]
Modified Aho-Corasick (State machine) imple-
mentation resulting 98% reduction in memory
consumption small enough to fit in the on-chip
FPGA memory.
Network Processor
Bos and
Huang [93]
Aho-Corasick (State machine) implementation
for searching patterns in packet in parallel using
multiple processors.
Piyachon and
Luo [105]
An implementation that modify Aho-Corasick
(State machine) into multiple bit-level state ma-
chine for searching pattern in packets using mul-
tiple processors in parallel.
of Snort attack rules and creates a representation of rule fields suitable for hardware
implementation. Using these rule fields, the Rule compiler then initialises the Content
Addressable Memory (CAM) content for packet header and payload checking. This
checking is carried out by the Rule processor which compares packet header fields and
contents with the contents of rule using parallel comparison logic of CAM. Once the
Rule processor complete rule checking and output the comparison results then the Rule
compiler process carries out the rule match result by raising the alarm for the attention
of network. This system is implemented on two Xilinx Virtex-1000 (XCV1000) FPGA
on a SLAAC1V board. The hardware designed is able to synthesised up to 66 MHz,
giving an effective throughput of 2.0 Gbps when tested with DARPA Lincoln lab net-
work traces for intrusion detection and testing with unspecified number of rules [107].
However, it can estimate from the year of paper publication that the number of Snort
rules used for experiment might be around 1500 to 2000 which are very low in number.
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Table 3.10: Hardware Details of development platform
Authors Hardware Description
Gokhale et
al [87]
2 * Xilinx Virtex 1000 XCV1000 FPGA on the SLAACIV board.
Liu et al [91]
Vitesse IQ2000 (VSC2100) Network Processor with four 200 MHz
RISC CPU packet processing engine.
Attig and
Loockwood [94]
Xilinx Virtex 2000E XCV2000E FPGA on the Field Programmable
Port extender platform.
Yusuf et al [85]
Xilinx Virtex-II Pro XC2VP30 FPGA on Xilinx University Program
board.
Caruso et al [92] Prototyped on Digilent Spartan-3 board with 3-picoCPU processor.
Cho et al [90] Xilinx Spartan-3 XC3S400 FPGA.
FPGA device utilisation summary for this design also shows that the complete rule pro-
cessing system occupies total 34 % of the FPGA logic slices of Xilinx Virtex XCV1000
FPGAs (8396 out 24576) which is acceptable because it comprises of rule header and
payload checking and on two FPGAs. In summary, this rule processing system is the
first ever proposal to addressed optimisation of Snort rule evaluation. A complete rule
evaluation system without integrated SB-NIDS is carefully designed to achieve a decent
throughput of 2.0 Gbps.
Liu et al in 2004 proposed a skip based prefix matching algorithm on Network Pro-
cessor [91]. This skip based algorithm which simplifies Snort rule processing is based
on simple reasoning: For any arbitrary pattern P, if packet stream with T number
of sequential bytes do not contain prefix of arbitrary pattern P, then the number of
bytes equal to the length of P can be skipped during searching. If in case prefix of
P found, then it is highly likely that the pattern is present in a packet stream. To
confirm the pattern presence a hashtable named as Rule Hashing Table (RHT) is im-
plemented that contains attack patterns and associated Rule IDs. The hash value is
computed on the suspected substring that previously matched with prefix pattern and
RHT is lookup in order to identify Rule. This algorithm implemented on Vitesse IQ2000
network processing board that has four 200 MHz RISC processors with each processor
has 2 KB of internal memory and a shared 512 MB Direct Rambus Dynamic Random
Access Memory (RDRAM). The algorithm performance is compared with the state of
the pattern matching algorithm which shows that this algorithm is more efficient than
set-wise Boyer-Moore Horspool [72], Aho-Corasick [55] and Wu-Manber [98] when length
of smallest pattern (LSP) search in the experiment is less than 4 (LSP ≤ 4) (35 % of
Snort pattern length were 4 or less when they tested the system.) out of the 1942 Snort
attack rules. In summary, it is a rule processing system that presents novel skip based
pattern matching algorithm. The experimental results show the algorithm performance
better than other state of the art algorithm only when pattern length 4 or less is search
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in packets. This is not a promising result with respect to the current Snort attack rules
number which is around 9000 which comprises of approximately 6800 patterns with over
length 4 patterns.
Attig and Lockwood in 2005 developed a framework for implementing a Rule processing
system in FPGA on University of Washington field programmable port extender (FPX)
platform [94]. The rule processing framework main components are packet header pro-
cessing and packet content scanning modules which is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex
2000E (XCV2000E) FPGA. Their implementation details are not well defined because
the stress is put in presenting the framework architecture. This system is implemented
with 2464 Snort rules which is able synthesised up to 80.6 MHz operating frequency,
giving a rule processing throughput of 2.56 Gbps. The device utilisation summary shows
the usage of only 25 % FPGA slices (4,832 out of 19,328) which is an efficient design. In
summary, a rule framework completely implemented on FPGA is presented which claim
to support for up to 32,768 Snort rules but does not provide any proof in the form of
test results. Also, an experiment for worst case traffic the framework throughput falls
to below 500 Mbps which is a clearly a bottleneck on gigabit data rate network.
Yusuf et al in 2006 proposed UNITE which is a rule processing system or engine [85].
UNITE performs packet header classification (Rule selection) and packet payload anal-
ysis utilising CAM which provide parallel comparison logic for matching packet header
and payload for rule selection and pattern matching. This design is implemented on the
Xilinx University Program (XUP) board which has a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro XC2VP30
FPGA. UNITE is implemented with 74 Snort attack rules and achieved an operating
frequency of 350 MHz with a packet processing throughput of 2.84 Gbps. In summary,
UNITE is a rule processing system but no packet header checking part of rule processing
which is a crucial weakness with respect to network security. It provides higher through-
put but only when implemented with 75 attack rules which has now soared to around
9000 attack rules and would significantly reduced the overall throughput of UNITE.
Caruso et al in 2007 proposed SPP-NIDS which performs parallel search of Snort attack
rule using clusters of processors [92]. This system is prototyped on Digilent Spartan-3
embedded processing board which has 3-picoCPUs (Processors). In SPP-NIDS, attack
rules are distributed and stored in picoCPU internal RAM. On receipt of packet in
picoCPU, each processor analyses the packet for the subset of rules stored in its local
memory. The prototype system performance is tested with 2124 Snort attack rules.
It shows that SPP-NIDS is able to analyse up to 100 Mbps network data rate which
is very low. The theoretical performance estimation of SPP-NIDS with 30-picoCPU
operating in parallel at 200 MHz frequency and with 1600 Snort rules shows maximum
achievable throughput of 53 Mbps. In summary SPP-NIDS is the lower performance
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rule processing system which is not feasible to be deployed on gigabit data rate network.
Its performance may further degrade if implemented with 9000 number of Snort rules
which would significantly increases the average number of rules checking per packet.
Cho et al in 2008 observed that most of the pattern of Snort attack rules can be searched
in a packet content in parallel and ideal to implement using FPGA parallel logic re-
source [90]. They developed a parallel search engine which comprises of a hardware
module called rule units. Each rule units implement the logic for a single Snort rule sig-
nature which comprises of rule header matching unit and comparator unit to compare
pattern with the packet payload content. Their pattern matching system was unable
to synthesise successfully only 2000 Snort attack rule. This is due to the inefficient
design which creates the static pattern comparator which requires atleast 66,000 LUTs
for 8 bit and over 260,000 LUTs for a 32 bit comparator. They improve this design
by leveraging on the hardware architecture and the data-specific optimisations. The
optimisation decreased 50 % of the logic area which is achieved by changing a design
to the memory based pattern tree search approach. Their final design implementation
on Xilinx Spartan-3 XC3S400 FPGA with 2000 Snort attack rules achieved a sustained
throughput of 1.6 Gbps. In summary, this rule processing system is an efficient design
but provide no header check facility which is considered an incomplete implementation.
It provides decent throughput 1.6 Gbps suitable for gigabit Ethernet data rate traffic.
Table 3.11: Snort Rule Evaluation Systems summary
Authors
Rule
Selection
Header
Check
Payload
Check
Snort Rules
(Number)
Throughput
Gokhale et al [87] X X X 1500-2000 2.0 Gbps
Liu et al [91] X X X 1942 Unspecified
Attig and
Loockwood [94]
X X X 2464 2.5 Gbps
Yusuf et al [85] X X X 74 2.8 Gbps
Caruso et al [92] X X X 2124 100 Mbps
Cho et al [90] X X X 2000 1.6 Gbps
In summary, state of the art rule processing systems are discussed. All rule processing
system are discussed are not part of SB-NIDS and so are incomplete systems. The
issue has been addressed in this thesis which proposed an integrated rule processing
system with NIDS on the embedded processing platform which advances the state of
the art (Section 5.3). The proposed designed also gives throughput of 1.85 Gbps for
pattern matching in FPGA which is lower in comparison to the design presented by
Yusuf et al. [85], Attig and Lockwood [94] and Gokhale et al. [87]. The main reason of
lower throughput is due to the restriction imposed by the embedded processing platform
used in development which does not allow synthesising FPGA hardware design along
with MicroBlaze soft core processor for more than 50 MHz operating frequency. This
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limitation can easily be overcome by synthesising a design to higher grade FPGA like
Xilinx Virtex 7 which would easily support much higher operating frequency. The rule
processing implementation presented in this thesis occupies 26357 FPGA slices (26357
out of 33792 slices) which is higher in comparison to the hardware design discussed above
but performs 16 parallel rule searches and supports around 9120 attack patterns which
supersede every implementation.
There are some other systems which are not a rule processing systems but are related to
this thesis work in a way that those work also used the Bloom filter [5] data structure
for pattern matching implementation. These FPFA hardware design are now discussed.
Dharmapurikar et al. [81] in 2003 proposed a Bloom filter engine for deep packet inspec-
tion (Pattern matching) on FPGA. Each engine has a separate Bloom filter programmed
with patterns of Snort attack rules for quick pattern checking in packet payload. When
packet payload content is streamed through the system, the hash values are computed
on each substring of packet content and corresponding Bloom filter index are checked. If
Bloom filter lookup result in a pattern presence then it is further checked with analyser
hardware module. The analyser module is comprises of Hashtable where patterns are
stored for comparison with a substring using hardware comparator circuit. This step is
necessary as Bloom filter gives matching result with some probability of false positive.
The functional prototype with a single Bloom filter engine is implemented on Xilinx
XCV2000E FPGA on the field programmable port extender (FPX) platform with only
up to 32 bytes pattern is able to achieve an operating frequency of 81 MHz. The FPGA
logic resources summary also shows that this design is efficient which only occupies
14 % of available FPGA logic resources and 35 block RAM. The test results show that
this system performs packet analysis of up to 2.46Gbps throughput. The test results
also revealed the implementation weakness which inefficiently searches any pattern over
16 bytes length. To overcome this issue and add support for longer patterns, Dharma-
purikar and Lockwood in 2006 extend this design with Aho-Corsaick based multi-pattern
matching algorthm [106]. In summary, this is considered the first ever implementation
of pattern matching for SB-NIDS using Bloom filter which advanced the state of the
art. The hardware architecture is also an efficient implementation apart of the design
inefficiency to deal effectively with longer patterns.
Nourani and Katta in 2007 proposed a Bloom filter based hardware architecture for
pattern matching on ASIC [82]. Streaming data is passed through the Bloom filter
accelerator hardware module which computes the hash value on substring and query
the Bloom filter index which may result in false positive match. In case of match the
dispatcher hardware module pass the substring to parallel hash engine that perform
the false positive check by comparing the matched pattern with the pattern stored in
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hashtable. The design was synthesized using Synopsys design compiler using library files
from Artisan targeting the 180 nm Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) fabrication process
and can operate at speed of 250 MHz given an effective throughput of 1000 Gbps that
is very higher than all other implementations. In summary, it is a high speed ASIC
pattern matching system which supports extremely high throughput.
In summary, the Bloom filter based pattern matching approach is ideal for excluding
major part of network traffic for full analysis using computationally demanding pattern
matching algorithms. Its straight forward implementation also consumes less memory
and enable high speed pattern searching on FPGAs. The only implementation issue is
the high number of hash value computation which affects the overall throughput of the
system. This issue has addressed in this thesis (Section 5.3).
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter began with an introduction of state of the art SB-NIDS implementations
which are explained in great detail in section 3.3. The state of the art is divided into
categories for clear understanding of state of the art implementations and contributions
made to advance the state of the art.
Chapter 4
Proposed System Architecture
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is currently considered the most reliable and stan-
dard solution of the internet security. One of its best examples is the EINSTEIN-2 [108]
project of the United States of America (USA) government to protect the government
infrastructure of computer networks hosting crucial data. EINSTEIN-2 is a Signature-
based Network Intrusion Detection system (SB-NIDS) that uses the set of attack signa-
tures or patterns to detect malicious activity on a network. Developing such a sophisti-
cated solution is a complex task and requires in depth understanding of network security
issues, network defence technology and processing technology requirement. This chapter
looks into some of these issues in order to lay the foundation of SB-NIDS prototyping
and optimisation (Chapter 5).
4.1 Chapter Roadmap
The rest of the chapter is divided into two major sections which are outlined as follows:
• In section 4.2, an overview of SB-NIDS is presented with a focus on its packet
analysis architecture and features in order to estimate requirements of developing
an improved SB-NIDS prototype.
• In final section 4.3 Snort SB-NIDS software architecture is discussed in detail
which helped in outlining prototyping challenges. These challenges also helped to
determine the appropriate processing technology for prototyping.
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4.2 System Description
This section includes description of SB-NIDS architecture and SB-NIDS features neces-
sary to understand the requirements of SB-NIDS prototyping.
4.2.1 Overview
The SB-NIDS prototype should be capable of performing real-time network traffic anal-
ysis on Internet Protocol (IP) network. This analysis should at least involve looking
for attack signatures in network packets, Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) and protocol
analysis. If SB-NIDS detects any attack in packet it should also raise alarm and inform
the administrator. It should also easily deploy on a network point or network backbone.
4.2.2 Architecture
SB-NIDS can be visualised as collection of software components or modules where each
component performs different tasks as shown in figure 4.1.
Capture Analysis Process
Result
Packet Queue Packet
Figure 4.1: NIDS Modules
SB-NIDS first captures the data or network packets from network interface in promis-
cuous packet capture mode. The raw packet data is decode and store into SB-NIDS
application memory for carrying out analysis. The analysis is a complex process per-
form in stages on the dissected data. This include search of attack signatures in packet
payload data, SPI to keep track of legitimate network traffic and protocol analysis to
detect any protocol based attacks which usually carries out by exploiting vulnerabilities
in internet protocols (Section 2.2.1).
In SB-NIDS software the packet analysis is usually perform by multiple analyser com-
ponents which are configurable in order to enable it to customise and configure for
different types of network environment. This configuration involves disable/enable par-
ticular type of analysis component, changes in size of memory requires for analysis and
updates attack signature database with newly release copy of attack signatures. To
apply this configurations SB-NIDS should provide at least simple user interface.
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4.2.3 Deployment
SB-NIDS is deployed at a point in network where all network traffic is visible and can
be capture for analysis. The general deployment of SB-NIDS is shown in figure 4.2.
Internet
NIDS
Network of Servers
Network of PC’s
Network Administrator
Figure 4.2: NIDS Deployment
The machine on which SB-NIDS is installed should have at least two network interface
card so it can be connected to a suitable network point or network backbone for network
traffic capture and another interface for configurations and management. SB-NIDS is
usually connected through a network switch which supports port mirroring which is
actually copying of network packets from all ports of switch to the analysis port on
which SB-NIDS connects.
4.2.4 Features
SB-NIDS should provide several network security services. Some of the major services
are now discussed:
Deep Packet Inspection
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a method that enables inspection of every single byte
of every network packet that passes through the network. This means every single byte
of packet header as well as packet content from layer-2 through layer-7 (Open System
Interconnection (OSI) model) is analyse for attack signature presence using DPI in real
time. DPI ensures to detect common attack signatures of malware and therefore essential
SB-NIDS features.
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Network Protocol Analysis
Network protocol analysis is a process to understand the data and information inside
the network packet encapsulated by the network protocols. A typical protocol analysis
involved capturing a network packet in real time, decoding of network protocols and
analyses of the decoded network packets data. Protocol analysis is perform to detect
common network attacks which are carries out by the misuse of network protocols (Sec-
tion 2.2.1). SB-NIDS should perform network protocol analysis for common protocols
whose manipulation can crash network applications and devices. Some protocol based
attacks could crashes the SB-NIDS itself such as TCP SYN packet flooding attack on
SB-NIDS force it to trigger hundreds of alert every seconds which would result in exhaust
of SB-NIDS processing resource (Section 2.2.1).
Stateful Packet Inspection
SPI is crucial for internet traffic monitoring where 90% of traffic is stateful or based
on TCP protocol. Lack of SPI feature means SB-NIDS is unable to detect stateful
attacks which may present in majority of network traffic. It is therefore essential that
SPI should be a part of SB-NIDS. For example SPI enables the SB-NIDS to detect state
based attacks such as TCP RST attack (Section 2.2.1).
Configuration Interface
SB-NIDS is sophisticated software that has multiple software analysis components to
carry out packet analysis in order to detect many types of complex network attacks.
Such SB-NIDS software needs configurable options to customise analysis components
and to enable them to operate on different types of network environment. It is essential
that NIDS should have some kind of interface to apply configurations and customise the
analysis components according to network environment.
Alert Reporting
NIDS or SB-NIDS should accurately and promptly notifies the network administrator if
any intrusions or attacks are discover during real time network packet analysis. The re-
porting should include accurate information about attack such as attacker IP addresses,
ports, protocol and timing of attacks. It is therefore essential that NIDS should pro-
vide a feature of real time reporting of network intrusion and attacks with basic attack
information.
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Prevention Capability
NIDS or SB-NIDS softwares only able to detect network intrusions and alert the net-
work administrator to take the appropraite actions. An automatic prevention facility
is desirable to prevent attacks without the need of human or network administrator
intervention.
4.3 System Prototyping
SB-NIDS prototyping with all desired features is an extremely complex software engi-
neering task which would easily require more than couple of years to create just a basic
SB-NIDS prototype model. An alternative technique is a software porting1. Porting
is comparatively easier and less complex than software development and saved vital
prototyping time. However, an in depth understanding of software package internal ar-
chitecture and other necessary features is required for successfully porting any software.
There were not many choices of good and freely available open-source SB-NIDS packages
(Section 2.4.5) that could select for prototyping. The two popular with most of the
essential and desirable features are Snort and Bro. Snort is prefer over Bro on the basis
of following two reasons:
• Bro is purely experimental NIDS for fine-tuning or improving the packet analy-
sis features whereas, Snort is a widely used open source free available SB-NIDS
software package for real time packet analysis.
• Snort in comparison to Bro is the chosen SB-NIDS for research and development
in academia mainly for optimising packet analysis speed performance.
4.3.1 Snort
Snort is a SB-NIDS software package capable of real-time detection of network intrusions
and attacks using attack signature, SPI and protocol analysis.
History: Snort first became available on December 22, 1998 on Packet Storm web-
site (http://www.packetstormsecurity.com) as network Packet Sniffer application. This
consists of 1,600 lines of C-programming language source code.
1Porting is a process of making the software to execute on a computing architecture that is different
from the one for which it was originally designed
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Features: Snort in just first 3 years emerged to full fledged SB-NIDS. It emerged as to
have all the essential and desirable features outlined in section 4.2.4. The main features
of Snort are:
• Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) which is a packet analysis involving each and every
byte of packet analysis using attack signatures specified in Snort attack rules.
• Protocol analysis from layer-2 to layer-7 protocols (OSI model) including port
scanning.
• Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) which involves keeping the track of the state of
network connections in order to detect stateful protocol attacks.
• Real-time attack alert and log facility for the analysis by network administrator.
4.3.2 Snort Architecture
Snort core component is the Packet Sniffer, the other components were added on top
of the core component as plug-ins to process the sniffed packet. These components
are the Preprocessor, the Detection Engine and the Decision Engine added as plug-ins.
Figure 4.3 is the Snort architecture showing packet processing flow in plug-ins.
Internet
1) Packet
Sniffer
3) Detection
Engine
4) Decision
Engine
Database
2) Preprocessors
Rules
Figure 4.3: Snort architecture showing packet processing flow
Snort sniffed the packet through sniffer component and then performs the packet analysis
in stages. First the sniffed packet protocol is decoded and the data is save to the
Snort application memory area. This data is then analyse by the Preprocessor which
check it for protocol based attacks. Once this complete this data is then check for
attack signatures using Snort attack rules in the Detection Engine component which also
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generates the detection results. This result is process by the Decision Engine component
which also raises the alarm and logs the detection result.
Packet Sniffer and Decoder: A Packet Sniffer allows to tap into the data network
in order to capture packets for troubleshooting and analysis. It captures them from the
hardware (network interface card) in promiscuous mode using the third party packet
capture library called libpcap. If packet sniffing is perform on the Internet facing net-
work then it is most probably the IP traffic encapsulating many different higher-layer
protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP, OSPF etc). Packet Sniffer also decodes packet protocols
with the help of its Packet Decoder component. The decoding results in arrangement of
packet protocol data separately in Snort run-time memory so packet can analyse easily.
Figure 4.4 shows the Packet Sniffer function.
Packets
Network
Interface Card
libpcap
Decoder
FTP
HTTP
SMTP
TELNET
TCP
UDP
ICMP
Figure 4.4: Packet Sniffer function
Preprocessor: Preprocessor component has a plug-in architecture covering many pro-
tocols from layer-3 to layer-7 (OSI layers). The plug-in architecture is a very useful
function as it allows enable/disable the Preprocessor through the simple text file inter-
face. For example each Preprocessor is designated to analyse specific protocol and if
certain protocol requires exclusion then this can be disabled through a simple command
in text file. Preprocessor performes detail protocol analysis to detect protocol based
attacks in network packets (Section 2.2.1). Data normalisation is also carries out for
certain protocol such as HTTP in order to make the data refined for quick signature
searching in Detection Engine component. Figure 4.5 shows the packet processing flow
through Snort Preprocessors.
Packet Decoder decodes the packet protocols and arranges all the packet protocol data
separately in Snort run-time memory. Now the IP defragmentation Preprocessor re-
assembles fragmented packets and also look for any malicious fragmentation purposely
done hackers to launch DoS attack (Section 2.2.1). The SPI Preprocessor then verifies
if the TCP packets are a part of an established connection and if not then packet is
treated as malicious. It also reassembles the packet to detect attacks that spans to
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Figure 4.5: Packet processing flow through Preprocessors
multiple packet or extends to the sequence of packet exchanges. The collection of appli-
cation layer Preprocessors normalises protocol data and also checks misuse of protocols
by hackers for launching attacks. Finally, packet data passes on to the Snort Detection
Engine component for further analysis.
Detection Engine: Detection Engine is the brain of Snort. This is where packet data
are searched for attack signatures specified in the set of Snort attack rules and makes
this brain functional. So effectively Snort search the packet data through the set of rules.
If the rules match the packet data then Decision Engine takes the action. Figure 4.6
shows the flowchart of packet analysis in Detection Engine using attack rules.
Snort rules: Without rules there is no purpose of Detection Engine and hence no
signature detection. So what exactly the attack rules purpose in Snort Detection Engine?
The simple answer of the exact question is it is an instruction to Detection Engine. But
what those instructions are? Now consider the way human language is used to describe
everyday acts and instructions, this will help to understand the concepts behind Snort
rules. Consider the instruction,
Chapter 4. Requirements and Analysis 83
Detection Engine
Rules
Any rule
match?
if YES, 
take action
if NO, 
discard
Packet
Figure 4.6: Packet checking in Detection Engine
“If the landlord elder son turns up to listen the complaint then make sure to give him
the exact information and request for an immediate action”.
This instruction contains a state, and then an action to perform if the state is true.
Like “complaint” and “immediate action request” can only be made to the “landlord
elder son”. Snort rules are also this type of instructions but more specific and exact
instructions supported by Snort rule language. Figure 4.7 is the Snort rule of CGI-PHF
attack specified in Snort rule language syntax.
alert tcp any any → 192.168.1.0/24 80 (content: “cgi-bin/phf”; offset: 3;
depth: 22; msg:“CGI-PHF attack”;)
Figure 4.7: Snort rule of CGI-PHF attack
This Snort rule clearly specifies state and the required action if the state is true. It gives
the instructions to the Detection Engine that if it encounter any TCP packet header
originating from any valid source IP address/port destined to IP address 192.168.1.0/24
and at port 80, and packet payload content string cgi-bin/phf is present anywhere be-
tween byte number-2 to byte number-25 then take an action on a packet by alerting the
administrator with a message of “CGI-PHF attack”. The packet payload content for
malicious pattern is searched using pattern matching algorithm. All Snort rules specifies
the instruction in a similar manner. Logically they are divided into two sections: Rule
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header and Rule option. Rule contents up to the first parenthesis belong to the rule
header and the contents of the parenthesis belong to the rule option.
Rule Headers: It specifies seven items as shown in figure 4.8. First item from the
left is action. There are five default actions in Snort:- alert, log, pass, activate and
dynamic. The 5 rule actions are available when Snort runs in Intrusion Detection Mode.
Other rule options are also available when Snort is configured to operate inline (Intrusion
Prevention mode). Next to action is protocol. Snort currently inspects TCP, UDP, IP
and ICMP protocols for suspicious activity and in the future protocols such as IGRP,
GRE, ARP, IPX, and RIP will be supported. Snort’s coverage of network attacks will
be extended at the cost of further increases in the Detection Engine’s (See section 5.3.1)
computational overheads. The remaining portion of a Snort rule deals with packet IP
address, port and packet flow direction information for a given rule. The first item after
protocol indicates the source IP address and after this the next item is the source port.
In the above example Snort rule (figure 4.7), keyword Any is used to specify any valid
IP address and port. Specific valid IP address and port ranges for destination system
just next to –> operator can also be specifies, this makes it possible to easily customise
the Snort rules for a particular network providing or consuming specific internet services
identified by IP addresses and ports. Next the direction operator –> indicates traffic
flow from source to destination, or another operator <> indicates bi-directional traffic
flow. There is no <– operator in the Snort rule description language. The item after the
direction operator indicates the destination IP address and port number, which can be
specified to match any address/port or specific single or ranges of both IP address and
port numbers. In summary, any incoming packet that matches the rule header items
(IP, Port and Direction) is selected to be analysed against the rule options. These rule
header items collectively called the rule selection criterion.
            Rule Header 
 
(a)      (b)     (c)         (d)        (e)          (f)              (g) 
 
ACTION PROTOCOL SRC-IP SRC-PORT PACKET-FLOW-DIRECTION DEST-IP DEST-PORT 
 
alert    ip    any    any          ->          any   3455 
   
Figure 4.8: Snort rule header
Rule Options: Rule options define the structure of a malicious packet that include
packet header and payload. These options are made up of option/value pair like in
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) options/tags. The values mentioned with these
options are actually checked against the packet. When all values found in a packet then
it is declared a malicious packet.
Rule option types: There are two types of rule options: header options (non-payload
options) and payload options. Some header options are Time to Live (TTL), Type of
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Service (TOS). These two options specify numeric values which are searched in packet
headers. Two important and mostly defined payload options are Content and URI-
Content. The values of these options are attack patterns comprise of strings. Payload
options are search at arbitrary or defined positions in packet payload content.
Content Modifier options: Content modifier options define where and how many
bytes to look into packet for attack pattern defined with the Content and URIContent
options. Some main modifier options are summarised in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Modifier Keywords
Modifier
Keyword
Description
Depth
The depth keyword specify how far into a packet Snort should search for
the specified pattern
Offset
The textitoffset keyword specify where to start searching for a pattern
within a packet.
Distance
The distance keyword specify how far into a packet Snort should ignore
before starting to search for the specified pattern relative to the end of
the previous pattern match.
Within
The within keyword is a content modifier that makes sure that at most
N bytes are between pattern matches using the Content. It is designed
to be used in conjunction with the distance rule option.
Decision Engine: This component is the exit point for packet data that entered for
processing through Packet Sniffer component. The component purpose is to take action
in case of rule matches on a packet specified in Snort rule header. For example: In
figure 4.7 this rule specifies that in case of rule match alert is sent to network admin-
istrator. It depends on Decision Engine configuration how the alert would be sent. It
can be configured to send alert through a network connection or UNIX socket or can be
stored in an SQL database server such as MYSQL or simply log the alert to hardisk.
4.3.3 Prototyping Challenges
Porting such a complex SB-NIDS software package poses several challenges. These
challenges need to be met so that the objectives are achieved. These challenges are now
discussed briefly:
Analysis
The three types of network packet analysis in Snort carries out in real-time are: Signature
analysis, SPI and protocol analysis. All of these tasks require sufficient packet processing
facility and amount of memory to make sure it should be drop free packet analysis.
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Speed
Snort is a bottleneck when executes on a general purpose processor [2]. This is one of
the most challenging tasks and requires detail analysis of packet analysis process as well
as careful consideration of selecting appropriate processing technology.
Memory
Snort primary analysis technique is attack signature checking of known attacks in every
network packet appearing on a network for the possible signs of intrusion and attacks.
The signature database is in thousands in numbers and that occupy significantly large
chunk of SB-NIDS runtime memory. If the Snort decides to be ported on an embedded
processing architecture that has limited memory then this problem needs tackling by
considering a suitable data structure of compactly storing the signature without com-
promising on packet analysis speed.
4.3.4 Prototyping Requirements
To meet the SB-NIDS prototyping challenges (Section 4.3.3) an appropriate development
tools and processing platform is chosen which is now discussed.
Processing Platform
Speed and Storage are two major prototyping challenges that can be meet by choosing
the right processing technology which should be ideal for network packet processing.
Following processing technology are identified for prototyping:
• Network Processing Unit (NPU)
• Cluster of PC’s on general purpose processor
• Graphical Processor Unit (GPU)
• Hybrid Hardware-Software (FPGA/Processor) embedded processing platform
Out of these four processing technology hybrid hardware-software embedded processing
platform is more viable for SB-NIDS prototyping due to the following characteristics
which has clear advantages over other three technologies:
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• It has a dedicated processing unit tightly coupled to the network interface which
are neither available with cluster of PC’s nor with GPU unit.
• Custom hardware accelerator for offloading computationally demanding SB-NIDS
sub-tasks from CPU to FPGA which are not available in NPUs.
• Multiple processing cores for parallel processing.
• Single cycle access of high speed on-chip FPGA memory for storing most frequently
access data.
The processing power of FPGA is enormous in comparison to processors. It also sup-
ports instruction pipelining, parallel processing and bit-level computing which are not
supported on general purpose processors instruction sets. It also has the ability to
quickly reprogram and consider as shorter time to develop application than Application
Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). Following section has a detail explanation of hybrid
hardware-software embedded processing platform for SB-NIDS prototyping.
Hybrid Hardware-Software Embedded Processing Platform
Hybrid hardware-software embedded processing platform is not only available at afford-
able cost but it has adequate processing power, ease of hybrid hardware-software devel-
opment interface and also scalable in terms of processing resources. Hybrid HandelC/Mi-
croBlaze based embedded processing platform is also of this kind which is available by the
manufacturer Mentor Graphics (Formerly Celoxica) that provide all essential features
of hybrid hardware-software embedded processing platform outlined in section 4.3.4.
HandelC/MicroBlaze Hybrid Processing Technology: The HandelC/MicroBlaze
based hybrid processing platform is shown in figure 4.9.
This platform is available on Celoxica RC series board (RC300) [109]. The main com-
ponents of the board are Xilinx XC2V6000 -4 Virtex-II FPGA, 2 Gigabit Ethernet
interfaces, 4 banks of 8 MB ZBT SRAM and 1 bank of 128 MB DRAM. Clearly, it is
important to note that the FPGA device used in this study is only a VirtexII whereas Vir-
tex7 device families are the current state of the art for Xilinx products. Virtex7 devices
offer significantly higher clock rates and enhanced non-configurable on-chip functional
units that offer the potential of corresponding improvements in performance merely by
pushing the design through the Xilinx and Mentor Graphics synthesis tools for a Virtex7
device target.
MicroBlaze Soft-core processor: MicroBlaze is a 32 bit RISC based architecture
optimised for Xilinx devices. It is a soft-core processor and is therefore implemented
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Figure 4.9: HandelC and MicroBlaze design system
entirely using FPGA logic resources. MicroBlaze programs are developed using the C-
language compiled with a Xilinx port of the GCC compiler called MicroBlaze-gcc(mb-
gcc). MicroBlaze also supports instruction and data caches. These two caches are
maintained in FPGA block RAM. MicroBlaze also supports three bus interfaces (FSL,
OPB and LMB). These busses are Local Memory Bus (LMB), Fast Simplex Link (FSL),
and On-chip Peripheral Bus (OPB).
LMB is a dedicated and low latency (memory mapped) addressable bus. In most cases
small sizes of memory modules (Scratch or Cache memory) are attached to this bus.
Some processors also allow custom hardware units to attach with this bus. In this
system, LMB provides a link to dedicated local on-chip memory (FPGA BRAM).
OPB is a shared MicroBlaze bus which is a part of IBM’s CoreConnect specification.
Due to the shared nature of the OPB, reading and writing into peripheral usually takes
around 10 or 11 cycles [110].
MicroBlaze Fast Simplex Link (FSL) provides a point-to-point interconnect to co-processing
unit. MicroBlaze supports up to 8 FSL links that provide flexibility to attach up to 8
co-processing units. These co-processing units can be either another MicroBlaze core
or a custom hardware accelerator. Dedicated instructions are also available to write
into and read from this interface. The two macros for reading and writing via FSL are
getfsl() and putfsl(). Reading and writing via FSL takes only up to 2 cycles per word
(32-bits) on average [111].
Chapter 4. Requirements and Analysis 89
Hardware Development: Custom hardware design on this platform can be imple-
mented using standard RTL flows, or they can utilise Mentor Graphics hardware descrip-
tion language HandelC. Celoxica’s Integrated Development Environment (IDE) called
DK can compile HandelC based designs into EDIF or VHDL/Verilog. The Celoxica
board-support libraries for the RC300 enable fast design prototyping. The key to achiev-
ing higher performance is to offload the functionality of computationally intensive NIDS
program components from CPU to HandelC specified hardware accelerator which can
be attached to MicroBlaze via FSL or OPB bus interfaces.
OPB provides a memory mapped interface to peripheral components. For example the
address space occupied by the HandelC interface on OPB is between 0xF0000000 and
0xFFFFFFFF. This address space is used for all OPB slaves created in the HandelC
design. This address space is specified in MicroBlaze Hardware Specification file sys-
tem.mhs as shown in figure 4.10.
BEGIN opb_hcbridge 
PARAMETER INSTANCE = opb_hc_bridge 
PARAMETER HW_VER = 1.00.a 
PARAMETER C_BASEADDR = 0xF0000000 
PARAMETER C_HIGHADDR = 0xFFFFFFFF 
BUS_INTERFACE SOPB = opb_bus 
END 
Figure 4.10: OPB slave memory space in system.mhs file
The address space between 0xF0000000 and 0xFFFFFFFF is also defined in shared.h
file can be created manually. This file is shared between hardware and software design.
This address space is used to split up the address space for different OPB slaves defined
in HandelC.
To attach HandelC hardware accelerator on OPB bus, HandelC source file should imple-
ment read and write callback macro for hardware-software communication or message
passing and another macro for defining the processing functionality of the hardware ac-
celerator. This source file should also include opb slave tl.hch header file which specifies
all the macro procedures required to implement hardware accelerator on OPB bus. Fol-
lowing are the required information the HandelC hardware accelerator source code file
should contain,
• a data structure for the HandelC hardware accelerator
• a macro procedure to define functionality of the HandelC hardware accelerator
• a macro procedure to run the HandelC hardware accelerator
• a callback macro procedure to write data to the HandelC hardware accelerator
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• a callback macro procedure to read data from the HandelC hardware accelerator
The data structure of HandelC hardware accelerator may consists of registers for ex-
changing data between accelerator and program on MicroBlaze. The four HandelC
macro procedures provide the hardware accelerator functionality. Two macro proce-
dures are callback macro for reading and writing data between hardware accelerator
and program on MicroBlaze. Another macro for running the hardware accelerator in
parallel with other HandelC hardware accelerator in the same design. One other macro
contains the core logic for HandelC hardware accelerator.
Unlike OPB, FSL bus is not memory mapped. FSL bus is a direct link to MicroBlaze.
FSL needs to be explicitly declared in MicroBlaze Hardware Specification file system.mhs
as shown in figure 4.11.
BEGIN microblaze 
PARAMETER INSTANCE = mblaze 
PARAMETER HW_VER = 2.00.a 
PARAMETER C_USE_BARREL = 1 
BUS_INTERFACE ILMB = i_lmb 
BUS_INTERFACE DLMB = d_lmb 
BUS_INTERFACE IOPB = opb_bus 
 
#FSL Bus description 
PARAMETER C_FSL_LINKS = 1 
PORT FSL0_S_READ = fsl0_s_read 
PORT FSL0_S_DATA = fsl0_s_data 
PORT FSL0_S_CONTROL = fsl0_s_control 
PORT FSL0_S_EXISTS = fsl0_s_exists 
PORT FSL0_S_WRITE = fsl0_s_write 
PORT FSL0_M_DATA = fsl0_m_data 
PORT FSL0_M_CONTROL = fsl0_m_control 
PORT FSL0_M_FULL = fsl0_m_full 
END 
Figure 4.11: OPB slave memory space in system.mhs file
To attach HandelC hardware accelerator to FSL bus, HandelC source file should imple-
ment read and write callback macro for hardware-software communication or message
passing and another macro for defining the processing functionality of the hardware ac-
celerator. This source file should also include fsl t1.hch header file which specifies all the
macro procedures required to implement hardware accelerator on OPB bus. Following
are the required information the HandelC hardware accelerator source code file should
contain,
• a data structure for the HandelC hardware accelerator
• a macro procedure to run the HandelC hardware accelerator
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• a callback macro procedure to write data to the HandelC hardware accelerator
• a callback macro procedure to read data from the HandelC hardware accelerator
The data structure of HandelC hardware accelerator on FSL may consists of registers
for exchanging data between accelerator and program on MicroBlaze. The three macro
procedure provides the functionality of hardware accelerator. Two macro procedures are
callback macro for reading and writing data between hardware accelerator and program
on MicroBlaze. Another macro for running the hardware functional unit in parallel with
other HandelC hardware accelerators in design. The core logic for HandelC hardware
accelerator can be provided separately in another macro procedure.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter began by looking SB-NIDS architecture and features which helped to es-
timates the requirements of prototyping an optimised SB-NIDS. This is followed by
in-depth discussion of Snort SB-NIDS software package which is a system chosen to
prototype a SB-NIDS. Snort internal architecture and features are discussed in detail
which helped to understand the requirements of processing and computing platform for
SB-NIDS prototyping and optimisation. In the end hybrid hardware-software embed-
ded processing platform that is chosen to developed the SB-NIDS prototype is discussed
which would enable to develop an improved a scalable SB-NIDS prototype solution. In
the following chapters the series of algorithms and hardware architectures are discussed
as part of the SB-NIDS prototype development and optimisation.
Chapter 5
Design and Implementation
Sir Frederick Henry Royce was an engineer and one of the founders of Rolls-Royce Ltd
said:
“Strive for perfection in everything you do. Take the best that
exists and make it better. When it does not exist, design it.”
This engineering philosophy is followed in the development of Signature based Network
Intrusion Detection System (SB-NIDS) prototype. Strive for perfection is the core prin-
ciple of engineering and is also applied in SB-NIDS prototyping. This is practically
achieved by choosing the best available hardware and software tools such as hybrid
hardware-software processing platform and Snort SB-NIDS software package. There are
few cores SB-NIDS features that are necessary and needs development to make SB-NIDS
packet analysis speed better. These features are carefully designed and implemented by
considering the development challenges outlined in section 4.3.3.
5.1 Chapter Roadmap
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows:
• In section 5.2, MMU-Snort I or SB-NIDS prototype development using hybrid
HandelC-MicroBlaze embedded processing platform is presented. This involve
a brief analysis of Snort SB-NIDS software execution to understand SB-NIDS
processing requirement, Snort SB-NIDS software architecture restructuring and
mapping details to processing platform.
92
Chapter 5. Design and Implementation 93
• In section 5.3, MMU-Snort II or Pattern Matching Hardware Asccelerator (PMHA)
development is presented. This involve an analysis of Snort’s Detection Engine
component that performs pattern matching and an analysis of Bloom filter data
structure for compactly storing large number of attack patterns. This is followed
by detail PMHA design and implementation description.
• In final section 5.4, MMU-Snort III or further improvement of PMHA is presented.
This include algorithmic and architectural improvement of PMHA to speed up
pattern false positive pruning process and efficiently search longer patterns (>
64 bytes).
5.2 Snort Port on Hybrid Hardware-Software Processing
Platform (MMU-Snort I)
This section contains detail description of MMU-Snort I development using hybrid
hardware-software embedded processing platform and Snort SB-NIDS software package.
This novel development platform and Snort SB-NIDS helped to come up with much
improved SB-NIDS solution in a significantly shorter time with all required features
(Section 4.2.4).
5.2.1 Analysis
The application execution analysis is the profiling of Snort. The profiling result of
Snort (ver 2.6.1.5) on Personal Computer (PC) using a GNU gprof profiler (v 2.16)
was obtained. Snort was executed on Intel 2.0 GHz processor on Debian Linux 2.6.18.
It was configured with five Preprocessor components (Stream4, frag2, HTTP Inspect,
Telnet decode and sfportscan) and 6565 number of rules. The network packet trace used
to obtain the profiling result was MIT Lincoln Lab’s 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection
Evaluation dataset (Network trace file (tcpdump format)) [107]. Table 5.1 shows the
percentage of the total execution time used by each component1.
Table 5.1: Profile of Snort on PC
Component Execution %
Detection Engine 49%
Packet Decoder 19%
Preprocessors 21%
Decision Engine 11%
1Profiling results depend on Snort configuration and test data.
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The Detection Engine component consumes the highest number of Central Processing
Unit (CPU) cycles. In this component most of the CPU time is spent on testing the
condition of rules (Protocol and packet content). It was observed that 35% of overall
execution time is spent in the Detection Engine method (acsmSearch2()). This method
is an implementation of the Aho-Corasick [55] pattern matching algorithm. In the Pre-
processor component the bulk of the CPU computational time is spent in preparing the
packet for evaluation. These computations involve frequent memory accesses such as
tasks related to fragmented packet assembly, storage and retrieval of TCP connection
information (IP addresses, sequence number, port numbers) from memory and modifica-
tion of HTTP packet content for further inspection. In the Packet Decoder component,
the bulk of the CPU time is spent in extracting data from the packet for further in-
spection. Decoding also involves computations such as bit manipulation for the Packet
Checksum calculation. Logically simple bit manipulation operations are typically inef-
ficiently supported by general purpose processor instruction sets and such operations
must be mapped onto a series of shift and mask instructions. Decision Engine perfor-
mance is entirely dependent on the way the detection result is processed. If the Decision
Engine stores results to a database/disk for later analysis then it may consume a high
number of CPU cycles to access and write detection results to databases/disk. In this
experiment Snort was configured to send alerts to the console.
5.2.2 Design
Snort on RC300 development board is ported by mapping Snort components on HandelC-
MicroBlaze based environment. This mapping involve restructuring the Snort architec-
ture which is carried out by considering the followings point:-
1. The modified version of Snort for hybrid HandelC-MicroBlaze based processing
platform and the standard software distribution of Snort should produce the same
detection results.
2. The modified version should also be easily customised via the same simple interface
as the original Snort distribution in which features can be easily added/removed
via a simple text file.
3. Snort dependencies on external software libraries/Operating System (OS) features
should be removed in order that there are no difficulties in porting to embedded
target that for example does not possess libpcap for packet capture and that is
not running any OS.
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4. Gain efficiency by offloading processing load from processor to Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA) hardware without consuming too much FPGA area/resources.
Careful design is required to avoid the inadvertent introduction of performance
bottlenecks due to communication between hardware and software components.
All these points were considered carefully for porting along with application execution
analysis result. The main goal of the design and implementation was set to successfully
execute the Snort on new HandelC-MicroBlaze environment (Point 1 above). File based
customisation of Snort was achieved easily with the help of MicroBlaze memory file sys-
tem (Point 2 above). The last two points (above) are significantly hard and required lot
of time and efforts because they involved careful design and implementation. Following
changes were proposed in Snort:-
• Remove Snort Packet Sniffer component reliance on 3rd party packet capture li-
brary (libpcap) because the OS call trap and return overhead, coupled with the
buffer copies of packets contribute to unnecessary overhead in Snort systems. This
was done by implementing a packet capture HandelC hardware accelerator that
captures raw packets from gigabit Ethernet interface tightly coupled to the FPGA
and the MicroBlaze providing high speed and low latency access for packet cap-
turing.
• Snort core components the Detection Engine and the Preprocessor decided to port
initially on MicroBlaze core by removing their dependency on external libraries
(arpa, socket, pcre)2. This porting decision was based on the idea that in future
MicroBlaze cores can be used to deploy critical Preprocessor component on individ-
ual processor and Detection Engine component which executes pattern matching
to offload from MicroBlaze to FPGA.
• Snort’s Decision Engine functionality is reduced to alert the administrator if packet
matches any rules. This was achieved by offloading Decision Engine from MicroB-
laze to FPGA which sends the alert through gigabit Ethernet interface. A separate
application would be developed in future to provide the logging/saving of the detec-
tion results to the database or disk and to present the result in a more interactive
Graphical User Interface (GUI).
The design of the modified Snort ported on RC300 board is shown in figure 5.1. A Han-
delC Packet Capture Hardware Accelerator (PCHA) directly captures packets without
any delay from gigabit Ethernet interface-0 and stores it in Static Random Access Mem-
ory (SRAM) BANK3 for further inspection. The gigabit Ethernet interface is tightly
2the current prototype does not support regular expression (pcre)
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Figure 5.1: Snort on RC300 board
coupled to the FPGA and the MicroBlaze providing high speed and low latency access
for packet capturing. The hardware implementation of packet capturing is a significant
improvement over the use of a software-based libpcap library as it does not require any
operating system interrupt calls, nor the copying of data from kernel to application
buffers. This design can still be further improved by creating a ring buffer for received
packets in SRAM/SDRAM (Static Dynamic Random Access Memory) or altering the
design to attach the PCHA via the high-speed FSL bus in order to provide a direct data
transfer link between packet capturing custom hardware and processor.
Snort’s three components with major roles in packet analysis are the Packet Sniffer,
Preprocessor and Detection Engine are ported on MicroBlaze. These components are
collectively called the Core Engine. The Core Engine is the heart of this SB-NIDS and
it involves the computationally significant operations such as pattern matching, packet
classification and stateful inspection that are the operations for further optimisation
ideally using FPGA logic resources or parallel processing of multiple processor cores.
In the original distribution of Snort, detection results produce by the Decision Engine
after packet analysis are typically log or store in database systems, displayed on a console
or sent over a network. In this system detection results are written first to SRAM
BANK3. This is then read by Decision Engine Hardware Accelerator (DEHA) that
sends the detection result over a network via gigabit Ethernet interface-I. A separate
application is decided to be developed in future that will use this result to log/store
remotely which would enable the detection result available for later analysis by Network
Administrators.
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5.2.3 Implementation
Snort porting on hybrid HandelC-MicroBlaze based embedded processing environment
required source code level changes in Snort application. These changes include remov-
ing methods not required on processing platform and providing implementations for
functions/methods that are not available in MicroBlaze-C (mb-gcc) library. Some of
these methods are Internet address manipulation methods (htonl(), ntohs() etc.) and
socket library methods (accept(), connect() etc.). Apart from these changes the two
new hardware accelerators are added to Snort port for optimising Snort’s packet anal-
ysis performance. The two hardware accelerators are: Packet Capture and Decision
Engine. Packet capturing facility is a part of Snort sniffer component in original Snort
package which in this prototype offloaded to hardware for bottleneck free packet capture
(Section 4.3.2). Decision Engine in original Snort package is also a separate Snort com-
ponent which also offloaded to FPGA. These two hardware accelerators are attached to
MicroBlaze On-chip peripheral bus (OPB). The communication between these hardware
accelerators on OPB bus and rest of the Snort core engine on MicroBlaze is facilitated
with the help of HandelC library (opb slave t1.hcl) methods which has a code for control-
ling OPB bus and enabling communication between hardware accelerators and software
on MicroBlaze.
Packet Capture Hardware Accelerator (PCHA)
PCHA is implemented using the necessary data structure and macro procedures (Sec-
tion 4.3.4). Its data structure consists of two 1-bit status registers (busy and start
register) and a 32 bit packet length register to store captured packet size in bytes. A
packet length register along with status register initially set to clear or zero. Figure 5.2
shows the PCHA architecture.
Packet Capture Functional Unit
Status Registers
Lenght Register
OPB
Control
Logic
Address
Decoder
OPB Bus
OPB Address Slave_DBus
Start Busy
OPB_DBus32
32 1 1
Figure 5.2: Packet Capture Hardware Accelerator (PCHA) architecture
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The communication between PCHA and rest of the Snort port on MicroBlaze is synchro-
nised and supported by HandelC status registers, and HandelC methods and macro pro-
cedures. Snort on MicroBlaze calls the OPBWriteUINT32(START REG BASEADDR)
register write method with start register base address as a parameter. A callback write
macro procedure OPBEthernetWrite() of PCHA activated which then writes the con-
tents of the OPB data bus to the start register. This status register update signals the
core packet capture logic in OPBEthernet() to capture the packets from RC300 board
gigabit Ethernet interface-0. It first sets the busy status flag to 1 and begins the packet
capture. The complete packet capturing time depends mainly on the packet length. It
takes 1-clock cycle for reading 1-byte of packet data from Ethernet interface and another
2-clock cycle to store every 4-byte of packet data to store in SRAM BANK-0. Once the
packet completely captured, the macro procedure writes the packet length to the length
register and clears the busy status register to zero.
During packet capture in accelerator hardware, Snort on MicroBlaze read the busy sta-
tus register on every clock cycles using a OPBReadUINT32(BUSY REG BASEADDR)
register read method with busy register base address as a parameter. This triggers a
callback read macro procedure OPBEthernetRead() in HandelC PCHA that reads the
contents of the busy register and pass it through OPB bus signals to Snort on MicroB-
laze. If Snort found busy flag cleared then it reads the packet length and analysis on
the captured packet begins with protocol decoding.
Decision Engine Hardware Accelerator (DEHA)
HandelC DEHA is also implemented using the necessary data structure and macro
procedure (Section 4.3.4). It comprises of a 1-bit busy register and 4-byte alert register
to represents the number of attack rules successfully matched on a packet. Figure 5.3
shows the DEHA architecture.
Decision Engine Functional Unit
Status Register
Num_Alert
OPB
Control
Logic
Address
Decoder
OPB Bus
OPB Address Slave_DBus
Busy
OPB_DBus32
32 1 1
Figure 5.3: Decision Engine Hardware Accelerator (DEHA) architecture
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DEHA functions in a very similar manner like PCHA. Busy and an alert register initially
sets to 0 to indicate that DEHA is not busy and there is no attack rules alert to process.
Complete functionality of Decision Engine is defined in four HandelC macro procedures.
When all Snort components on MicroBlaze finished packet analysis then detection result
is wrote to SRAM BANK-3 and total number of attack rules matched on a packet wrote
to alert register. This is carried out by calling a OPBWriteUINT32-
(NUMALERTS-REG-BASEADDR) and OPBWriteUINT32(BUSY-REG-BASEAD-
DR) register write method with alert and busy register base address as a parame-
ter respectively. These methods call triggers callback write macro procedure OPBRe-
sultWrite() in hardware accelerator which then writes the contents of the OPB data bus
to the alert and busy register respectively. At the same time the core logic in macro pro-
cedure OPBDecisionEngine() that runs in infinite loops checks the busy register status
in every clock cycle and on finding that it’s status is set to 1, it starts reading detection
results from SRAM BANK-3 and sends them through gigabit Ethernet interface-1. This
Ethernet interface can be connected to network administrator console or PC where a
real time software application can read this detection result and displayed it on screen
for analysis.
In summary, MMU-Snort I or prototype SB-NIDS design and implementation is de-
scribed which is carried out by porting Snort SB-NIDS software package on hybrid
HandelC-MicroBlaze based embedded processing platform. The novelty of this effort is
the first ever SB-NIDS on hybrid hardware-software embedded processing platform. This
SB-NIDS performance is also tested to identify any packet analysis speed performance
improvement and any possible performance bottlenecks (Section 6.3). The performance
bottlenecks is then improved by further research and development (Section 5.3 and Sec-
tion 5.4).
5.3 Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (MMU-Snort II)
SB-NIDS prototype testing results shows packet analysis speed improvement and also
indicated some packet processing bottlenecks (Section 6.3). One of the bottlenecks
identified is the pattern matching algorithm which performs attack signature search in
packet payload. Another issue is the large number of attack signatures that does not
fit completely on embedded processing platform memory. To deal with two these issues
and design a solution a brief analysis is carried out first.
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5.3.1 Analysis
This analysis involved understanding the internal structure and working of Snort’s De-
tection Engine component which performs pattern matching. This is followed by a
discussion on Bloom filter data structure for understanding how it can make possible to
compactly store large number of members or attack patterns in embedded processing
platform memory for fast lookup [5].
Detection Engine Functions
Detection Engine and Snort attack rules were discusses before briefly (Section 4.3.2).
Their functions are now discussed in detail.
Each and every packet in Snort is pass through the series of processing stages as shown
in figure 5.4. The numbering shows the flow of packet from one processing stage to
another.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Packet Decoder 
2(b) Preprocessor (HTTP) 2(a) Preprocessor (SMTP) 2 (c) Preprocessor (FTP) 
4) Decision Engine 
3) Detection Engine 
Captured 
Packet 
Figure 5.4: Key Stages of Snort
Packets are firstly captured from network interface(s), and then decoded and analysed
by Preprocessor component(s). Next, packets are passed onto the Detection Engine
component, where Snort attack rule are selected and evaluate on packet. In brief, the
Detection Engine performed three main operations: Rule Parsing, Rule Selection and
Rule Evaluation.
Rule Parsing
At Snort application initialisation stage, the Detection Engine component reads and
parses all the rules found in a Snort configuration text file (Snort.conf) in order to
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generate a data structure for rule evaluation, as depicted in figure 5.5 known as the
Snort rule tree (SRT) [1].
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Figure 5.5: Parsed structure of Snort rules in memory (SRT)
SRT is made up of Rule tree nodes (RTN) and Option tree nodes (OTN). An RTN con-
tains the data associated with a rule header, whereas an OTN contains data associated
with rule options that include rule meta-data and detection options such as offset, depth
(Section 4.3.2). The SRT groups all OTNs with the same rule header under a single
RTN in order to facilitate fast rule evaluation on packets.
Rule evaluation
Rule evaluation in Snort involves checking packet header for invalid protocol values and
packet payload for malicious pattern. Header checking is straight forward process of
checking numeric values where as payload checking involves pattern matching algorithm.
Early Snort versions used Boyer-Moore [54] pattern matching algorithm with relatively
small memory requirements. It is very inefficient with larger number of attack pattern
search because each pattern search in packet payload occurs one-by-one. Thus, Boyer-
Moore algorithm for pattern search in SB-NIDS can easily become a victim of DoS
attack on high data rate network [112]. Subsequent releases of Snort versions exploited
the power of Aho-Corasick based multi-pattern matching algorithms [55] which search
the whole number of patterns in packets in one go using finite state machine that it
creates in Snort run-time application memory (Figure 5.6).
This algorithm is a significant improvement in terms of speed over Boyer-Moore pattern
matching algorithm at the cost of large amount of run-time pattern memory for finite
state machine. Even finite state machine memory optimisation does not result in any
Chapter 5. Design and Implementation 102
0
¬{h,s}
h
1
3
2
s
e
4
h
6
e
7
i
8
m
s
9
Figure 5.6: A state machine concept constructed using patterns “he, she, him, her,
his”
significant reduction of run-time memory requirement for Aho-Corasick [97] (Figure 6.6).
This same issue also caused problem to execute Snort port on embedded processing
platform with all Snort attack rules (Section 6.3)). Still Aho-Corasick multi-pattern
search algorithm performance is much better than Boyer-Moore single pattern search
both in terms of speed and its worst-case performance. Therefore, in recent versions of
Snort (such as Snort version 2.0 and after), Aho-Corasick is the default pattern matching
algorithm to search packet content for attack patterns. This search is supported by SRT
which helped to drive the pattern search in packet content as well as invalid protocol
values search in packet header both specified in Snort attack rules. This search is called
Rule Evaluation on packet involved packet header check and packet payload search using
rules. Before the rule evaluation SRT also helps to select rules for evaluation using packet
classification (Section 2.4.7) process commonly referred as Rule Selection in the context
of SB-NIDS.
SRT also contains the Snort rule content modifier options specified for some 45% of
attack rules. These options identified as crucial for pattern search performance because
it reduced the overall pattern search time in packet content by specifically mentioning the
number of bytes and offset to search into packet contents instead of all packet content
(Section 4.3.2). For example, consider the Snort rule as shown in figure 5.7, which
specifies that an alert should be sent to the network administrator if the ttl value of
the IP packet under inspection is less than three and the pattern Kill Now is found in
the packet payload between byte four to twenty-four. Pattern search is performed very
quickly for this rule due to the depth and offset Snort rule content modifier options which
specifies the exact location to search instead of all packet content. If these modifiers are
Chapter 5. Design and Implementation 103
not present in rule then Detection Engine has to search all packet payload which may
be around 1500-bytes (Ethernet MTU).
                                            
 Rule Header 
 
alert ip any any -> any 3455 (ttl:<3;content:    
                             "Kill Now”;offset:4;depth:20;) 
 
                       Rule Option 
 
Figure 5.7: Example Snort rule
Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic set membership data structure. It allows
set members insertion and query but does not allow deletion (deletion is possible with a
Counting Bloom Filter [113]). An insert operation on a new set member is implemented
using multiple hash functions applied to an integer value (representing the member). A
character string such as “FAT” can be represented as an unsigned integer value that
is created by concatenating the ASCII character codes (bit patterns), see figure 5.8.
The results of applying hash functions to the integer value representing each and every
keyword string are bit-wise OR-ed together in order to create the stored Bloom filter bit-
pattern value. Bloom filters have been successfully applied to computer security based
applications such as Email Spam Filters [114], Network Intrusion Detection Systems [81]
and Computer Worm Detection Systems [115].
>>>>  (ord('F')  <<  16)  +  (ord('A')  <<  8)  +  ord('T') 
Figure 5.8: Python code: 3 character string to integer conversion
Bloom Filter Algorithm
An empty Bloom filter is a bit-array (B = 0,...,m-1) (also known as bit-vector) of m
number of bits, all set to 0 initially as shown in figure 5.9. It is used to efficiently and
compactly represent a set of bit-strings S, with n number of members (S = x1,x2,...xn).
A Bloom filter can be programmed (Insert) for a bit-string x of a set S using k number
of hash functions (h1()...hk()). textitk hash functions are computed on any bit-string x
resulting in k hash values. Each of these k hash values represent a single bit position
B[k]) set to 1 in a bit-vector of size m. Hence each hash value computed on any bit-
string x is used for setting k number of bits to 1 in the size m bit-vector. Each one of
the k hash values can be interpreted as an integer in the range from 20 to 2m−1.
Figure 5.10 illustrates the Bloom filter programming. Two bit-strings x1 and x2 are
programmed in the bit-vector B of m = 10 number of bits with k = 3 number of hash
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     9               m-bit-array     0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 5.9: Empty Bloom Filter
functions. It can be noticed that two different bit-strings (x1 and x2) set the same bit
positions in bit-vector index of B[2] corresponding to a hash value of 22, this is known
as a hash collision.
                                    x1                  x2 
                                                  h3(x1)   h1(x2)             h3(x2) 
          h1(x1)        h2(x1)                               h2(x2)     
    9   m-bit array    0  
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Figure 5.10: Insert bit-strings (x1) and (x2)
Querying the bit-vector B for a bit-string x is similar as insert operation. Using the same
k number of hash functions h1()...hk(), k hash values are computed for any bit-string
x of a set member S. The k hash values are checked against the stored Bloom filter bit
position values B[k]. If atleast one of the k bit position B[k] is 0, the member is declared
to be a non-member of a set S or not programmed in a bit-vector. If all k bit positions
B[k] in bit-vector B are found to be 1, the member is declared to be a member of set S
or found programmed in a bit-vector with certain probability. If all k bit positions B[k]
in bit-vector B are found to be set 1 for bit-string x but it is not a member in a set S
or not programmed in a Bloom filter, then it is said to be a false positive.
                                    x3                  x4 
                                                h3(x3)                          h3(x4) 
          h1(x3)       h2(x3)                   h1(x4)   h2(x4)     
    9   m-bit array    0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Figure 5.11: Query bit-strings (x3) and (x4)
Figure 5.11 illustrates the Bloom filter query. Membership query for bit-string x3 shows
it is not a member of a set S or not programmed in bit-vector as two k bit positions B[3]
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and B[7] found to be 0. However, membership query for bit-string x4 is false positive
as k hash values maps to bit positions B[6], B[2] and B[0] set by bit-strings x1 and x2
of a set S (See figure 5.10). The advantages of Bloom filter is that they can efficiently
search to see if a given bit-string contains one or more members of a set of keywords,
unfortunately false positive results must be resolved and these require further pattern
matching.
Bloom Filter Characteristics
The Bloom filter helps to overcome Aho-Corasick multi-pattern matching algorithm two
main computational factors: Memory space and Search time by observing its following
characteristics.
• Bloom filter membership query does not involve any bit-to-bit members matching
unlike similar hashing coding techniques (Hash table). Membership tests involved
checking k bits status (set to 1) in a pre-computed bit-vector. Thus providing
mechanism to lookup any length or size member with constant lookup-time O(n).
• Unlike other data structures (arrays, linked lists, hash tables) and popular pattern
matching algorithms (Boyer-Moore and Aho-Corasick), the members of a set S
are not stored in the bit-vector B, instead each member is represented only by k
number of bits position in a bit-vector B[k] (Bits are shared between members).
Thus making it suitable for compactly storing large number of members in a bit-
vector B.
This space and time advantage in a Bloom filter is achieved at the cost of allowable
errors. In other words, querying bit-pattern x in a bit-vector may return a false positive
true result even when bit-pattern x is not in the set or not programmed in a bit-vector
(Figure 5.11). This happens when k number of hash values for a bit-pattern x coincide
with bit-vector B positions corresponding to the hash values set to 1. The probability
of such allowable errors occurring for any bit-pattern x query is called the false positive
probability. Bloom in his work [5] defined the false positive probability as,
f = (1− (1− 1
m
)nk)k ≈ (1− e−nkm )k (5.1)
Where m is a size of a bit-vector, n is the total number of bit-patterns in a set S and
k is the number of hash functions to be computed on a bit-pattern. It can be noticed
from the equation that m, n, S and k all affect the false positive rate. For n number of
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bit-patterns the false positive can be reduced by choosing appropriate values of m and
k. The value of m needs to be large compared to the value of n, whereas, the optimal
value of k achieving a low false positive rate depends on the ratio m/n, i.e. the average
number of bits occupied by single member. This optimal k is calculated by minimising
equation 5.1 as,
k = (
m
n
)× ln2 (5.2)
k is an integer and this value of k produce lowest possible false positive rate with respect
to the values of m and n.
From this analysis it can now be concluded that the Detection Engine component of
Snort port on RC300 board requires major code level changes in order to integrate the
PMHA because part of Detection Engine component performs pattern matching not
the whole component. Also Snort application specific knowledge (attack rule content
modifier options) inclusion to PMHA can improve the pattern matching performance due
to lower number of byte search. It can also be deduced from the Bloom filter discussion
that its characteristics are suitable for compactly storing the attack patterns in FPGA
memory as well as to support quick pattern matching in packet content. Keeping the
lower false positive rate is also crucial for PMHA performance which can be lower by bit-
vector lookup with higher number of hash values per member or pattern. However, this
may easily affect optimisation effort due to higher number of hash value computations
per pattern. This issue can be overcome by implementing hardware friendly optimal
hash function as well as using a simple mathematical calculation to quickly compute
large number of hash values per pattern (Section 5.3.3).
5.3.2 Design
The three core operations performed by Detection Engine are:– Rule Parsing, Rule
Selection and Rule Evaluation. All three core operations required source code level
modification in order to design, develop and integrate PMHA to come up with MMU-
SnortII prototype. Rule evaluation which involved packet header and payload check
with rules required major source code level modification in which the packet payload
check (pattern matching) is offloaded from MicroBlaze to FPGA. Figure 5.12 is the top
level diagram of modified Detection Engine component partitioned between hardware
and software and communicating or passing data using MicroBlaze Fast Simplex Link
(FSL) bus.
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II) Rule selection.  
III) Packet non-
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I) Packet payload 
checking (String 
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rule. 
Figure 5.12: Top level diagram showing modified Detection Engine
Software Design
On MicroBlaze, the modified Detection Engine now performs:– rule parsing, rule selec-
tion and packet header check (Part of rule evaluation). The rule parsing is modified
and it no longer creates the Aho-Corasick finite state machine. Rule selection opera-
tion remains unchanged while rule evaluation went through major modification in which
packet payload check (part of rule evaluation) is offloaded from MicroBlaze to FPGA.
Hardware Design
On FPGA, packet payload search (part of rule evaluation) for attack pattern in packet
payload is performed. This search is based on Bloom filter based pattern search ap-
proach. Figure 5.13 shows the block diagram of PMHA.
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Figure 5.13: Block diagram of pattern matching hardware function unit
The PMHA has four main modules: Job Manager, Rule Processing Engine, Bloom Fil-
ter Lookup Module, False Positive Analyser that actively function together as pipelined
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pattern matching hardware modules. This design is better and has advantages over pre-
vious Bloom filter based pattern matching hardware solutions and Snort Rule Processing
System (Section 3.5.3) due to following reasons:
Application specific knowledge: It is the first time ever Snort rules content modifier
options are integrated into pattern search algorithm that specifies clearly the part of
packet content to search for attack patterns. This results in less computation and lower
number of clock cycles due to:
• Less number of hash computation.
• Low numbers of Bloom filter lookup or block memory access.
• Few pattern for pruning in false positive analyser.
In comparison, the previous Bloom filter implementations fully search or every byte of
the packet payload for locating attack patterns [81].
Hash computation technique: The conventional way of computing any number of
hash values in hardware or FPGA is hash computational unit. The same hash computa-
tional unit can be used to compute multiple numbers of hash values. But for computing
ten hash values or more this will cost high computation time. To fix this problem an-
other approach is to have multiple numbers of hash computation units which will cost
more FPGA logic resource and power and thus also result in performance degradation.
To overcome this problem a novel mathematical technique by Kirsch [6] is used to imple-
ment the 2-to-N hash module that uses two hash values to compute another eight hash
values in just 2 clock cycles without any increase in asymptotic false positive probability
of Bloom filter. The advantages of implementing 2-to-N hash module in comparison to
multiple hash computation units are summarised as:
• Lower FPGA logic area usage and minimal power consumption
• Large number (eight) of hash values computation in just two clock cycles
Integrated Rule Processing System: Snort Rule Processing Systems were either
implemented as standalone systems on FPGAs or on Network Processors (Section 3.5.3).
The standalone solutions aim were to present optimised rule processing solutions but did
not clearly demonstrate how these Snort Rule Processing Systems would be integrated
to function or process attack rules for SB-NIDS. This design presents an integrated
Rule Processing System to snort SB-NIDS port (MMU-Snort I) using hybrid hardware-
software processing platform which never done ever before and so advances the start
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of art. This state of the art also supports the highest number of attack rules and
compactly stores the attack pattern in FPGA local memory. Figure 5.14 shows this rule
processing/evaluation on packet.
Packet Capture
(FPGA)
Rule Selection
(MicroBlaze)
Packet header
check
Packet Payload
Search
Process Result
(MicroBlaze)
Network 
Interface card
Database
ResultResult
Packet
Header Payload
MicroBlaze FPGA
Alert
Figure 5.14: Packet processing flow for Snort rule evaluation
Each rectangle in the figure represent a processing component. Packet capture and
Packet payload search components are HandelC hardware accelerators attached with
MicroBlaze on OPB bus and FSL bus respectively. The rest of the components execute
on MicroBlaze3.
Packet is captured by the packet capture component from RC300 gigabit Ethernet port-0
and stored in off-chip SRAM BANK-0. Next the key packet header values are compared
with rule header in the rule selection component on MicroBlaze that returns the subset
of rules for evaluation on packet as shown in figure 5.15.
3Figure 5.14 highlights only rule evaluation in Detection Engine and does not show other Snort
processing component
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Figure 5.15: Rule selection
Next the rule evaluation is started on packet in packet header check and payload search
component. Packet header check component evaluates only the header options (Non-
payload options) of the subset of rules on packet header using SRT. On successful match-
ing of header options it writes in SRAM the Rule ID of matching rule. Packet payload
search component evaluates payload options of the subset of rules which involve search-
ing attack patterns in packet payload using payload content modifier options. Before any
payload option evaluation these content modifier options, any other options and packet
payload are passed from MicroBlaze to packet payload search component via FSL bus.
The complete rule evaluation process on packet is now explained to get the greater
understanding of operations performed by each component of hardware accelerator.
Packet Header check
Consider an example Snort rule in figure 5.7 for understanding its evaluation on packet
payload with content: abckill nowabdhgyppt. First the payload options from this rule are
extracted separately for passing on to PMHA. Only header option in this rule for packet
header check is ttl:<3;. Packet header check component search the IP packet header ttl
value. If the ttl value in a packet is less than 3 then the packet header check component
writes the Snort Rule ID in SRAM and wait for the payload options evaluation result.
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Packet Payload search
For Snort rule in figure 5.7, the only payload options to evaluate on packet payload
is (content:“kill now”;) which involves the search of attack pattern kill now in packet
payload (abckill nowabdhgyppt). Content keyword modifier depth and offset of this
rule indicates search for kill now only between byte-4 to byte-20 of packet payload. This
search is carried by four modules of hardware accelerators with the support of Bloom
filter pre-programmed with all attack patterns from Snort rules including the sort rule
in figure 5.7 4. Figure 5.16 shows the payload search processing flow involving these four
hardware modules and now explained in further detail.
Job Manager
Payload
   
Payload
Options  
Rule Processing
Engine
Payload
Payload
Options
Bloom Filer Lookup
Unit
Hash
Values
False Positive
Analyser
Hash
Value
Pattern
Pattern
Result
Figure 5.16: Hardware modules performing packet payload searching
Job Manager: Packet payload content and payload options are passed from MicroBlaze
to Job manager module of PMHA. It is the first hardware that receives the payload
4A software program written in JAVA to extract attack patterns from Snort rules to create the
hardware representation of Bloom filter
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options and packet payload from MicroBlaze via FSL. Its main purpose is to manage
the complete packet payload search process. It performs this by initiating packet payload
search in the Rule Processing Engine and streaming the packet payload. Job manager
not only initiates the packet payload search but also aid in pruning false positive match.
All these functions are performed by Job Manager with the help of its five sub-modules:
Rule loader, Rule dispatcher, Match loader, Match dispatcher and Data feeder.
Rule Processing Engine: This is where the actual payload search starts. Rule pro-
cessing engine has sixteen rule units that are able to perform packet payload search for
sixteen Snort rules in parallel. This is carried out with the help of its sub-modules: hash
module which compute the hash values on substring of streaming packet payload for
checking it’s presence in Bloom filter.
Figure 5.17 shows the hash computation process on every 8-bytes substring of packet
payload abckill nowabdhgyppt in rule unit for Bloom filter lookup.
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abck...Data Feeder
8-bytes Data Register
abckillnow
abc
kill
now
abdh
gyp
pt..
..
..
hash-1
hash-2
abck...
Off-chip SRAM
abck...
bcki...
ckil...
kill...
Figure 5.17: Rule units computing hash values
Packet payload bytes abckill nowabdhgyppt is streamed through 8-byte data register by
Data feeder module which is synchronised with rule units. Rule unit then copies 8-bytes
(kill now) of data register, signals the data feeder that data has copied. It then copied
those 8-bytes to two hash modules operating in parallel. These Hash modules computes
two hash values in just 2 clock cycles using hardware efficient XOR-based hash function.
This hash value is passed on to the Bloom filter lookup unit for checking Bloom filter
index for corresponding hash values. This process of hash computation is repeated until
all 8-bytes substrings are processed up to packet payload byte-20.
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Bloom Filter Lookup Unit: Assume that this module receives two hash values of kill
now substring. Before any Bloom filter lookup this module actually computes further
eight hash values using two hash values. This is carried out with the help of 2-to-N hash
module in just 2 clock cycles. Figure 5.18 shows the hash computation process.
Hash Modules
Rule Unit
abck...
abck... hash-1
hash-2
Hash Values
2-to-N Hash module
Figure 5.18: 2-to-N hash module computing ten hash values using two hash values
All hash values are now copied to Bloom filter probe unit for checking Bloom filter index
for corresponding hash values. The Bloom filter is constructed in dual port FPGA Block
RAM. The boom filter lookup process for 10 hash values takes further 5 clock cycles as
shown in figure 5.19.
Hash Values
2-to-N Hash module Filter Lookup unit
Bloom Filter (FPGA Dual-Port Block RAM)
Figure 5.19: Bloom filter index checking with corresponding hash values
For all ten kill now hash values, Bloom filter index corresponding to hash value is found
to be 1 because the pattern kill now in Snort rule 5.7 is parsed and programmed in
Bloom filter. This match however may be a false positive due to nature of Bloom filter.
A hash value of kill now is then copied to False Positive Analyser Module to verify the
match.
False Positive Analyser Module: This module prune the false positive match. It
performs this pruning with the help it’s two sub-modules: Hash table lookup unit and
comparator circuit and hash table in SDRAM where all patterns and associated Snort
Rule IDs are stored. To check kill now is true match, the hash table lookup unit uses
the hash value of kill now to fetch content of hash table index for corresponding hash
value. It then passed the content to the comparator. If comparator found any Rule ID
then it start comparing payload substring kill now with a pattern from hash table. The
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pattern comparison process is a simple brute-force pattern matching that performs four
bytes comparison per clock cycles. If all kill now bytes matches the pattern then it is
declared as a match. The Snort Rule ID of this pattern is then written to SRAM for
processing of detection result on MicroBlaze. Figure 5.20 shows this process.
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Figure 5.20: False positive analyser with hash table lookup unit and comparator
circuit
Snort Rule Match
Packet header check and packet payload search write the Rule IDs of matching header
options and payload options of Snort rules. Only those Snort rule is declared a match
when the same Rule ID of rule is found in packet header check result as well as in packet
payload search result.
5.3.3 Implementation
Packet payload search or PMHA are attached to high speed FSL bus. The communi-
cation between hardware accelerators on FSL bus and rest of the Snort detect engine
component on MicroBlaze is facilitated with the help of HandelC library (fsl t1.hcl)
which contains the source code for controlling FSL bus and enabling communication
between hardware accelerators and software on MicroBlaze processor.
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Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA)
HandelC PMHA is implemented using the necessary data structure and macro procedure
(Section 4.3.4). Its data structure comprises of only one 1-bit status registers (busy
register). A busy status register initially set to clear or zero to indicate that no Snort
rules are needed processing in hardware accelerator. Figure 5.21 shows the architecture
of PMHA.
Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator
Status Register
FSL
Control
Logic
FSL Bus
FSL Port
Busy
1 1
Figure 5.21: Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA) architecture
The communication between packet capture hardware accelerator and the Packet Snif-
fer part on MicroBlaze is synchronised and supported by 1-bit status registers, methods
and macro procedures containing hardware accelerator logic. Snort modified Detection
Engine component on MicroBlaze first calls the get fsl nbread(int fslport,int bitvalue)
read method with FSL port number and variable to read in the content of register.
This invoked the callback read macro procedure FslSlaveRead() hardware accelerator
that reads the content of status register and writes it’s contents to the FSL data bus.
If the check on variable found the register contents zero then Detection Engine com-
ponent starts sending the payload options of rule and packet payload content towards
the accelerator hardware. The hardware accelerator then evaluates the payload options
on packet payload and once finished write the detection result in SRAM BANK-0 and
clears the status register content by writing 0.
One of the important parts of Bloom filter based pattern matching hardware implemen-
tation is the hash function. Oncoming section contains the detail discussion on hash
function implementation and explanation on computing large number of hash values
readily and efficiently in hardware.
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Optimal hash function
One of the main considerations of the Bloom filter based pattern matching implemen-
tation in hardware/FPGA is the selection of appropriate hash function. Ideal hash
function should consume minimal FPGA power and resource as well as produced lower
or atleast theoretical false positive rate (Section 6.4). To achieve this effectively a class
of universal hash function called H3 that exploits bit-wise logical operations [116, 117]
is selected for implementation. Such a hash function is efficient in terms of hardware
resource consumption and due to simple bit-wise logical operation it can be readily and
efficiently implemented in FPGA. Dharmapurikar et al. [81] also implemented this hash
function for their Bloom filter based pattern matching hardware implementation on
FPGA [81]. Figure 5.22 illustrates the equivalent hash function circuit implementation
of HandelC code.
 
Figure 5.22: Hash calculator circuit design
This shows that for any input bit-pattern X with i number of bits represented as,
Xi = [x1, x2, x3, ...x8] (5.3)
The kth hash value Hk for Xi is calculated as,
Hk = [(q0 · x1)⊕ (q1 · x2)⊕, (q2 · x3)⊕ ...⊕ (q7 · x8)] (5.4)
Where · denotes the binary AND operation and ⊕ the exclusive OR operation. q(0..j−1) is
a vector of random integer values in the range of 1 to m. The vector values are generated
Chapter 5. Design and Implementation 117
by a software program that developed in JAVA programming language. The vector
values then copied from software program into the index of HandelC array (registers).
Similarly, another kth hash value Hk for bit-pattern Xi can be calculated with another
vector p(0..j−1) of random integer values in the range of 1 to m as,
Hk = [(p0 · x1)⊕ (p1 · x2)⊕, (p2 · x3)⊕ ...⊕ (p7 · x8)] (5.5)
This vector p(0..j−1) of random integer values is also generated by the same software
program and copied into the index of another HandelC array (registers).
Two Hash Function Solution
Equation 5.2 suggested that the ratio of the number of bit-pattern n to program in a
Bloom filter to the total number of bits m in Bloom filter is the number of bits allocated
to each bit-pattern in a Bloom filter. Taking ln2 of this value decides the optimal
number of k hash functions needed to compute for each bit-pattern to insert/query
them into Bloom filter. Let suppose if there are n = 2385 number of bit-patterns
and the number of bits in Bloom filter is m = 32768, then on average ≈ 14-bits per
keyword is allocated in Bloom filter (m/n = 13.73 ≈ 14). For this ratio (m/n) value,
the number of hash functions needed to compute per bit-pattern for insert/query is k =
13.73 × ln2 ≈ 10 (where, ln2 = 0.69314). This number of hash function is difficult to
implement in FPGA and for query intensive application like SB-NIDS pattern matching
it may become bottleneck. Simple solution to this problem is to reduce the number
of hash functions by reducing the number of bits allocation per keyword in Bloom
filter. However, this simple solution would cause increase in false positive probability
that also result in comparing large number of bit-patterns with brute-force (bit-by-bit)
pattern matching. For example: false positive probability according to equation 5.1 is,
1-e−
2385×10
32768 ≈ 0.001365, if lower value of k is chosen by reducing the number of bits
allocation per bit-pattern in Bloom filter to m/n 6.85 ≈ 7 by lowering the number of
bits in Bloom filter to m = 16384, then value of k would be, k = 7 × ln2 ≈ 5 (where ln2
= 0.69314). This will increase the false positive probability of Bloom filter to 1-e−
2385×7
16384
≈ 0.03695.
To compute such a large number of hash values, a very different technique is used that
can yield an effective speed up of pattern matching in hardware for SB-NIDS. It is the
first time this technique is use for SB-NIDS pattern matching in hardware which is
originally proposed by Kirsch [6] for Bloom filter and related data structures. According
to this technique, only two hash functions are necessary to effectively implement a Bloom
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filter without any increase in asymptotic false positive probability. With this idea two
hash functions h1(x) and h2(x) can simulate more than two hash functions of the form,
gi(x) = (h1(x) + ih2(x)) mod m (5.6)
i ranges from 0 to k-1 for k number of hash values. For example: if i = 9, then this will
produce ten hash values. Every hash value is taken modulo of the Bloom filter size (m
number of bits) to ensure the values within the range of m.
In summary, it is the first time ever a PMHA for SB-NIDS implemented with Snort
application specific knowledge and with efficient hash function computation technique.
Also unlike other Snort Rule Processing System (Section 3.5.3), this PMHA is integrated
with the Snort SB-NIDS prototype on hybrid HandelC-MicroBlaze embedded processing
platform to perform a complete rule processing. It is also this hardware accelerator
that is implemented with the largest number of patterns (7176) from Snort rules and
compactly stores them in FPGA block RAM.
5.4 Final Optimisation of Snort Port (MMU-Snort III)
This section contains explanation of further improvements to the hardware accelera-
tors which resulted in MMU-Snort III prototype. This involved hardware accelerator
architecture and algorithm improvement:
• An algorithmic and architectural improvement of PMHA algorithm to optimise
pattern pruning process.
• An extension to existing PMHA algorithm to efficiently search longer size patterns
(> 64 bytes).
A brief analysis is presented that shows the issue with the PMHA algorithm. This anal-
ysis also covers how the longer patterns can be efficiently search with PMHA algorithm.
5.4.1 Analysis
This analysis reviewed the need of algorithmic changes of existing PMHA algorithm.
This will result in increasing the speed of PMHA algorithm and improved longer patterns
search in packet.
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Rule Evaluation revisit
The modified Snort Detection Engine on hybrid HandelC-MicroBlaze processing plat-
form performs rule evaluation which is summarised as follows:
• Snort rule selection by matching key packet header values (IP, Port, and Protocol
etc.) with all rule headers on MicroBlaze.
• Selected rule evaluations, this involve rule header options evaluation on packet
header on MicroBlaze and rule payload options evaluation on packet payload on
FPGA.
The header options evaluation is trivial which involve checking numeric values in packet
header. In case all header options match, the Snort Rule ID is recorded. The payload
options evaluation which is the packet payload search of attack pattern is complicated
and computationally demanding process. It involved hash value computation of sub-
string from packet payload and Bloom filter index lookup for corresponding hash value.
If substring found to be programmed in Bloom filter and also matches with a pattern
from hash table, its Snort Rule ID is recorded. The header options and payload options
result is then processed on MicroBlaze.
Algorithm
Section 5.3.2 contains the detail explanation of payload options evaluation on packet
payload using four of the PMHA modules. It is observed that payload option evaluation
in False Positive Analyser module performing lot of unnecessary substring comparison
with patterns stored in hash table. This is highly susceptible to DoS attacks because
if attacker sends a carefully crafted packet with patterns that repeatedly triggers the
brute-force searches. This can become further worst with longer length patterns. The
main reason of excessive number of pattern comparison is that there is no mechanism
exists to further prune the result before full pattern comparison. Figure 5.23 shows this
issue.
Only Rule IDs found on both sides of the rule evaluation (header options and payload
options) are the only rule match, so some of the payload search is resulting in waste of
clock cycle or time.
Example: Following example further clears this problem. Consider two Snort rules
(Figure 5.24) which is parsed by Detection Engine to construct the SRT like the one in
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Figure 5.23: Rule selection and evaluation result
                Rule Header 
 
  alert ip any any -> any any  (Rid:1;ttl:<3;content:”kill”; 
  length:4;offset:4;depth:20;)                   
            
                            Rule Option 
 
 
      Rule Header 
 
  alert ip any any -> any 2334 (Rid:2;tos:!4;content:”will”; 
     length:4;     )   
 
                            Rule Option 
 
Figure 5.24: Example Snort rules
figure 5.5, the patterns are programmed in Bloom filter and the Rule ID (Rid) along
with pattern are added to hash table.
Imagine only the first rule (RuleID:1) header match with key packet header values and
selected for evaluation on packet. Rule header options (ttl:<3) evaluation for this rule
using SRT also found the packet IP header has ttl values <3. This means that this rule
header options is declared a match and it’s RuleID:1 is recorded. Now the remaining part
of rule evaluation which is a packet payload search or payload options evaluation carried
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out in PMHA using Bloom filter. It has to search all four bytes substring in packet data
from byte 4 to byte 20. If the packet payload is “abcdkillsushd688willfhfjhk10” then
packet payload search will find both “kill” and “will” substring programmed in a Bloom
filter. For false positive check, it will also find the Rule ID and pattern in hash table
which will trigger the brute force pattern matching for both substrings with pattern.
The brute-force matching involves fetching the patterns from hash table in SDRAM and
comparing it with substring found in Bloom filter. The packet payload search result
in the end declared both patterns a match and mentioned the associated Rule IDs.
Although both substring are found in Bloom filter and also match with pattern using
brute-force matching, but the reality is it is only “kill” in the end that is match. The
reason is simple, as ‘kill” belongs to the first rule and it is only first rule that was selected
for evaluation as well as first rule header option check on a packet also result in a match.
The second rule (RuleID:2) was not selected at all for evaluation on a packet and so
“will” is not a match.
In summary, algorithm successfully able to perform rule evaluation but has issues which
resulting in lot of unnecessary brute-force matching. A design changes in pattern match-
ing algorithm was suggested to remove this issue and boost up algorithm performance
(Section 5.4.2). Another issue of the pattern matching algorithm is the poor perfor-
mance with longer pattern (> 64 bytes). An analysis is now present which explains how
to efficiently search longer length patterns with PMHA.
Snort rules
First an analysis on Snort rules is presented here to find out the number of over 64 bytes
pattern that the PMHA does not search efficiently.
There are total 7876 unique patterns in Snort rules released in June 2008. Out of 7876
patterns, 7170 patterns are 64 bytes and less which hardware accelerator can search
efficiently using Bloom filter. The rest of the 706 patterns are over 64 bytes which
hardware accelerator does not search efficiently. A clear spike in the graph in figure 5.25
at x-axis (180) value can be notice which indicates that there are 439 (y-axis) patterns
of 180 bytes (x-axis) in length.
Now the total number of over 64 bytes pattern is identified and solution is needed to
search them efficiently.
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Figure 5.25: Patterns from Snort rules with their length
Longer patterns (> 64 bytes)
A software program was written in JAVA using JDK 1.6.0 to analyse the longer patterns
in Snort rule. This analysis concentrated on finding out how many more patterns would
result if patterns over 64 bytes are broken down in 64 bytes chunks. Figure 5.26 shows
the graph that demonstrate this.
This graph clearly shows the effective increase in number of pattern as a result of
breakup. Table 5.2 shows the exact summary of the total number of increase in patterns
as a result of over 64 bytes pattern breakup.
Table 5.2: Total number of patterns
Summary
Total Pattern 7876
> 64 bytes (Before breakup) 706
> 64 bytes (After breakup) 1980
New Total 9150
The breakup of longer patterns into 64 bytes chunks would be used to optimise the
search of longer pattern. This will require only minor changes in PMHA algorithm.
Before this is explained, pruning optimisation in False positive analyser module will be
explained which required minor algorithmic and architectural changes of PMHA.
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Figure 5.26: A line graph showing the increase of patterns after breakup
5.4.2 Design
This design changes is carried out in PMHA (Section 5.3.2). These design changes
involved minor algorithmic and architectural changes mainly concerned improving the
performance of PMHA.
Algorithm Modification
In section 5.4.1, the problem with the pruning process in False positive analyser hardware
module of PMHA is illustrated. This highlights the need to come up with some kind of
fix in false positive analysis hardware module that can reduce the unnecessary number
of pattern comparison with brute-force searching. The algorithm fix is now explained.
Figure 5.27 shows flowchart of old and new pattern search algorithm.
The changes in the new algorithm can be notice in the fourth processing stage. A new
check is inserted at this stage to prune further the substring match before actual brute-
force comparison. This new check make sure that only those substring are compare
with patterns in hash table using brute force comparator whose RuleID from hash table
matched with the RuleID of the rules selected for evaluation in Rule Selection component
(Figure 5.15). The modified algorithm will now result only with little number of RuleIDs
as shown in figure 5.28.
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Figure 5.27: Old and new Pattern Matching algorithms on FPGA
The new modified algorithm can now be made clear further with the help of following
example.
Example: Consider the Snort rule in figure 5.24. Suppose the second Snort rule
(RuleID:2) header matched with key packet header values and so selected to carry out
evaluation on packet. Let suppose that header options (tos:!4) check in IP packet header
also found the tos value other than 4. This means the second rule is declared a match for
header options evaluation and its RuleID (RuleID:2) is recorded. Now the remaining part
of rule evaluation which is a pattern search or payload options evaluation is carried out in
FPGA using Bloom filter. Suppose the packet payload is “abcdkillsushd688willfhfjhk10”
then packet payload search will find both “kill” and “will” substring programmed in a
Bloom filter. On finding the first substring “kill” in Bloom filter an additional check is
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Figure 5.28: Rule selection and evaluation result with modified algorithm
carried out now in this stage to confirm if the patterns found in Bloom filter that has as-
sociated RuleID in hash table which matches with RuleID of selected rule for evaluation.
This comparison result will not match as the RuleID associated with “kill” is RuleID:1
and the search is carrying out for second rule RuleID:2. This means a straightforward
single clock cycle check has removed the need to compare substring with the pattern from
hash table using brute-force matching with comparator. For pattern “will” the RuleID
comparison would result a match. This time the pattern is fetched from hash table in
SDRAM and the brute force pattern matching of substring and pattern is performed.
The comparison in this case would result in a match and Snort RuleID:2 is recorded.
As both header options and payload options evaluation result output the same RuleID:2
then this rule is declared a match.
Architecture Modification
An extra pruning step is implemented in the False positive analyser hardware module.
The false positive analyser module is comprises of hash table lookup unit and a com-
parator unit (Figure 5.20). The hash table lookup unit is the module in which the actual
architectural changes are made. This is carried out with a simple HandelC code snip-
pet which compares the RuleID from hash table with the RuleID of the rule selected
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in the rule selection component. Figure 5.29 shows this architectural modification in
which hash table lookup unit now has a RuleID comparator unit to carry the RuleIDs
comparison which takes only 1 clock cycle.
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Figure 5.29: Modified false positive analyser with Hash table lookup unit and Com-
parator circuit
Long Pattern
To optimise the pattern matching of total 706 longer patterns (> 64 bytes) a simple
solution is proposed instead of different algorithm. Any new algorithm to deal separately
with longer pattern would make system more complicated as well as it’s implementation
would require more FPGA resources (area/space) on current development board which
may exhaust all FPGA resources and does not synthesize the full design on FPGA.
Therefore, an extension to the current PMHA (Section 5.3) seems appropriate solution to
deal efficiently with larger pattern. This is achieved by breaking the patterns into smaller
chunks and searches them using the same pattern matching algorithm accordingly. This
would require only minor changes in PMHA algorithm which now explained.
Algorithm
The breakup of pattern will not only increase the number of patterns but also slightly
increases the Bloom filter false positive rate. However, the pattern breakup would result
in increase of the overall throughput of the PMHA so considered and accepted to extend
the pattern search algorithm to search differently the longer patterns.
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PMHA remains unmodified. The main changes were carried out in pattern search algo-
rithm and hash table structure for dealing with longer pattern. Figure 5.30 shows the
flowchart of the algorithm that deals efficiently with longer patterns.
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Figure 5.30: Pattern matching algorithm flowchart for longer (> 64 bytes) pattern
The pattern matching algorithm is slightly modified to deal with longer pattern search
in a packet differently. The modified algorithm makes sure to compute the hash value
of up to 64 bytes pattern. Pattern search longer than 64 bytes now search in chunks.
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An additional check is added to algorithm before declaring a substring search result.
This check makes sure that all chunks are processed before deciding the match result.
If during search any chunk does not found programmed in Bloom filter or declared false
positive in false positive analyser hardware module then the further chunks or remaining
bytes of substring is not search anymore.
The modified algorithm searches the longer pattern more quickly and also consumes
lesser number of clock cycles. This modification and pruning helped to increase the
overall throughput of pattern search in PMHA (Section 6.4)
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter began with the description of novel SB-NIDS prototype architecture or
MMU-Snort I which is designed and implemented by porting Snort (ver. 2.6.1.4) SB-
NIDS software package on hybrid HandelC-MicroBlaze based embedded processing plat-
form. This was followed by the description of the PMHA which is the most computation-
ally intensive operation of SB-NIDS. This novel PMHA design is based on Bloom filter
search approach and first time ever implemented with Snort application specific knowl-
edge and with efficient hash function computation technique. Unlike other Snort Rule
Processing Systems (Section 3.5.3), this PMHA is integrated with the Snort SB-NIDS
prototype on hybrid HandelC-MicroBlaze embedded processing platform to perform a
complete rule processing which result in MMU-SnortII prototype. This hardware ac-
celerator has been implemented with the largest number of patterns (7876) from Snort
rules and compactly stores them in FPGA block RAM (Section 3.5.3). Finally, a further
algorithmic and architectural improvement of PMHA is presented to improve pattern
pruning process and to add support to efficiently search of longer patterns (> 64 bytes).
Chapter 6
Results and Analysis
The basic goal of any software system testing and evaluation is to ensure that the
system works as per the functional requirements as well as meeting other requirements
(Section 1.3). Therefore, SB-NIDS prototype and its hardware accelerators are evaluated
to identify any improvements and issues in processing. The test results are also compared
with the state of the art systems to verify the improvements of the proposed design.
First the functional test is performed to verify error free execution of MMU-Snort I or
modified Snort port on hybrid HandelC-MicroBlaze embedded processing platform (Sec-
tion 5.2). Then the performance test is performed which involved comparing MicroBlaze
CPU cycles executing Snort port with general purpose processor CPU cycles executing
the same version of Snort.
Performance test of MMU-Snort II or Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA)
(Section 5.3) and MMU-Snort III (Section 6.4) is performed to determine the improve-
ment. This is carried out by obtaining the attack patterns memory space amount,
determining the effect of different hash functions and packet analysis throughput. The
memory space result and throughput results are compared with the state of the art
pattern matching systems (Section 6.4.2).
6.1 Chapter Roadmap
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows:
• In section 6.2, the experimental testbed network topology is explained which is
used for the testing of the prototype SB-NIDS and hardware accelerators.
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• In section 6.3, the SB-NIDS prototype or MMU-Snort I testing and evaluation
results are presented. The prototype solution is tested for functional and per-
formance test. The functional test is carried out to determine the correction
functionality. The performance test is carried out to identify the performance
improvement. This is carried out by counting CPU clock cycles. In the end the
FPGA synthesis results summary is presented.
• In final section 6.4, PMHA or MMU-Snort II and MMU-Snort III performance test-
ing and evaluation results are presented. The performance test involved memory
requirement test, throughput test, false positive rate test and FPGA design/space
test. Finally, the throughput and memory test is compared with state of the art
pattern matching solutions.
6.2 Experimental Testbed
The experimental testbed was prepared to carry out the system testing. This test
network consists of two PCs and RC300 board connected together as shown in figure 6.1.
PC1 
TCPReplay 
PC2 
Snort 2.6.1.5 
RC300 
Snort 2.6.1.5 
Figure 6.1: Topology of experimental test network
PC1 with Debian Linux 2.6.18 was installed with the TCPreplay (version 3.3.2) traffic
generator software. TCPreplay reads logged packet from a network trace file (tcpdump
format) and sends the packet through an Ethernet interface. PC2 with Ubuntu Linux
8.04 (2.6.25) was installed with Snort version 2.6.1.5 and the Performance Application
Programming Interface (PAPI) [118] in order to obtain an accurate processor execution
cycle count. The prototype system based on Snort version 2.6.1.5 implemented on
an RC300 board was also connected to the test bed. On MicroBlaze, an execution
cycles count is obtained using method (XTmrCtr GetValue (TmrInstance, TIMER ID))
defined in xtmrctr.h header files. The test network is a 100MB subnet that is private
and isolated from all other networks. The system is tested throughput against network
trace files from MIT Lincoln Lab’s 1998 DARPA offline Intrusion Detection evaluation
and from shmoo group capture the flag project [107, 119].
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6.3 Testing and Evaluation of Snort Port (MMU-Snort I)
First the MMU-Snort I functional test is performed and then the performance test. The
testing environment for both test is the same as shown in figure 6.1.
6.3.1 Functional Test
The functional testing was performed in two phases with two different configurations.
In the first phase, both systems were configured with the same Preprocessor compo-
nents (frag2, Stream4, Telnet, DNS and sfPortscan) and number of rules. They were
then tested twice against two different network trace files from MIT Lincoln Lab’s 1998
DARPA offline Intrusion Detection evaluation. In the second phase, again both systems
were tested twice with the same network trace file but each time configured with different
parameters. The first time both were configured for 5 Preprocessor components (frag2,
Stream4, DNS, Telnet, and HTTP Inspect) and 5320 rules. On the second time both
systems were configured for 6 Preprocessor components (frag2, Stream4, sfPortscan,
FTP, Telnet, DNS) and 4747 different rules.
For both phases of experiments the detection result summary (Protocols breakdown)
and alert messages generated by both systems are compared. It was observed that
both NIDS produced the same alert messages (Rule Security ID (SID)). The detection
summary also demonstrates that the types of packets analysed and number of alerts
generated were identical. Thus, the prototype passes the operational test.
6.3.2 Performance Test
Performance test helped to determine exactly the computationally significant part of
Snort source code as well as help in determining the packet analysis speed improvements.
This is actually determined by CPU cycles count test.
CPU Cycles count
MicroBlaze cycle count executing Snort port on RC300 board and PC with general
purpose processor executing original Snort package is obtained. Both systems were
configured with the same parameters and number of rules.
The system was tested against three different network trace files. Two of these files are
from MIT Lincoln Lab’s 1998 DARPA offline Intrusion Detection evaluation and one
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from shmoo group capture the flag project. Results obtained on both systems for all
three data files are shown in figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Snort CPU cycles comparison
The average CPU cycle count on the PC per packet is much higher than prototyped
Snort system on RC300 board. This is mainly because of differences in how packets
are captured due to the close coupling of the network interface on the FPGA board to
the MicroBlaze core and also due to some restructuring in the design. Another main
reason of lower clock cycle in Snort port on RC300 is the differences of prototype system
architecture. For example, MicroBlaze method OPBREADUINT32() to read 32 bit
data from SRAM require only 16 clock cycles over OPB Bus and MicroBlaze method
OPBWRITEUINT32() to write 32 bit data to SRAM requires only 19 clock cycles over
OPB Bus.
Lost CPU cycles
The above test presents the average CPU cycles consumed for packet analysis on both
architectures with three different data files. In order to identify the Snort code sections
that consume computationally significant portions of CPU cycles methods related to
packet capture, pattern matching, packet classification and packet decoding on both
architectures are instrumented. This experiment is conducted only for DARPA data file
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1 6.2. Figure 6.3 and 6.4 shows the average number of CPU cycles required per packet
for these main methods that usedSnortt for packet analysis.
Figure 6.3: CPU cycles count of Snort on PC
In these results the only major difference in the number of CPU cycles was noticed for
packet capture method. Packet capturing on PC requires copying of packet from kernel
memory to a user-level application buffer that normally consumes large number of CPU
cycles due to buffering and user-kernel protection mode switching. In contrast to the PC,
the packet capture method of prototype system requires only 1 clock cycle to capture
a packet byte from the Gigabit Ethernet interface and another cycle to store that byte
in SRAM. The number of CPU cycles required accessing SRAM from MicroBlaze over
the OPB Bus and to copy that byte to Snort application buffer on average requires
accurately 16 clock cycles. This may vary depending on the number of peripherals on
OPB bus.
It also observed that other methods on both architectures do not show any major differ-
ence in computational requirement in terms of the number of CPU cycles. However, it
is clear from results that the number of CPU cycles consumed for the same methods on
MicroBlaze is slightly lesser in number than that of Snort on PC. It is highly likely that
this slight different is due to differences in their hardware architectures as MicroBlaze
soft processor core on RC300 board is executing on tightly coupled environment where
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Figure 6.4: CPU cycles count of Snort on MicroBlaze
memory accesses only require tens of cycles. In contrast Snort on Intel Pentium platform
takes hundreds of CPU cycles just for single memory access.
Summaries of synthesis and place and route reports are presented in order to indicate
the utilisation of the FPGA device and the potential hardware still available for the
provision of functional units. The synthesis results obtained for final design on a clock
speed of 50 MHz are in figure 6.5.
Device Utilization Summary: 
Number of DCMs:                      2 out of 12     16% 
Number of External IOBs:           491 out of 824    59% 
Number of MULT18X18s:                7 out of 144     4% 
Number of Block RAM:                41 out of 144    28% 
Number of occupied SLICES:         4092 out of 33792  14% 
 
Figure 6.5: Synthesis result on Xilinx XC2V6000 -4 Virtex-II FPGA
This information shows that the current prototype on the FPGA only occupy 15% of
FPGA area, so more hardware such as pattern matching were easily fitted easily into
this design.
Chapter 6. Testing and Evaluation 135
6.4 Testing and Evaluation of Pattern Matching Hardware
Accelerator (MMU-Snort II and MMU-Snort III)
Only the performance test is carried out to determine the improvements of PMHA
developed for Snort-based SB-NIDS prototype or MMU-Snort I on RC300 board.
6.4.1 Performance Test
The performance test involved memory test, throughput test and false positive test. In
memory test the pattern memory space requirement is obtained and presented which
later also compared with state of the art solution (Section 6.4.2). The throughput test
is performed to identify the PMHA performance with/without application specific infor-
mation. This test result is also compared with state of the art solutions (Section 6.4.2).
False positive test involved determining false positive rate of Bloom filter. This included
measuring the hash function effect on actual false positive rate. Finally, FPGA design
space synthesis result is presented that shows the effect of efficient implementation of
hash function technique to compute large number of hash function.
Memory Test
The memory is the main component of the PMHA. Hence, it influences the acceler-
ator size and limits the throughput. Storing compactly all attack patterns is crucial
which can be achieved by either memory efficient data structure or by compression al-
gorithm. Instead of designing any new memory efficient algorithm a Bloom filter based
pattern matching filtering approach is used which results in significantly less memory
requirement as shown in the figure 6.6.
The Bloom filter approach resulted in compactly storing all 7876 patterns unique attack
pattern in just 0.0302 MB (247.50 Kbits) of FPGA block RAM (BRAM). So a large
number of patterns can be checked in packets with low latency access to FPGA local
memory which would increase the overall throughput of the system. In comparison to
the state machine based algorithm such as variants of Aho-Corasick that requires huge
amount of runtime memory. This occurs as their memory requirement increases linearly
with the number of characters in pattern set as shown in the figure 6.7.
This graph shows the linear increase of memory requirement of Aho-Corasick state
machine with the number of characters in pattern database. As the new unique pattern
added to the Snort database then it will result in increase of Aho-Corasick state machine
memory size and will also increase the pattern search time.
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Figure 6.6: Aho-Corasick state machine and pattern matching hardware accelerator
memory requirements
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Figure 6.7: Aho-Corasick (ac-standard) state machine memory size (MB) for different
character count
Clock Cycle count of MMU-Snort II
This test evaluates the PMHA performance in terms of number of clock cycles. The
clock cycles count results are then used to compute the throughput of the PMHA. This
system operates at 50 MHz clock frequency and tested with data from MIT Lincoln Lab
website and shmoo group capture the flag website. Table 6.1 shows the number of clock
cycles consumed by PMHA.
It is important to understand that the clock cycles count is heavily dependent on the
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Table 6.1: Clock cycle count of Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA)
Pattern Size
Total
Patterns
Packet
Trace
Bytes
Inspected
Clock Cycles
(Without Rule
Options)
Clock Cycles
(With Rule
Options)
< 16 bytes 3232
10 MBytes 597032 171683 148885
15 MBytes 980590 326902 277148
16 to 31 bytes 2590
27 MBytes 656432 193815 172745
30 MBytes 891343 237330 222835
32 to 64 bytes 1348
22 MBytes 234143 79323 71281
47 MBytes 959121 413232 361932
> 64 Bytes 706
62 MBytes 414010 162859 153337
35 MBytes 192121 80457 76848
Figure 6.8: PMHA throughput at 50 MHz for the test results in Table 6.1
nature of test data which may have high number of patterns with variable length. Due
to this reason the PMHA is tested each time for variable length patterns in order to
get the accurate performance results. From the test results it is observed that for
shorter size patterns (<16 bytes) search pattern matching algorithm consumes lesser
number of clock cycles. However, the performance of pattern matching degraded for
the longer size pattern (>64 bytes) search. The main reason of higher number of clock
cycle for longer patterns is the hash value computation and false positive pruning which
takes longer time for longer length pattern. This test result also revealed the effect of
application specific knowledge (Snort rule options). The inclusion of these Snort rule
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options specifies exactly the number of bytes of packet payload to search for patterns
instead of the whole packet payload. This means less number of hash computation,
Bloom filter lookup and false positive. The direct effect of all theses are lower number
of clock cycles and hence better throughput. Figure 6.8 shows the effective throughput
obtained for the clock cycles in table 6.1.
Pattern matching hardware throughput test results shows the best effective throughput
1.49 Gbps and the lowest throughput of 0.93 Gbps when PMHA operating at 50 MHz
clock frequency. Also it can be seen clearly that the PMHA with Snort rule options pro-
vide higher throughput pattern matching. Another performance test is carried out with
two MIT Lincoln lab data file and two defcon date file. This time the system is config-
ured/programmed with all 7876 Snort patterns and with rule options. Figure 6.9 shows
the throughput of pattern matching hardware operating at 50 MHz clock frequency.
Figure 6.9: Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA) throughput with total
7876 patterns
It can be notice that when the PMHA programmed with all 7876 Snort pattern and
with rule options provide much better throughput. The best throughput in this case is
obtained as 1.72 Gbps.
Clock Cycle count of MMU-Snort III
Another clock cycle count test is carried out to evaluate the performance of optimised
PMHA or MMU-Snort II (Section 5.4). This optimised hardware accelerator more effi-
ciently prune the false positive results and search the longer size patterns (> 64 bytes).
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Table 6.2 contains the comparison of the clock cycle count of pattern matching hardware
before optimisation (MMU-Snort II) and after optimisation (MMU-Snort III).
Table 6.2: Comparison of clock cycle count of PMHA before and after optimisation
Pattern Size
Total
Patterns
Packet
Trace
Bytes
Inspected
Clock Cycles
(Unoptimised)
Clock Cycles
(Optimised)
< 16 bytes 3232
10 MBytes 597032 148885 135193
15 MBytes 980590 277148 256932
16 to 31 bytes 2590
27 MBytes 656432 172745 169009
30 MBytes 891343 222835 200017
32 to 64 bytes 1348
22 MBytes 234143 304169 261121
47 MBytes 959121 217608 184678
It is observed from the test result that the MMU-Snort III improve the overall result
by searching variable size patterns with lesser number of clock cycles. This is mainly
due to efficient false positive pruning and faster optimised pattern matching for longer
size patterns. Throughput calculated based on these clock cycles clearly shows the
performance improvement as shown in figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10: PMHA throughput comparison before and after optimisation
There are not anymore longer size pattern (> 64 bytes) in this test as these patterns
has broken. Overall the throughput of PMHA shows the better performance for every
size patterns. Another test is carried to measure the throughput of pattern matching
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hardware after optimisation with total of 9150 Snort patterns which increases as a re-
sult of pattern breakup. This throughput is compared with the throughput obtained
previously with 7876 patterns as shown in figure 6.11.
Figure 6.11: PMHA throughput comparison before and after optimisation
Even with the increase in number of pattern and false positive rate the optimised PMHA
provide better pattern matching throughput. The best throughput observed in the
optimised PMHA for all 9150 Snort pattern is 1.85 Gbps.
False Positive Test
Two hash functions MD5 and XOR-based hardware hash function effect on Bloom filter
false positive rate are compared. MD5 is picked up for comparison as it produced well
distributed hash value. XOR-based hardware hash function is implemented in PMHA.
In order to test the effect of two different hash function on false positive rate a test
program is written in JAVA using jdk 1.6.0. The test program is executed on a computer
cluster at Manchester Metropolitan University for 48 hours. There were total of 7876
(n=7876) distinct patterns used to obtained false positive rate for different Bloom filter
sizes. Bloom filter sizes in this test range from 2 KiloBytes to 10 KiloBytes (m=16384
to m=81920 number of bits). For each Bloom filter, the test program randomly selected
the 90 % of patterns out of 7876 to insert/program into Bloom filters, and then the test
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program query the Bloom filters for the rest of 10 % patterns. This process is repeated
for 48 hours for each Bloom filter size for both hash functions. The final result shows
the comparison of false positive rate of each Bloom filter vector for both hash functions
and predicted false positive rate calculated with equation 5.1. Figure 6.12 shows the
result summary.
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Figure 6.12: False Positive vs Bloom filter size
For each Bloom filter query, the XOR-based hash function produced lower false positive
rates than MD5 hash function. Also XOR-based hash function produced better false
positive rate than predicted false positive rate with the exception when Bloom filter size
is set to 3 Kilobytes.
Another false positive test is carried out to analyse the practical false positive rate of
Bloom filter lookup in pattern matching hardware. The 8 KiloBytes (m=65535 bits)
Bloom filter programmed with 7876 number of patterns (n=7876) with a predicted false
positive rate of 1.8390 % calculated from equation 5.1. Table 6.3 shows the false positive
rate obtained for different network trace files.
Table 6.3: False positive rate of PMHA (MMU-SnortII) with 7876 patterns
Packet Trace Total Data
Pattern
Lookup
False
Positives
False Posi-
tive Rate
MIT Lincoln Lab 50 MBytes 40050 537 1.3408 %
MIT Lincoln Lab 100 MBytes 52541 793 1.5092 %
MIT Lincoln Lab 250 MBytes 72012 1116 1.5497 %
Defcon 20 MBytes 20150 282 1.3995 %
Defcon 12 MBytes 21020 336 1.5984 %
The false positive rate obtained from the test is lower and better than predicted false
positive rate. The best case false positive rate is 1.34 % which is approximately 1.37
times better than predicted false positive rate.
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The Snort pattern number has increased due to the pattern breakup so the optimised
PMHA is also tested for practical false positive rate of Bloom filter. The optimised
pattern matching hardware acceleration has 8 KiloBytes (m=65535 bits) Bloom filter
programmed with 9150 number of patterns (n=9150) with a predicted false positive
rate of 3.1667 % calculated from equation 5.1. Table 6.3 shows the false positive rate
obtained for different network trace files.
Table 6.4: False positive rate of PMHA (MMU-Snort III) with 9150 patterns
Packet Trace Total Data
Pattern
Lookup
False
Positives
False Posi-
tive Rate
MIT Lincoln Lab 50 MBytes 40050 1069 2.6691 %
MIT Lincoln Lab 100 MBytes 52541 1508 2.8701 %
MIT Lincoln Lab 250 MBytes 72012 2102 2.9189 %
Defcon 20 MBytes 20150 556 2.7593 %
Defcon 12 MBytes 21020 621 2.9543 %
The false positive rate obtained from the test is lower and better than predicted false
positive rate. The best case false positive rate is 2.66 % which is approximately 1.18
times better than predicted false positive rate.
FPGA Synthesis Results
Six pipelined hash functions are implemented separately to identify the FPGA design
space requirement for computing six hash values in parallel. Summary of the FPGA
synthesis results is shown in figure 6.13.
Device Utilisation Summary: 
Number of DCMs:   3    out of         12  25% 
Number of External IOBs:  324     out of         824  39% 
Number of MULTI8X18s:  7    out of         144  4% 
Number of Block RAM:  38    out of         144  26% 
Number of occupied SLICES: 13234     out of         33792  39% 
 
Figure 6.13: Synthesis result of six hash module on Xilinx XC2V6000 -4 Virtex-II
FPGA
The synthesis result of implementation which can compute N number of hash function
using only two hash is shown in figure 6.14.
This implementation has two hardware hash modules and one 2-to-N hash modules
(Section 5.3.3) to generate N number of hash values using two hash values. The 2-to-N
hash module is implemented in the PMHA to reduce the FPGA design space requirement
of hash function modules. This implementation use less block RAM and occupy less than
17 % of FPGA slices than the six hash module implementation. The final synthesis
results of PMHA integrated with Snort port on RC300 is shown in figure 6.15.
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Device Utilisation Summary: 
Number of DCMs:   2    out of         12  16% 
Number of External IOBs:  290     out of         824  35% 
Number of MULTI8X18s:  7    out of         144  4% 
Number of Block RAM:  24    out of         144  16% 
Number of occupied SLICES: 7591       out of         33792  22% 
 
Figure 6.14: Synthesis result of two hash module and 2-to-N hash module on Xilinx
XC2V6000 -4 Virtex-II FPGA
Device Utilisation Summary: 
Number of DCMs:   6    out of         12  50% 
Number of External IOBs:  523     out of         824  63% 
Number of MULTI8X18s:  7    out of         144  4% 
Number of Block RAM:  121    out of         144  84% 
Number of occupied SLICES: 27120     out of         33792  80% 
Figure 6.15: Synthesis result of full SB-NIDS prototype (MMU-Snort III) on Xilinx
XC2V6000 -4 Virtex-II FPGA
This synthesis result is obtained for a full prototype system which consists of PMHA,
packet capture hardware accelerator and Decision Engine hardware accelerator inte-
grated with Snort port on RC300 board. This information shows that the full prototype
on the FPGA occupy 80 % of FPGA area, so more hardware such as stateful packet
inspection hardware accelerator can still fitted into this design.
6.4.2 Comparison with Previous Work
In comparison to other state of the art this PMHA is memory efficient as it provides high
speed pattern lookup in Bloom filter programmed in FPGA BRAM. This comparison is
shown in table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA) Memory Size (Kbits)
Related Work
Snort
Patterns
FPGA
BRAM Size
(Kbits)
BRAM Used
(Kbits)
Gokhale et al [87] 1500-2000
Xilinx Virtex
1000 XCV1000
128 23.04
Sarang et al [81] 1434
Xilinx Virtex
XCV2000E
640 140
Attig & Lockwood [94] 2464
Xilinx Virtex
XCV2000E
640 568
PMHA
(MMU-Snort III)
9150
Xilinx Virtex-II
XC2V6000
324 180
The performance of pattern matching hardware is also compared with state of the art
pattern matching hardware solution. The performance is compared in terms of through-
put and design space/area of FPGA. Table 6.6 shows the throughput of different state of
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the pattern matching hardware and pattern matching hardware architecture on RC300
board.
Table 6.6: Pattern matching hardware architecture on FPGA
Related Work Snort Patterns Throughput
Gokhale et al [87] 1500-2000 2.0 Gbps
Yusuf et al [85] 74 2.8 Gbps
Attig & Lockwood [94] 2464 2.5 Gbps
PMHA (MMU-Snort III) 9150 1.85 Gbps
The throughput recorded for the proposed pattern matching hardware on RC300 board
is lower that other similar state of the art pattern matching hardware architecture. How-
ever, the lower throughout is due to operating frequency of 50 MHz which is maximum
possible achievable with MicroBlaze on RC300 board. Another reason of lower through-
put is the number of rules the system is tested with which in compare to other systems
is much higher than other pattern matching hardware architecture.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the detail testing and evaluation of the SB-NIDS prototype and
hardware accelerator. This chapter began with the introduction of testbed network
topology. This is followed by the testing and evaluation of novel SB-NIDS prototype.
The testing and evaluation involved functional and performance test. The functional test
is carried out to make sure the SB-NIDS work error free. The performance test identifies
the bottleneck and improvement of porting a system on high performance computing
platform. Finally, the PMHA testing and evaluation is presented which involved mainly
performance testing and comparison with state of the art pattern matching hardware
solution.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The objective of this thesis is the optimisation of Signature-based Network Intrusion De-
tection System (SB-NIDS) packet analysis speed using the high performance embedded
processing platform.
7.1 Chapter Summary
Low speed packet analysis of SB-NIDS becomes bottleneck on high data rate network.
Due to this reason various SB-NIDS solutions has been proposed. Some of these so-
lutions use high performance 6processing technology to optimise the SB-NIDS. These
technologies mainly include cluster of processors and embedded processing platforms.
Cluster of processors are expensive in terms of cost. Their maintenance cost are also
very high. In comparison embedded processing technologies are compact size. They of-
fer high performance processing and easy to deploy for network monitoring and surveil-
lance. Their maintenance cost is also lower in comparison to cluster of processors.
Therefore, the embedded processing technology is viable and so chosen to develop and
optimise SB-NIDS. The embedded technology used is FPFA-MicroBlaze based hybrid
hardware-software processing platform. It is tightly coupled hardware architecture with
two gigabit Ethernet network interfaces. It also provide ways to offload processing from
processor to hardware and has multiple processing cores. Due to these features it is an
ideal platform for SB-NIDS prototyping and optimisation which is the subject of this
thesis research. In summary, Introduction chapter 1 introduces this research, contains
the problem statement, aims and objectives, outcome and contribution of this research.
Background chapter 2, is the study of the core concepts related to this research. This
includes an overview of network security issues and network defence technologies. The
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main emphasise is on SB-NIDS network defence technology to highlight limitations and
issues concerning this technology which is the main motivation of this research.
Survey and Related Work chapter 3 is the detail survey of the related work to this
thesis. This survey is organised into two parts: i) High performance SB-NIDS architec-
ture and ii) Pattern matching for SB-NIDS. The first part is dedicated to the state of
the art SB-NIDS solutions proposed for performing high speed packet analysis. These
state of the art SB-NIDS solutions are implemented using cluster of processors and em-
bedded processing hardware architecture. The conclusion of this part of survey found
that SB-NIDS implementation using embedded processing platforms is viable solution
as compare to cluster of processors. They are lower cost and offer ease of deployment,
maintenance and further development. The second part is dedicated to state of the
art pattern matching algorithms and hardware architecture for SB-NIDS. The state of
the art pattern matching is logically organised into three categories: i) SB-NIDS spe-
cific pattern matching, ii) packet filtering technique and iii) High performance pattern
matching hardware architecture. SB-NIDS specific pattern matching algorithms are hy-
brid pattern matching algorithms developed by combining state machine and skip table
search technique. Packet filtering techniques are algorithms for filtering as much net-
work traffic as possible in order to reduce the amount of traffic to be sent for analysis in
SB-NIDS. Pattern matching is implemented using high performance embedded process-
ing architecture. Two high performance processing platforms used to implement pattern
matching are Network processors and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). In
all implementations FPGA based designs provide better and high throughout pattern
matching solutions. The average throughput observed is well over 1.0 Gbps.
Proposed System Architecture chapter 4 contains the study to identify the development
challenges and requirements. To pursue this effort SB-NIDS software package Snort and
high performance embedded processing hardware architecture HandelC-MicroBlaze is
studied and discussed. This study helped to understand the SB-NIDS internal working
and processing architecture. It also help identifying performance issue and formulating
plan for SB-NIDS development and performance optimisation as explained in chapter 5.
Design and Implementation chapter 5 contains the detail system design and imple-
mentation which is carried out in three stages resulted in three system prototypes: i)
Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU-Snort I), ii) MMU-Snort II and iii) MMU-
Snort III. MMU-Snort I is the novel SB-NIDS prototype based on Snort developed on
Mentor Graphics RC300 board. The prototyping involved Snort internal architecture
restructuring and mapping/porting to HandelC-MicroBlaze based architecture. This
prototyped executes only on single MicroBlaze core with two HandelC hardware ac-
celerator units: Packet Capture Hardware Accelerator (PCHA) and Decision Engine
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Hardware Accelerator (DEHA). PCHA is the high speed and low latency packet cap-
turing facility that captures packets directly from one of the gigabit Ethernet interface
on RC300 board. DEHA is the replacement of Snort’s Decision Engine component. Its
job is to send the detection results through second gigabit Ethernet interface on RC300
board for reporting to Network Administrator. MMU-Snort I is the first ever such
SB-NIDS that utilises hybrid hardware-software embedded processing platform power.
It is faster when performance is compared with the Snort on general purpose proces-
sor. MMU-Snort II is the Pattern Matching Hardware Accelerator (PMHA). PMHA
is implemented with Bloom filter based pattern search approach. It is improved and
better pattern search algorithm design than other Bloom filter based pattern matching
implementations. PMHA novel features are integrated pattern matching hardware with
Snort port on MicroBlaze, compact storage of largest number of attack patterns (9150
patterns) in FPGA local memory, and lower number of pattern lookup in Bloom filter
achieved by using Snort application specific knowledge (Snort rule options). MMU-
Snort III is the PMHA optimised and extended version. This optimisation involved
an algorithmic and architectural improvement for efficient pattern pruning and faster
longer size patterns (> 64 bytes) search. Efficient patterns pruning technique is achieved
by utilising Snort attack rules unique identification number (Rule ID). Using Rule ID
for pattern pruning lowers the number of pattern comparisons and resulted in faster
pruning. For faster longer size pattern (> 64 bytes) search, all over 64 bytes pattern
is broken down. If the first part of the longer pattern is match with packet data after
comparing using pattern comparator then the second part is checked in Bloom filter,
otherwise the search is stop. Efficient pruning and faster longer pattern search result
in increase of pattern matching throughput. Finally, the testing of all prototypes are
carried out which is explained in Results and Analysis chapter 7.
Results and Analysis chapter 7 contains the testing and evaluation of all three pro-
totypes. MMU-Snort I is tested with publicly available test data (MIT Lincoln Lab
and Defcon Shmoo group) to identify any functional issues and performance improve-
ment. Functional test results showed the correction detection result of network packet
analysis. The performance result of MMU-Snort I on hybrid hardware-software embed-
ded processing platform is compared with the Snort performance on general purpose
processor on personal computer. It was concluded that Snort port on RC300 board
(MMU-Snort I) performance is 1.7 times better than original unmodified Snort software
package on general purpose processor. This difference is due to the tightly coupled
hardware architecture of embedded processing platform. Also PCHA and DEHA also
improved the overall speed of the packet analysis speed. The test results also indicated
the computationally intensive operations of Snort. These include pattern matching algo-
rithm, Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) and packet classification. MMU-Snort II which
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is the PMHA integrated with MMU-Snort I is tested with publicly available test data to
identify performance improvement. The test results showed that at 50 MHz operating
frequency the highest and lowest throughput of 1.72 Gbps and 1.23 Gbps respectively
when 7876 Snort attack pattern is searched in packet. Another throughput test for
varying length patterns indicated the lower throughput for pattern matching for longer
size pattern (> 64 bytes). The throughout dropped to 0.86 Gbps in this case. Fur-
ther throughput test is conducted to evaluate application specific knowledge inclusion
in search algorithm. The throughout result clearly indicated better results for pattern
matching algorithm with application specific knowledge (Snort rule options) which is one
of the major contribution of this research. The false positive test results also showed
the better performance of MMU-Snort II. The best false positive rate found was 1.34 %
which is 1.37 times lower than predicted rate of 1.83 %. MMU-Snort III which is the
final prototype with optimised PMHA is also evaluated with some series of test. The
optimised PMHA offers efficient pattern pruning and faster longer pattern search. The
throughput results with 9150 attack patterns at 50 MHz operating frequency shows the
increase in best case throughout from 1.72 Gbps to 1.85 Gbps. The lowest case through-
put also increased from 1.23 Gbps to 1.41 Gbps. This PMHA also supports highest
number of 9150 Snort attack patterns. All these patterns are compactly stored for quick
lookup in 8 KB (64 Kbits) of FPGA Block Random Access Memory (BRAM). Even
with such a high number of attacks pattern FPGA synthesis result summary of PMHA
shows only 180 Kbits of FPGA BRAM usage. The final prototype MMU-Snort III
FPGA synthesis result summary shows the whole design occupy 80 % of FPGA logic
resources and 84 % of BRAM (272 Kbits). MMU-Snort III comprises of PMHA, PCHA
and DEHA integrated with Snort port executing on MicroBlaze. The test results also
compared with the closely related work and appeared to have lower performance in
terms of throughput. Main reason is the lower operating frequency achievable on this
grade of FPGA with MicroBlaze. In comparison the FPGA used for pattern matching
implementation in closely related work are higher grade and so support higher frequency
and pattern matching throughput. Another reasons for lower operating frequency is the
HandelC hardware description language. It requires extensive source code level refine-
ment to reduce the hardware design complexity and to synthesise efficiently at higher
operating frequency. In summary, HandelC is slower than other lower level Hardware
description language like Verilog. It also demands extensive and time consuming source
code refinement in order to achieve modest operating frequency.
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7.2 Overall Conclusion
The primary objective of this thesis is the development of optimised SB-NIDS design
which has been achieved and advanced the state of the art. The novel MMU-Snort III
developed on tightly coupled hybrid hardware-software embedded processing architec-
ture is the final version of SB-NIDS. It consists of three HandelC hardware accelerators:
PCHA, DEHA, PMHA, while the rest of the Snort port executes on single MicroBlaze
core. PCHA provides low latency and fast packet capturing facility. DEHA is the lighter
version and replacement of Snort’s Decision Engine component which provides fast in-
trusion analysis result reporting. PMHA is the high speed pattern matching solution
for faster attack pattern search in packet. Series of test results shows improved overall
performance indicating higher throughput and lower false positive rate. However, when
throughput compared with closely related state of the art work it is lower than most
them, but offers well above and one of the highest number of 9150 attack pattern search
which also compactly stored in FPGA BRAM. FPGA device utilisation summary shows
the MMU-Snort III prototype utilised 80 % of FPGA logic resources and 84 % of FPGA
BRAM leaving very limited resources for further optimisation.
Let suppose MMU-Snort III design has migrated to high end Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA and
assume final FPGA device summary result shows only 50 % of FPGA logic resources
and FPGA BRAM usage providing opportunity for further optimisation. What could be
the next possible optimisation target? There are few attractive choices but the two most
useful candidates are offloading of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet analy-
sis or Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) from MicroBlaze to FPGA and exploitation of
multiple processing resources to increase the overall efficiency of packet processing. SPI
demands fast packet processing and frequent data memory access. It involve computing
hash values on key packet header values (IP addresses and ports) of every incoming
packet and using hash value it lookup on TCP connection table which normally stores
in application memory or Random Access Memory (RAM) in order to determine packet
association with established connection. Packet with the same IP address and ports
are hashed to the same memory location and in this way packet can be identified as
a part of connection. Offloading SPI to FPGA would benefit FPGA fast memory ac-
cess and parallel processing feature. This would significantly increase overall packet
analysis speed. Also SPI is comparatively simple process than pattern matching and
so SPI hardware accelerator would only consume very limited FPGA logic resources.
For example, hash value computation on FPGA is a straight forward operation which
can easily be computed on key packet header values (IP address and port number) in
around 5-10 clock cycles, while another 2 clock cycles for accessing off-chip memory on
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this hybrid hardware-software platform to access TCP connection table for retrieving or
storing connection information.
Another option which is now going to be discussed is the usage of parallel processing
available in the form of multiple MicroBlaze core. The biggest question that arises is
which part of SB-NIDS and how to execute these parts on multiple MicroBlaze core.
According to SB-NIDS architecture and execution analysis it was identified that there
are some SB-NIDS components that are independently process the data without relying
on any other components. Each of these components can be assigned a separate Mi-
croblaze core for processing. These SB-NIDS components are SB-NIDS Preprocessor.
Some of these are Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) Preprocessor, Domain Name
System (DNS) Preprocessor, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Preprocessor, File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) Preprocessor and Telnet Preprocessor. These Preprocessor
perform packet analysis only on particular part of decoded packet data. They simply
take input the decoded data, process them and give the output which is the detection re-
sult summary. Assigning these Preprocessor a separate MicroBlaze core would certainly
increase the overall efficiency of packet processing. The implementation of such effort
would be highly complex. It would require major architectural changes of the current
MMMU-Snort III prototype.
There are other limitation exists in final MMU-Snort III prototype. These are the
limitations that could also be the candidate for further research and development. These
now discuss in the following section 7.3.
7.3 Limitations and Future Directions
This section will briefly examine further future research directions resulting from the
work presented in this thesis.
7.3.1 Regular Expression Search
Mitra et al and Brodie et al presented the FPGA hardware architecture to perform
regular expression based search [102, 103]. These hardwares are designed to search
the malicious patterns in network packets up to gigabit rate throughput. Mitra et al
hardware architecture addressed the issue of regular expression search of Snort attack
rules. This idea can be applied to the PMHA for Snort presented in this thesis. This will
also enable the first full Snort port on hybrid hardware-software processing to perform
not only ordinary pattern matching in FPGA but also a regular expression search which
is an integral part of pattern search of Snort.
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The regular expression search can be implemented using one of the same approaches
that have been applied consistently in previous work on ordinary pattern matching.
Implementing them in FPGA is rather challenging due to limited amount of memory and
design space. One of the widely used approach is state machine implementation where
regular expression based search can be based on and search is carried out in parallel
using FPGA parallel logic resources as proposed by Mitra et al. Bloom filter based
search approach can also be applied for regular expression search in which characters
that are specifically specified in regular expression are check in packet data using Bloom
filter. In case all specified characters in a pattern is found then in next step wild card
character search is carried out either with brute force searching or using state machine
based approach. Whatever the type of search technique is applied to regular expression
search in FPGA it should result in fast and high throughput solution provided it is
implemented efficiently so can be synthesized at high clock rate.
7.3.2 Non-Interruptible Update
In order for SB-NIDS to be effective it needs to have updated attack signature list. The
signature update requires copying of new signatures to SB-NIDS files and restarting a
SB-NIDS software package. During this process SB-NIDS does not able to inspect any
network traffic leaving large number of packets to enter into network without inspection.
An alternate is to have multiple SB-NIDS deployment on a network while one is being
updated then other inspects the network traffic. This is rather expensive solution and
the best option is to have non-interruptible update facility where the same SB-NIDS
continued the network traffic inspection while signature database is being updated with
new signatures.
Non-interruptible update facility is difficult to implement in SB-NIDS software. On
hybrid hardware-software processing platform this is further challenging as part of sig-
natures known as patterns stored in RC300 board off-chip Synchronous Dynamic Ran-
dom Access Memory (SDRAM) as well as in FPGA BRAM. Rest of the signature parts
are stored in MicroBlaze memory. Viable solution on this platform is FPGA hardware
functional unit which will promptly update the signature in both SDRAM and FPGA
BRAM. Also fundamental changes in MMU-Snort III would also be required, such as
Bloom filter needs to change to counting Bloom filter which allows pattern addition
and deletion. MicroBlaze memory or Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) is tricky
to perform signature update. Only way to do this successfully is to create a copy of
updated signatures data structure in memory and overwrite it to the original signature
memory. This is the complicated task and may cause SB-NIDS to stop search for a short
interval of time, possibly few seconds which would result few packets un-inspected.
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7.3.3 Packet filtering
In chapter 3 3 some state of the art work are discussed that applied the packet filtering
techniques to SB-NIDS in order to optimised NIDS pattern matching algorithm perfor-
mance. Packet filtering can also be applied to the MMU-Snort III as well. Packet filter-
ing implementation is more appropriate and effective. For example, a filtering system
quickly checks the encapsulated protocols in packets and filter them if no network/ap-
plication/operating system is processing such packet. These packets do not required
analysis and cannot harm the network.
7.4 Final Comments
MMU-SnortIII is a complete SB-NIDS prototype developed on high performance hybrid
hardware-software embedded processing platform using state of the art Snort SB-NIDS
software package. Unlike previous state of the art solutions that have limited threat
detection features this SB-NIDS prototype has one of the effective detection facility
provided by Snort. It effectively analyses many different types of protocol (Layer-3
to Layer-7 of Open System Interconnection (OSI) layer) and able to detect many new
attacks due to regular signature database updates release. Also the processing platform
high performance processing facility has been exploited during prototype development
which resulted in improvement of packet analysis speed. A novel hardware accelerator
of pattern matching is also developed that boosted the packet analysis speed. The
novel feature of this hardware accelerator is the first ever integrated PMHA to full SB-
NIDS software package. Another novel feature which proved successful in improving the
packet analysis speed is the use of application specific knowledge (Snort rule options).
This reduces the number of pattern search and so lower the search computation time.
It also supports one of the largest databases of attack patterns (9150) search which
it stores compactly in FPGA BRAM for quick pattern search. It also offers a decent
throughput of 1.85 Gbps operating at 50 MHz of clock frequency. The lower frequency is
the limitation imposed by the development platform otherwise this hardware accelerator
itself without MicroBlaze on the same grade FPGA can be synthesized at 80 MHz.
The final MMMU-Snort III prototyped is far from perfect and has limitations (Sec-
tion 7.3). One of the concerns is related to the development platform which has lower
grade Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA and does not support higher operating frequency and lim-
ited FPGA design/space. MMU-Snort III performance can be boost up to 10 times
if design is migrated the high end Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA which would easily able to
synthesise the design over 650 MHz operating frequency. In summary, MMU-Snort III
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on hybrid hardware-software processing platform is found to be a well suited platform
for SB-NIDS performance optimisation and this prototype can serve as a platform for
further research and development for SB-NIDS performance optimisation.
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